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Background, Motivations and
Literature
...the shores of the Caspian were beginning to give a great advantage to the
caravan routes... costly wares of India, silk from China and precious goods of
Cathay provinces... no day in the year passes that there do not enter the city
1000 cart-loads of silk alone...
(From Marco Polo's The Travels to Central Asia via Silk Road during 1272-95)
Historically, the current Central Asian Region comprising the territories of Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, has been integrated into world
trade in a variety of ways. The remarkable example is the Great Silk Road when Central
Asia (CA) served as a bridge by connecting the civilizations of the East Asian, South
Asian, Mediterranean, African and European regions through the exchange of goods, tech-
nologies, art, knowledge and religion for over 2000 years. Without going back to the
period of the Great Silk Road integration, the last regional integration of the CA na-
tions that had practical rather than formal significance was the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) that, besides five CA nations, also included 10 other Soviet Social-
ist Republics, namely, current Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. During the USSR period, CA experienced mas-
sive industrialization, migration and collectivization reforms that substantively changed
the relationships among the CA nations. However, despite having strong political ideology
and planned economy, for the same reasons the Soviet Union collapsed into the Common-
wealth Independent States (CIS)1. Since then, for over 20 years, CA has developing as
separate economies, namely, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turk-
menistan. Even though the region is well endowed with energy resources, minerals and
land, and has a strategic geographic location to develop trade between Europe and Asia,
CA hasn't turned into another the Great Silk Road yet. The CA economies separately are
1The CIS has 9 official members (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) and two unofficial members (Turkmenistan and Ukraine). Georgia was
CIS member during 1993-2008 period.
1
weak competitors with giant neighbors like China and Russia. Intra-regional CA relation-
ships are complicated, and established regional organizations work only on paper mainly
because CA economies compete in similar category of goods and services. There are a
lot more factors that negatively affect the regional development of theCA economies and a
possible solution is seen in uniting the CA countries under a single regional economic block
which could give them some weight to have even negotiations with their giant neighbors
and strengthen their economies. In the last decade, China is progressively entering the CA
market with its investments for extraction of raw materials and building energy pipelines.
The EU is getting closer to the CA borders too with its eastward enlargement. In response,
Russia, which is slowly losing its regional economical and political influence, is trying to re-
establish its economic relationship with CIS members by forming the Eurasian (Re)Union.
However at the moment the formation of the union is only separating the CA nations into
two blocs rather than reuniting them. On one side, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan which
are pro-Eurasian integration. So far only Kazakhstan is taking part in the Eurasian Union
(along with Belarus), and Kyrgyzstan is also aiming to join soon. On the other side, Tajik-
istan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, concerned about their sovereignty, but from those
other CAs only Tajikistan show some interest to the Eurasian Union. Regional deeper in-
tegration of the CA nations is preferable but whether the Eurasian integration with Russia
would be beneficial for them requires comprehensive analysis. To provide some clarity to
the CA issue, there is a need for analysis of the past (Soviet) regional integration experience
of CA countries, with specific focus on Soviet CA-Russia relationship, and analysis of post-
Soviet relations of CA with Russia. This is the general motivation of this thesis. Further
in this section, the background of the CA transitional economies is provided followed by
the motivations for the three specific issues of our analysis, and also a review of theoretical
and methodological aspects. As we note the object of our research is regional economic
relations of CA countries; however, it will be better to examine the background of CA
countries in the context of the CIS. CA countries shared common historical economic ties
as USSR members (for 70 years), started the transition from planned to market oriented
one during the same period of time (in early 1990s), and still have more socio-economic
relations.
0.1 Background of CA regional trade relations
In this section, the main aspects of CA regional economic development are viewed as
transition patterns, trade openness, trade specializations and regional trade relations in
the post-Soviet era.
2
CA economies in the post-Soviet period
In the 1990s, the termination of the centrally planned economy, and reorganization of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) into the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) gave CA countries an opportunity to develop their national economies where
the main factor for their economic development was their endowment level of natural and
human resources. However, some members of CIS such as Kazakhstan possess large amont
of natural reserves, some others like Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan don't. CIS countries have
had to go through a transitional recession period in the 1990s, and economic boom during
2000s if to ignore global crisis of 2008. In Table 1 and Table 2 present changes in import
and export volumes, respectively, over 1993-2011 period. For instance, trade volumes for
Kazakhstan reduced by 20-30% level in 1994, than reduction in trade by 6-8% in 1999 and
also in 2009 by 11-26%. However, except those 2-3 years, trade volume of Kazakhstan was
constantly improving by average of 15% per year. Such trends are observable for all CIS
countries. The downturn in trade volumes for CIS countries which are caused by economic
cataclisms such as 'transition shock' of early years of post-Soviet period, Russian crisis of
1999 and the global crisis of 2008.Despite losses in trade in those years, overall percentage
growth for exports is +135 % and imports is +169 % in U.S. dollar terms for the period
1993-2011. The data starts from 1993 because data for early transition period (1989-92)
had some statistical distortions such as deviations from world prices, hyperinflation and
multiple administered exchange rates.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, trade policies of CA countries changed in a
somewhat heterogeneous manner, firstly, because the level of resource endowments varies
across CA countries which serves as the comparative advantage in trade and as the main
factor of economical development, and, secondly, because the sharp fluctuations in world
prices and demand for various exporting CA goods over the transition period. Oil is the
prime exporting good for Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and was the major factor for their
quick economic growth during the second decade of transition, 2000-2010. Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan are rich in natural gas and seek ways to export it under long-term contracts
to neighboring regions. The transport network is important for CA countries since they are
landlocked and it is costly for them to export their goods to other regions, though, oil and
gas are mostly transported through pipelines. Thus, the question of whether long term
agreements for gas/oil supply will be obtained is of the first importance and concluded
or not is of the second importance. Mineral rich areas are Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan,
especially for gold. Tajikistan as well as Kyrgyzstan have a huge amount of fresh water
3
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resources that could supply the entire CA region and with energy as well due to their
hydroelectric advancements. However, water usage is two-sided problem for the region,
especially for main cotton producers, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where, at one side,
use of water for cotton production is the cause for ecological problems (drought and soil
erosion), and, on the other side, reduction of water use could cause economical problems
(unemployment) since cotton production is the main source of income and it is labor
intensive sector.
In the 2000s, the CA economies started developing very quickly and the rapid growth
of GDP was 7% on average for CA until 2008. Although energy endowed CA developed
quicker than non-energy ones. With the rise of prices and world demand for energy and non-
energy raw materials, the export of those materials has benefited the region substantially,
in particular, for oil-exporting Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan which profited from their oil
contracts, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan from gas contracts. However, Kyrgyzstan
had difficulties in negotiating on the rent of its mineral rich lands by foreign companies.
Yet, Russia accounts for some 60% of economic activity with the comparatively large size
of its territory, as well as human and natural resources. The export oriented improvements
of the CIS region helped to provide sufficient conditions to develop small and medium sized
business and strengthen the regional trade system.
In the 2010s, with introduction of the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), economic ac-
tivity within the ECU was increased with annual growth of GDP at 4% on average and
short term growth of intra-union trade by 20-30% on average. However, similar patterns in
growth were observed in the CIS region as a whole which could be linked with the recovery
process from the 2008 global financial crisis. Export and import of the ECU members
with non-ECU regions have declined. Additionally, since the economy of Kazakhstan and
Belarus are relatively smaller than Russian (about ten times), with establishment of the
ECU, the price for consumer goods increased in Kazakhstan, especially for imported con-
sumer goods from non-ECU countries. Some acceleration of inflation rate in Kazakhstan
and Belarus was observed. During the same time, other CIS members, Turkmenistan
has enlarged its export of natural gas, Azerbaijan's oil production has slowed down with
repairments of some platforms, and the agriculture sector in Armenia was rebounded sig-
nificantly. Russian - EU relations worsened due to Ukraine which chose not to take a part
in the ECU and further economic integration with Russia. Currently, Russia (along with
other ECU members) is experiencing some negative impact of Western economic sanctions
coming through financial means.
Intra-industry trade between Russia and CA: Grubel-Lloyd Index
The comparison of intra-industry trade between CA and Russia in Soviet and post-Soviet
years shows that in current trade and trade-production relations between the regions have
6
high correlation and imply that Soviet ties are still exist. In Table 3, we provide with
Grubel-Lloyd indices2 representing intra-industry trade shares of each CA with Russia
at the end of USSR period (where for 90% trade has been accomplished with Russia)
and the indices for three group of post-Soviet periods (i.e., 1997-99, 2000-09 and 2010-
12). Shadowed areas show the bias (or specialisation) in production and trade of each
CA country and Russia. Most of the specializations we observe in post-Soviet period are
quite similar to trends were observed during Soviet years (although we only looking at
intra-industry trade for the latest decade of the Soviet Union). As seen from the table,
Kazakhstan still specialises in electricity, coal, metals, chemicals, machine building, food
products (although we know that Kazakhstan is oil exporter however the data from WITS
doesn't reflect it); Uzbekistan is still mainly supply natural gas (to Russia from Soviet build
Centralnyi channel), but also electro-energy, machinery, textile products; Kyrgyzstan
is still due to climatic advantages and geographic features specialise in foodstuff, mining
(especially gold) and textile produce (however, oil and some mining industries have stopped
their work right during USSR collapse years); Turkmenistan is still biased toward oil and
gas (as Uzbekistan uses Centralnyi gas channel interchangeably), chemicals, wood and
cotton goods production; Tajikistan has similar trade patterns as during Soviet years in
light and food industry products, nonferrous products (such as aluminum) and also hydro-
electro energy.
There are two issues to mention regarding consistency of indices presented in Table 3.
First, we are comparing share of specific sector trade (i.e., total trade flow of a CAC in a
specific sector over total trade flow of USSR in that sector.) with Grubel-Lloyd indices for
three post-USSR period (1997-99; 2000-09; and 2010-12). Ideally, we would want to obtaine
GLIs, however, there are rare trade data available on bilateral trade of USSR period, so
we used official USSR statistical data provided by GosKomStat (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet
Statistiki) in USSR ruble terms. The other issue had to do with sectoral aggregation. Data
for post-USSR period on trade flows were given at one type of standardized classification
of traded goods by sectors which aren't the same for the data at sectoral level for USSR
period. In order to bring them together at some comparable level, trade flow data on
post-USSR period had to be aggregated by the same sectors given in the USSR trade data.
Trade openness of CIS countries
According to Elbourgh-Woytek [51], trade openness of the CA region increased substan-
tially from 5% to 15% over in the first five years of CIS (1992-97). Then, with the crisis
2To construct Grubel-Lloyd indices for 11 main aggregate sectors we used bilateral USSR trade data
from the GOSSTATCOM (Gosudarstnyi Statisticheski Commitet) database, and aggregated bilateral trade
data for the same country pairs and sectoral split for 1997-2012 years is from the WITS database.
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Table 3: Comparing Soviet Intra-Industry trade shares with Post-Soviet Grubel-Lloyd
Indexes
8
Figure 1: Comparison of CA Trade Openness with CIS, CEE and EU level
Source: Modified from Elborgh-Woytek [51]
in 1998, it declined and, following quick recovery, it went up to average 10-12% percent
for the beginning of 2000s. The distribution of openness varies across the CA countries
significantly. Openness to trade is higher for Kazakhstan and Tajikistan relative to the
other CA countries. In general average level of trade openness of CA was at the similar
average level of the other CIS countries.
However, comparing to other regions, aggregate CA openness is two-fold smaller than
in CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) and fivefold smaller than of the EU (Figure 1 ). The
reasons for the low level of openness can be the level of GDP growth, the depreciation of the
real exchange rate, possible trade and non-trade barriers, trade diversion from CIS region to
non-CIS region (which hasn't compensated for the previous level of income). The openness
to trade might have to do not only with openness of trade policies of CA countries but
with geography as well. The landlocked location of CA countries incur additional costs to
access sea ports of neighboring coastal countries. The non-traded barriers of CA countries,
which are due to non unified trade regimes and policies with different trade restriction
measures require additional payments associated with protection of domestic producers
and discrimination of producers from another CA country. There is a strong correlation
between political regime and trade policies of CA countries where both, the regime and the
9
policies, varies from more liberal, as in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, to more restrictive,
as in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
The CAC faced huge trade and production hardships with the Soviet collapse and sub-
sequent hyperinflation in 1991-1996. Within a year of independence trade with Russia fell
tenfold (Sinitsina, [167]). Later, in 1998-1999, CAC were hit by the Russian financial crisis.
Despite these circumstances, these countries were already beginning to diverge in terms of
international integration  particularly, though not exclusively with Russia. Already by
1998 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had joined several major RTAs with Rus-
sia, including the CISFTA in 1994, the EurAsEc (Eurasian Economic Community) and
the SCO (Shangai Cooperation Organization) in 1996 while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
were only observers. CA trade with Russia was damaged substantially by the 1998 crisis,
especially for those countries which had engaged in integration (Westin, 1999). The more
isolationist Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had less exposure. The period 2000-2007 was
more fruitful as world prices for the CA's primary export goods (oil, gas, cotton) accel-
erated and volumes of trade and FDI inflows, mainly from China and Europe, increased.
The main beneficiaries were more open economies, but Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also
benefited from a global boom and increasing global gas demand, negotiating with China
and Iran to reduce their dependence on the Russian market. The 2008 crisis had both
direct and indirect effects on the CA trade and economic well-being. The exposure of
Kazakhstan's banks to the global financial crisis spread to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which had more limited financial links with other CAC,
Russia and rest of the world were originally less affected by the crisis.
Main areas of Specialization of CIS countries
The specialization of CA countries depends on the mix of resource endowments, geograph-
ical location and relationship with other regions, especially with Russia and other former
CIS countries. The main specializations of CA countries show some overlap with trade spe-
cializations in several sectors (Table 4). The Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan economies rely
on oil and gas export and optimal geographic location to trade; Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan deal with production of cotton as they have convenient climate and wa-
ter resources; Kyrgyzstan has major gold mines, strategic mineral reserves, production of
wool, and benefit from tourism; Tajikistan possesses the water resources that are essential
for cotton production of neighboring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
In terms of the specialization of CA and Russia in CA-Russia trade, Central Asia
specializes in exporting to Russia products such as oil and gas (from Kazakhstan, Turk-
menistan & Uzbekistan), ferrous and non-ferrous metals (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kaza-
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Table 4: Main areas of trade and production specialization
Source: Frienkman, Polyakov and Revenco [66]
11
khstan), agricultural raw materials (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan), radioactive
and chemical elements (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan & Uzbekistan), cotton fibre and textile
goods (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan & Uzbekistan), chemical products (Uzbekistan & Kaza-
khstan), machines and equipments (Kyrgyzstan & Uzbekistan). Russia exports products
such as energy products (to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan & Uzbekistan), food stuff (Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan & Uzbekistan), fabrics and clothing products (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
& Uzbekistan), metals (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan), agricultural raw materials (Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan), machinery and transportation equipment (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan & Uzbek-
istan). Some studies explain such a trade pattern on the basis of physical charachteristics
such as resource endowments, comparative advantage in producing certain types of goods,
geographic and climatic conditions. This is indeed true. In fact, Kazakhstan & Turk-
menistan, & Uzbekistan are well endowed with oil and gas; a convenient climate allows
Turkmenistan & Uzbekistan to produce goods made of cotton fibre, Kazakhstan grain
and Kyrgyzstan & Uzbekistan fruits and vegetables; Kyrgyzstan has some gold mines and
mineral reserves; Tajikistan possesses the water resources to generate electro-energy.
CA regional trade partnership
The trade pattern in the CA region is a complex scheme with many spokes and hubs
(ADB, [187]), and it depends on many factors that could give a regional community new
possible ways to increase their trade volumes and create new jobs. The complexity in
trade relations of CA is the result of the pursuit of gains by individual countries rather
than gains for the region. As all CA countries are landlocked, for away from the major
world trade markets. It is important for CA to have access to the sea transport system
(which is cheaper than overland transportation), and access to the transportation related
infrastructure of other CIS (especially to Russian) to transit traded goods (Grigoriou,
[69]). In overland transportation the most convenient transport means is rail, however,
the gauge of railways build in Soviet period is different from the gauge size of railways of
other regions. A further issue in formation of current regional trade is the heterogeneity
in trade relation reforms undertaken, adopted different technical, production, sanitary and
other standards and measures in CA that created extra trade obstacles too. There are also
political, institutional and other aspects that other studies find (Pomfret, [136]; Auty, [10];
WB, [193]).
Since the 1990s, CA countries have joined several major trade partnerships that show a
clear bias toward the CIS region (see Figure 2 ). This is mostly explained by the historical
coexistence and inherited economic ties from the Soviet era of CA with other CIS members,
especially with Russia. Some of the main established RTAs that involve all or part of the
CA countries are The CIS Free Trade Area (CIS-FTA), The Eurasian Economic Commu-
nity (EurAsEC), The Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), Shanghai
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Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), the Single Eco-
nomic Space (SES) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). The CIS-FTA was created
in 1994 and covers all the CIS countries, and, in 2009, only eight of its members (Kaza-
khstan, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine) have
agreed to launch the CIS FTA in 2011, and the other CIS countries (Azerbaijan, Uzbek-
istan and Turkmenistan) have not joined and playing the role of observers. The EurAsEC
was established by Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus in 1996. In 2001, these three coun-
tries as well as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a treaty to organize a common system
of water and energy use. The CAREC was the only organization that consisted of all five
CA members which formed in 1991, but the organization have eventually merged with
the EurAsEC in 2006. The new wave of Russian-lead Eurasian Integration began with
the ECU and SES that aims to create a common supranational system, common foreign
trade policies, with four freedoms and harmonized system of production standards, trade
terms and measures for CIS region and other possible joiners in the Eurasian continent.
So far, from the CA, only Kazakhstan has stepped up together with Russia and Belarus,
and not all of the other CIS members are interested in the union. Regarding trade in-
tegration of CA with the world trade system, Kyrgyzstan succeeded so far by joining to
the World Trade Organization in 1998. Kazakhstan has been negotiating with WTO and
has a fair chance of becoming a WTO member soon as well. The other CA are relatively
more reluctant from economic integrations at regional and international level. However,
most of these RTAs remained as formal agreements only, except the EEU creation which
is bringing more of practical impact by unifying the custom rates, harmonizing non-tariff
policy measures and forming supranational institutional framework for resolution of main
economic problems in the territory of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus.
0.2 Motivations
Post-colonial trade predictions vs. post-Soviet CA-Russia trade dynamics
After the Soviet disintegration, Russia's position as the `big brother' in CA gradually
began to lessen as the EU, China, Turkey and Iran emerged as new regional players. CA,
possessing large hydrocarbon deposits, caught the attention of the world giants. This
resulted in an increase in trade volumes with more distant countries. Meanwhile Russia,
from being the major trading partner for CAC in the early 90s, fell to second and even
third place in terms of its total share in CA exports and imports. Mogilevskii [120] shows
that, for instance, Russia became the second major trade partner for Kyrgyzstan (after
China), for Turkmenistan (after Iran), Kazakhstan (after the EU) in the second decade of
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Figure 2: Mapping CA RTA linkages
Note: WTO members are in italics.
14
independent development (i.e., 2000-10 years). He also reported falls in the Russian share
in total exports of Kazakhstan (from 25% to 10%), Tajikistan (from 25% to 10%) and
Turkmenistan (from 40% to 27%) and, on the import side, of Kazakhstan (from 45% to
38%) and Turkmenistan (from 15% to 10 %).
Despite the stylized facts and arguments offered in the literature showing that Russia-
CA economic ties are eroding over time, overall Russia was able to keep its position of
Big Brother and even increase its trade share with CA, as we find. Russian share in
Kyrgyzstan's exports (from 15% to 20%) and those of Uzbekistan (from 15% to 35%).
Russian share in import shares of Kyrgyzstan (from 22% to 35%), Tajikistan (from 10%
to 30%) increased and for Uzbekistan show almost no sign of change.
Besides, if we take trade shares for the period 1995-2011 then we see that trade shares
are steady with some periodic fluctuations. The share (as we show in the next section)
of Russia in in total CA imports was around 25% and, in total exports, around 20% in
early years of independence. The share of the CAC in Russian imports was about 8%
and in exports it was around 4%. Moreover, nominal values of trade between the CA
and Russia have increased 11 times between 1995 and 2011. Despite a significant trade
drop after the initial Soviet collapse, hyperinflations in the region and further trade flow
diversification to non-CIS areas, CA-Russian trade is still fairly strong compared to other
similar post-colonial trade relations in the world.
Relevant theories predict that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the gaining
of independence, it is expected that the Russia and CA economic relations should cool
down gradually. By applying a gravity formulation which is highly consistent with the
concept of post-colonial erosion, and utilizing a sophisticated, time-varying adaptation of
Anderson and vanWincoop's (AvW [6]) multilateral trade resistances, HMR [78] found that
a country's trade with the colonizer, typically, erodes by 60% after 30 years of independence.
HMR findings also receive support from Viner's [180] concepts of trade diversion and trade
creation effects. After independence, a colony (as well as colonizer) begins to build new
economic linkages with countries from a non-colonial pool of countries, as a result, a post-
colonial country reduces its economic relations with the metropole (ex-colonizer) in favor
of more optimal trade partner and, consequently, the colony's trade gradually begins to
decline with its ex-colonizer and, instead, trade volumes with non-colonizer countries began
to gradually grow. So why are post-Soviet Russia-CA economic ties increasing instead of
eroding as post-colonial theory suggest?
These seemingly contradictory observations haven't specifically been addressed in the
literature. However, from the existing body of the literature we draw three broad cate-
gories of studies. The first category of studies analyses the economic trends of CA-Russia
in the post-Soviet period. Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc [61] also found that CA-Russian trade
was relatively 30 times higher than `normal' by 1998. Sinitcina [167] agrees that the CA
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and Russia are important for each other because Russian exports of manufactured goods,
such as foodstuffs, machinery and transport equipment, and more recently textile. . . based
on importance for the Russian economy, imports from CAC can be categorized energy
products, first of all natural gas, intended primarily for re-export to Ukraine and other
east EU (but Former Soviet) countries; raw materials and intermediate products scarce
in Russian or more competitive than Russian products in some regions of Russia, mainly
cheaper ores and metals and coal from Kazakhstan, cotton from Uzbekistan, clothing from
Kyrgyzstan, fruits and vegetables from Tajikistan. . . Russia is an important trade partner
for Central Asia that makes up over 50% of Uzbekistan's and 1/3 of Turkmenistan's gas
exports. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan depend to Russia for 43% and over 30%
of imports . . . Russia still remains an important trading partner for all of them due to its
leading role as a sales market for goods produced by Central Asian extracting and manu-
facturing industries, as well as their agricultural sectors, which are significant employers.
The second group of literature that is related to current CA-Russia relations and to
their historical coexistency, reforms and established economic ties during the USSR period.
As WB [193] reports, the majority of production standards are represented in the form of
GOSTs3 established during Soviet period. Although having the same production standards
in the industries of both regions only enhances their cooperation in production, for the
same reason, the production technology in the industries is outdated and the quality of
commodities produced lagged behind the quality of similar goods produced in neighboring
China and the EU.
The collapse of the USSR caused another wave of Russian (much lesser Ukrainian,
German) outward migration who wished to receive permanent residency in their home
lands. In total, from 1979 to 1999, share of only Russians in Kazakhstan dropped from
40.8% to 30%; in Kyrgyzstan from 25.9% to 12.5%; in Uzbekistan from 10.8% to 3%;
in Tajikistan from 10.4% to 1% and in Turkmenistan from 12.6% to 2%. The majority
of these people were well skilled, educated and young. While by the 2000s, the outflow
of Russians seems to have slowed down, the migration of indigenous Central Asians has
begun. Those migrants were temporary labour forces from CA with low per capita GDP
(from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). Between 1995 and 2010, indigenous CA
seeking jobs in Russia increased 10 times, from 0.12 to 0.87 million. According to Sinitsina
[167], in 2000s, 12.3 million legally and 5-8 million illegally migrated to Russian from CAC.
Reasons she provide for CA citizens to seek job in Russia are a visa-free border passage
and diasporas.
The Russian language is not just a lingua franca in CAC-Russia diplomatic meetings,
business negotiation, but also an important part of life in Russia, of course, and in CA.
Even though CA have their own titular languages and enough time has passed for them to
3GOST comes from GOsudarstvennyi STandard which mean government production standard
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put their own languages into daily life use, the Russian language seems to remain popular
in everyday life, also in media, in education, in employment and so on.
The third group of literature is relatively recent that is analysing CA-Russia economic
trends in context of new Eurasian (Re)Union of CIS countries. The WB [193] study
quantified possible costs and benefits for Kazakhstan in the Customs Union. In their
current scenario, they find for Kazakhstan larger trade diversion from the EU and the
ROW toward Russia. Mkrtchyan [122] finds that, before the ECU formation, Kazakhstan
had relatively twice lower tariff rates than its co-members of the union. As a result of
the tariff harmonization, Russian and Belorussian tariffs have reduced by about 10% while
Kazakhstan's tariffs grew by 58% and now for Kazakhstan, Russian or Belarus made
commodities are cheaper relative to imported from outside the ECU. Further, Isakova
& Plekhanov [85] argue that the benefits of the policy to Kazakhstan (and likely other
members of the union) have been limited comparing to the other two members. For
Kazakhstan, imports from China saw a more significant decrease (from the EU, the CIS &
the ROW were largely unaffected) in response to higher tariffs, and imports from Russia
and Belarus increased, although the increase was relatively small. A motivation for CA-
Russia trade could be an improved institutional framework. Dragneva and Wolczuk [43]
argue that because of the one country - one vote feature the Eurasian union could
succeed as it could limit the major policy decisions in favor of Russia as smaller members
can outvote Russia, thus Kazakhstan can equally negotiate with Russia that positively
influencing on their trade relations.
The literature hasn't been much concerned about post-colonial trade predictions. As
a highly special case of post-colonial relations, the enhanced economic ties of CA-Russia
in the post-Soviet period, which contradict the predictions, is interesting issue. Possibly,
colonial ties of the CAC, which had been under the rule of Russian Empire for 80 years
and later coexisted with Soviet Russia under Marxist ideology, is an important factor in
explaining this contradictions. Massive industrialization, migration, collectivization and
linguistic reforms during Soviet years, indeed, have created strong economic, political and
social ties between Russia and CAC, where as a result 95% of USSR trade occurred among
the union members (WB [196]). Also, intensification of Russian-lead regional economic
integration and (re)union of some former Soviet countries is another possible cause for the
contradiction. However, significant questions remain: Could it be that behind enhancing
post-Soviet trade between the two regions the colonial (or Soviet) ties are working? Does
it mean that CAC are returning back to their Big Brother (Russia)? Thus, this issue also
needs from our view comprehensive analysis and identification major drivers behind the
enhancing economic ties between CA and Russia in the post-Soviet period.
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Heterogeneus CA: transition, reforms and economic performance
Much of the existing (economics) literature has tended to treat the CA countries (CAC) as
a relatively homogenous region. However, after more than two decades of independence,
important differences are emerging. In terms of trade performance, the trade/GDP ratio
over the period 1995-2011 is much higher for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (38% on average)
than for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (26% in average). This ranking also
corresponds to that in the 2013 World Bank Doing Business report, which reflects the
ease of doing business, tax collection, investor protection, access to credit, trading across
borders, corruption, economic freedom and competitiveness. Kazakhstan (49th out of 183
countries) is the highest ranking CA, followed by Kyrgyzstan (70), Tajikistan (141), and
Uzbekistan (154) while Turkmenistan is not ranked at all.
The standard transition literature emphasizes a combination of initial conditions and
the reform policies adopted during the transition period (Falcetti et al. [55] present a good
review). The CACs differ in terms of neighbors, land sizes and landscape, size of popula-
tion, endowment of natural resources, and historic production specialization. Kazakhstan
possesses the largest territory, borders with Russia and China and has relatively better
rail and road connections left from Soviet times. It is well endowed with oil, coal, metals
and agricultural land. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are mountainous, smaller
in size and population and have mountain borders with China and Afghanistan. Uzbek-
istan has a relatively large population, possesses substantial natural gas reserves and good
conditions for cotton production. Turkmenistan is much more sparsely populated, but
well-endowed with natural gas. In sum, these distinguishing factors explain the observed
trends in economic performance, doing business and trade openness as many studies find.
Besides the initial conditions of each separate CAC, perhaps the trends in CA eco-
nomic performance also linked to the overall politico-economic reforms and liberalization
processes. Pomfret [137] among others concludes that transition reforms proceeded faster
in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan and slower in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
EBRD transition indicators show a similar ranking in terms of privatization and price lib-
eralization - policies which are an important stage of ongoing transition reforms (Barlow
and Radulescu [18]). In Box 1, the liberalization processes for CAC overviewed, and as
can be seen, the process hasn't taken the same path in all CAC. Although Uzbekistan
did well with price liberalization in the mid-1990s, it kept enterprises under state control
and has been slow with other reforms. Gas-rich Turkmenistan has been reluctant to make
substantial changes in its economy, although after the death of the president Nyazov in
2006 the country has begun to liberalize. Tajikistan went through a civil war (1992-1997)
and since then has been slow to implement reforms.
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Box 1: Liberalization processes in Central Asia
Kazakhstan is a unitary state with a presidential form of government. Since independence, through re-elections,
Nursultan Nazarbaev has been the president of the country. Kazakhstan has undertaken rapid systemic reforms in
early years of its independence to build a democracy based on a market-oriented economy. Since early 1990s several
reforms were implemented. To stabilize the labour market regional and local labour market employment system and
wage flexibility policies were adopted. Restrictions on internal trade were fully eliminated, the regulation of foreign
trade was simplified and the exchange rate system unified by the new currency, tenge. During the period 1991-
1996 as a result of wide price liberalization the country experienced high inflation level. Even though privatization
reforms were criticized for corruption by 2001 50% of large enterprises were privatized. To develop good economic
and political relationship with major regional players (Russia, China, EU and US), the country has adopted a
multifactor foreign policy. The stable political and economic situation and discovery of large oil reserves in the
Caspian shelf have attracted FDI to the country, especially during 2000s when world commodity prices accelerated.
Kyrgyzstan had a presidential form of government until 2010 when it shifted to parliamentarian government. Due
to high corruption problems the country experienced political instability during 2000s resulting in several presidents
changes. The current president is Almazbek Atambayev. Kyrgyzstan is so far the only CAC WTO member (since
1998). Kyrgyzstan did more efforts than Kazakhstan in establishing a market economy and democratic society.
In early years of independence, the country abolished trade restrictions (setting the lowest customs tariffs among
CAC), freed capital control, and declared a liberal exchange rate regime. As a result of the privatization reforms,
by 2003, 93% of all enterprises were in private ownership. The banking system initiated in 1991 has also been by
2004 privatized. Price liberalization proceeded in a manner similar as in Kazakhstan but the inflation problems
were solved quicker (inflation rate below 50% by 1995). However, transitional reforms were less successful in the
labour market where unemployment has remained high (15 - 32% in the first decade of independence) and led to
immigration to Kazakhstan and Russia.
Tajikistan experienced civil war in early years of independence (1992-1997). Tajikistan has a presidential form of
government and its president since 1994 till present is Imomali Rahmonov. The political problems in the 1990s have
slowed the democratization and transition to market economy. As a result Tajikistan is one of the poorest CAC
(per capita income $150 in 2001). The country is perceived as high risk for FDI and has high corruption levels.
Privatization reforms have been slow as the large companies remain state owned. Tajikistan continues to use Soviet
ruble and later Russian ruble until 1995 when the country introduced its own currency (Tajik ruble) which was later
replaced by solomi in 2000. Tight monetary policies have brought inflation down (from 60% to 12% by 2002).
Turkmenistan has a president ruled government within a single party system. Under its first president, Saparmu-
rat Niyazov's rule Turkmenistan had highly centralized government and few economic or political reforms were
undertaken. After Niyazov's death in 2006, his successor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov started some liberal re-
forms such as redesigning the constitution, reforms related to property rights, foreign investment, licensing, and
lowering customs rates in an attempt to convince investors of country's economic openness; since 2008 cautiously
liberalization of financial sector begun. Having less financial and trade linkages with the world left Turkmenistan
almost unaffected by the global crisis of 2008. Since 2008 Turkmenistan started more extensive trade liberalization
reforms leading to trade agreements with Iran, China, and Ukraine in attempt to redirect its gas export and become
less dependent on Russia. By 2011 64% of enterprises have been privatised but profitable businesses were kept un-
der state control. Furthermore, the government is reluctant to allow private or foreign owned enterprises in certain
sectors (i.e., media). The labour market is in poor condition as in 2007 unemployment rate was as high as 60%.
Uzbekistan like Turkmenistan is another less liberalized CAC with presidential government as the president of
Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, has been in power since independence. Due to the authoritarian political system the
transition to a market-oriented economy has been slow. Even though by 1996 almost all prices were liberalized,
enterprise privatization had little success and large enterprises in profitable sectors (cotton and wheat) have been kept
under government control. Further, reductions of government intervention, protection of legal rights for enterprises,
and foreign exchange liberalisation have been halfway fulfilled by authorities in later years. Like Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan has pursued a tight monetary policy which by 2002 allowed reducing inflation to 7%.
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There is no study focusing on the trade determinants and performance of CAC, even
though it has been recognized that there is a strong correlation between success in transition
from plan to market and foreign trade performance (Kaminski et al. [91]). In addition,
the literature has not paid enough attention to the developments in Central Asia after
Soviet Union disintegration and there is no study focusing on the business environment
in CAC and their trade performance. The IB literature has a few examples of papers on
disintegration and rebuilding of networks between former Soviet republics (e.g., Davis et
al. [32]), but these papers are now rather old. Pittman [133] covers Central Asia, but from
the limited perspective of transport system restructuring. Moreover, much of the literature
on post-Soviet transition has focused on the experiences of the countries in Central and
Eastern Europe and the Russia, CAC have received relatively less attention. Some notable
exceptions are Rumer ([155, 156, 157]), Burghart and Sabonis-Helf [26], Pomfret [137, 139],
Starr [169], Hausmann et al. [74], Dowling and Wignaraja [41, 42], and UNDP [191] which
focus on general economic development and political issues.
The Eurasian Economic Union: asymmetry and deeper EU-like integration
Following the experience and standards of the European Union, the post-Soviet `troika',
namely, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, are working toward the establishment of the
Eurasian Union that is aiming to foster economic ties not only of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), but also of the other countries of the Eurasian continent. The
troika have proven the seriousness of their intentions to form the Eurasian Economic Union
in an EU-like stepwise fashion by, first, forming a customs union in 2010, by setting free
trade zone covering the CIS region in 2011, by launching a common market space within
the territory of the troika in 2012. The culminative step is the formation of the Eurasian
Economic Union in 2015.
The performance of Eurasian integration appears to be not bad in the light of recovery
from global crisis, although there are members which are earning the benefits and some
members that are paying the costs. The statistics show that comparing to 2009, trade
turnover in 2011 within the ECU rose by 3/4 (62$ bn). Several studies find a small (or
temporary) trade creation/diversion effect occurred in for the members. Regarding the
impact for separate members, some studies conclude that Kazakhstan is now paying more
as the consumer prices increased, but that Belarus benefits from Russian FDI inflows,
and Russia earning from additional exports and expansion of Russian companies into the
markets of Kazakhstan and Belarus. The WB [193] study quantified possible costs and
benefits for Kazakhstan in the Customs Union. In their current scenario, Kazakhstan
would lose 0.2 % in real income per year plus the external tariffs doubles but main part of
tariff revenues are going to Russia (as the revenues distributed based on agreed % shares,
not what is coming to each member), the earnings of labor and capital also reduced, and
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moreover larger trade diversion from the EU and the ROW.
The impact of the ECU resulted in improvement of customs rates of Kazakhstan in-
creased at least by half while tariffs of co-members of the union have reduced. Mkrtchyan
[122] show that as a result of the tariff harmonization, Russian and Belorussian tariffs have
reduced by about 10% while Kazakhstani tariffs grew for 58%. While Russia reduced its
specific tariffs (-19%) more than ad-valorem tariffs (-7%), Belarus and Kazakhstan made
more or less similar commitments of each category of tariffs, respectively, -10% and +60%
in average. Further to note, Kazakhstan also had almost three times more imported prod-
uct types that are tariff free comparing to Russia and Belarus but after the policy had to
obligate with tariffs another 452 line of products (taking into count that total number of
the product lines is 5052).
Isakova & Plekhanov [85] argue that a sharp trade expansion and rapid growth may
be a reflection of post-crisis recovery trends unrelated to policy. They also conclude that
benefits of the policy to Kazakhstan (and likely other members of the union) have been
limited comparing to the other two members. For Kazakhstan, imports from China saw a
more significant decrease (from the EU, the CIS & the ROW were largely unaffected) in
response to higher tariffs, and imports from Russia and Belarus increased, although the
increase was relatively small. Interestingly, Isakova & Plekhanov [85] find that imports
from non-member CIS countries for the ECU also declined, suggesting that despite the
formation of the EFTA, these countries cannot be seen as net beneficiaries of the trade
diversion effect. The possible explanation for the evidence could be an increase in non-
tariff restrictions in trade between CIS countries based on the membership. Isakova &
Plekhanov [85] provide some evidences of them, for example, the time for trucks to clear in
the Kazakh-Kyrgyz borders have lengthened significantly. Mkrtchyan [122] also mention
that Kazakh-Kyrgyz border control tightened as there was a widespread smuggling of
cheap Chinese products into the ECU zone. However, unlike Isakova & Plekhanov [85],
Mkrtchyan [122] find that the overall impact of the non-tariff barriers of the ECU on non-
ECU members (although by non-ECU members meant not only the CIS but the other
trade partners) is positive.
Dragneva and Wolczuk [43] raises the issue of the asymmetry in bargaining power in
the union. Russia, as the former Big Brother and the current undoubted leader of the
integration, might be influencing of the other (smaller) members' decisions taken in the
union for its own use. The smaller members won't be able to deviate from the Russian
course as they will be concerned about their territorial safety (considering the case of
Ukraine in the case of having disagreement with the Big Brother) or possible losses if
Russia uses its economic means (sanctions, restrictions and other discriminatory policy)
to accept its rules of the game. Because during the negotiations on the common external
tariffs, Kazakhstan mostly agreed to accept Russian tariff rates which weren't optimal
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actually, now as the WB [193] study finds the country is paying the costs of the integration.
Some studies suggest that Kazakhstan is seeking long run benefits and was ready for
the commitments, while others suggest that the country had no choice but to accept to
join under the given condition of Big brother. If there will be no further reduction of
expected non-tariff barriers, the WB study find that Kazakhstan will lose another 0.3 % in
real income per year plus losses from further increase in external tariffs, and larger trade
diversion from the EU and the ROW. While the Eurasian Integration project helping to
tighten the economic ties of Russia with former Soviet countries, some studies also report
that over the years, Russia have given up its influence on Former Soviet members to some
degree to the other world powers. On the west side, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and
Azerbaijan have been increasing their economic ties with the EU countries. The presence
of the EU but also China and the US has been growing in the Central Asian region since its
independence from Soviet Russia. Besides, the new institutional framework of the EEU will
also impose an obstacle to Russia exercising its bargaining power over smaller members.
Dragneva and Wolczuk [43] argue that because of the one country - one vote feature of
the Eurasian union, in taking major policy decisions in favor of Russian gains, smaller
members can outvote Russia.
Those issues are linked to the European Union and the role of Russia in the new re-
gional formation. The EU Integration is indeed serving as a model of successful regional
integration for the Eurasian Union and the EU integration practice is being imitated by the
Eurasian integration in fact but in a speedy manner. However the concern is whether the
EU model is convenient and suitable for the EEU integration considering the economic dif-
ficulties the EU is facing in recent decade, that some studies find due to the EU integration
model and the EU institutional structure (Hartwell [72]). what would be the consequences
of EU-like deeper integration for the future of the Eurasian Union? Another concern is
Russia. Russia is clearly the leader of the (re)union, and whether the new union will share
the same karma as the former (Soviet) union? Tarr [175] and Dragneva and Wolczuk [43]
find the asymmetry in the union as worrisome part of the new integration as influence of
Russia even now at the earlier stages of integration exercising its bargaining power, and
influencing the decisions of Kazakhstan and Belarus for its own favor. What the impact of
concentration of political and economical power once again in Moscow (instead of creating
regional institutional framework with fair distribution of the power practically among the
members) to the future of the Eurasian Union?
While some studies attempting to identify pros and cons of the integration for mem-
bers and non-members, the possible shape of the Eurasian Bloc and the possible impact of
deeper integration, the impact of two important aspects of the integration hasn't gained
much attention. For example, Hartwell [72] claim that the EEU group will succeed even
without Ukraine but only if all Former Soviet Central Asia becomes a part in the part
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of the union. Demidenko [36] agrees in the last point. Using the GLOBE CGE model,
Demidenko finds that macroeconomic indicators of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbek-
istan will improve if they join the EEU. Dragneva and Wolczuk [43] state that voluntarily
from Central Asian countries (without taking Kazakhstan into account) only Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan could join. However, both countries are economically weak and possibly
less attractive for the current members of the union. Besides, from the recent activities,
it has become clear that only Kyrgyzstan would be joining the union. Further, to note
that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are now supplying their gas to China and Iran, and
express no interest in returning to their Big brother, Russia. By looking at eastern parts
of the CIS, Knobel [96] argues that Armenia and Moldova trade more with the ECU and
therefore deep integration into the EEU would be beneficial for the civilized development
of a unified labour market. Armenia most likely to join unlike Moldova which like Ukraine
more biased toward integration with the EU.
0.3 Theoretical frameworks and methods
There are two types of methods we used in our analysis. One is is gravity model with
inverted gravity indexes that are seen as backward looking methods and the other, the
CGE model, is a forward looking tool. We further proceed with broad definition of each
type of methods and provide reasons why those methods more suitable for our analysis
comparing to other available tools.
Gravity and inverted Gravity Approaches A modified form of the Newton's gravity
equation, the gravity model of trade has been around since its first use by Tinbergen [176].
Principally, the gravity model predicts bilateral trade flows based on economic sizes and
geographic distance of two trading countries. The gravity model has become a work
horse tool of applied trade for its strong prediction power and consistency with empirical
findings, and has found theoretical foundations and its place in international economics.
Major theoretical works are Anderson & van Wincoop [6], Bergstrand [20], Deardorff [34],
Eaton & Kortum [45], Helpman et al. [80], Chaney [27] and some other papers which are
well reviewed and discussed in Shepherd [161], WB [193] and Head and Mayer [79].
While the model consists of factors that have more to do with geography and spatiality,
the gravity model has been used to test hypotheses rooted with pure theories of trade such
as the HO (Hecksher-Ohlin) model. Although the HO model predictions are clear enough
from theoretical point, it is suffering from empirical problems. Investigation of real world
trading patterns has produced a number of results that do not match the expectations of
comparative advantage theories. Deardorff [34] shows that a basic gravity model can be
derived from the HO model, but it is not useful for evaluating the empirical validity of
23
theories. Past research using the gravity model has also sought to evaluate the impact
of various variables (besides standard gravity variables) that cannot be captured by the
standard trade models. For example, Summary [173] attempted to examine the specific
role of political factor on trade using gravity model. Her model did not include income
and population level to find an interaction since she only used the data that was weighted
by the same cross-sectional factors. Her study showed how a country's export and import
are affected by a number of political and social variables related to business ties, alliances,
foreign policy as well as the basic factors used in the gravity model (the basic factor used
separately). Thus, the gravity model explains adequately what the HO (Hecksher-Ohlin),
RV (Ricardo-Viner) or the Armington models can not justify and vice-versa, but they all
can be incorporated into one model.
Despite its common association with trade, the gravity model can also be used to
measure trade costs and bilateral dyads (country-pair specific factors and ties). There are
number of gravity based methods can be found (that are discussed in HM [78]) but further
only two inverted gravity based methods are discussed.
One of the methods is the Geometric Mean of Trade Costs (GMTC). This had been in-
troduced in Head-Ries [77] first and further expended by Novy [125] and [127]. The method
provides measures of overall bilateral trade costs (the full specification of the method is
given in Chapter 3) by taking ratio of ratios and making assumption on the elasticity of
substitution (if utility represented by CES function). Novy states that OTCI is compre-
hensive because it captures a wide range of trade cost components such as transportation
costs and tariffs, but also components that not directly observable such as the costs as-
sociated with language barriers and red tape. OTCI is consistent with assumption of
iceberg-melting-costs and can be interpreted as an ad valorem tariff equivalent for trade
costs.
Another gravity based method is the tetrad method. Tetrad, like the GMTC method,
is a ratio of ratios type of approach. However, this time, instead of taking geometric mean
of trade costs between any ij pair, this method use trade flows of reference importer k and
a reference exporter l. Like the GMTC approach, the tetrad of flows allows elimination of
all the importer, exporter, and constant terms of gravity equation. The obtained measure
captures bilateral factors explaining trade (such as distance or colonial ties) and eliminates
all the importer, exporter, global (time) effects. Another difference of the method from
the GMTC is that no assumption about the level of elasticity of substitution is needs to
be imposed.
Besides having theoretical gravity foundations, both methods have proved to be con-
sistent with empirical findings. HM [78] used tetrad method to capture the effect of inde-
pendence on trade flows between metropole, colony and siblings over time, and as well to
capture effect caused by changes in RTA, GATT membership and currency rates. Roma-
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lis [150] used the tetrad approach to evaluate the effect of NAFTA tariffs on trade flows
among USA, Mexico and Canada. Jacks, Meissner and Novy [86] used GMTC to analyse
the impact of trade costs on the world trade between 1870 and 2000. The GMTC appear
in a number of empirical and theoretical papers by Novy[125, 126, 127].
The CGE Approach The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is a system
of equations interconnect with each other, and the general equilibrium satisfy formulation
provided by Arrow and Debreu to solve supply, demand and price level that maintain
equilibrium for all markets with the use of real data set. In recent decades, CGE models
have been used widely by policy analysts all over the world, and some of the main reasons
for that is the advancements in computing tools, software packages, availability of data
sources and development of new specifications for CGE models. Mainly, CGE models have
been used to investigate economic effects of trade policies taken in one country (or sector
or region) on other regions. For instance, if a country reduce its import tariffs for clothing,
it then increase the import of clothing which might reduce the cost of clothing or improve
the quality of clothing in domestic market through competition, and finally enhance the
welfare of consumers, or cause a problem to domestic clothing producers. Therefore, it is
useful to use a CGE model to investigate the consequences of some policies to the state
of economy. There are some CGE models that are used worldwide such as the GTAP
model with standard set of assumptions, but many CGE analysts construct their own
CGE models for specific countries or regions or even sectors of an economy with the set of
appropriate theoretical foundations and linkages. There are basic conditions that should
be included into a model to make it a CGE model. The one of the standard conditions
for general equilibrium is zero profit condition meaning that the price of output equals the
sum of input prices. Further important condition is market clearance condition achieved
by equating supply and demand of good i. The cost of living is also important general
equilibrium condition which should be equal to the unit expenditure level. Final condition
is the income balance where utility by unit expenditure is equal to income of country i.
It is not novel, nowadays, that by the use of CGE approach, the blend of pure the-
oretical models of international trade can be done, and incorporation of the HO, SF and
the Armington models into an encompassing CGE model is not an exception. This way,
it is easy to overcome the limitations of all those models and extend it with some other
useful instruments. As Lloyd [110] states:  Given the ambiguities that still remain the
predictions of general equilibrium theory, the use of CGE models is a natural vehicle to
explore the economic effects, and blend of theories in CGE modeling might deviate re-
sults of empirical work from the way theory postulates (see Marrewijk [117]). Furthermore,
the CGE model is very flexible in construction of an empirical model that could embody
different theories and explain trade from different aspects by giving much greater explana-
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tions about trade liberalization issues. Moreover, it can even incorporate with some other
theories that are directly or indirectly effect trade realities such as imperfect competition
(e.g., monopoly pricing), demands not influenced by price (e.g., government demands), a
range of taxes externalities, such as pollution, or geographical distance between trading
countries.
The deep regional integration associated not only with policy changes but also with
externalities of integration coming from the technology transfer, productivity increases,
and economies of scale with possible Smithian and Ethierian type of gains. To reflect such
aspects, neoclassical or even gravity models are limited, and the most convenient tool is
the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approach. The approach is quite flexible tool
to incorporate a body of theory (or several theories) also, and to model various specific
features and dimensions needed to capture outcoming impacts and externalities of a specific
deep integration process.
With respect to capturing the impacts of regional integration, the CGE studies of later
decade attempt to incorporate structures of the modern trade theory rather than standard
trade theory. This is because, despite of having the elegant structure, the standard trade
theories known as the Ricardo-Viner-Meade (RVM) or the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
(HOS) theories are found to be very simple, too stylized and limited to capture two-way
trade, the discussed externalities and gains from the integration. Later, these appeared
what is known as the Armington specification, which has the desirable feature of imperfect
substitution and product differentiation by the origin to allow to way trade plus include
insights of the RVM and HOS (however cannot capture linkages with historical trends or
establish link between trade and economic performance). Robinson et al. [151] argue that
the Armington specification cannot adequately reflect trade share changes occurred in the
EU regionalisation as it misses production or expenditure effects on trade shares (because
trade shares are determined by the relative prices).
The recent trade theories such as the Melitz or the Dixit-Stiglitz (DS) formulations
can capture above discussed externalities arriving from the deeper integration better than
the standard trade models, and thus more suitable for analysis of regionalization. The
DS structure assumes there is Chamberlinian monopolistic competition introduced by the
number of identical firms and consumers marked with `love-of-variety' demand feature, thus
two-way trade even in the presence of trade barriers with the gains from the variety and
the economies of scale. The Melitz model incorporates effects related to firm productivity
differences into the DS formulation. Further, there is a greater support from the empirical
findings at a micro level in favor of the modern trade models (Falvey [56]).
The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) integration is highly correlated with the con-
cept of the regionalism (rather than unilateralism or multilateralism). The clear sign of
regionalism is when separate nation states of a particular geographic region unite with
26
each other to pursue a collective goal to establish an area with common economic, and
further social and political standards. In this regard, the EEU initiative can be seen as
if it is in its first stage to establish a common economic platform by eliminating phys-
ical, protective, discriminatory barriers, creating a system of supranational institutions,
introducing common economic standards and norms (as if they are one large country made
of smaller distinguished states). There is a number of gains and productivity growth
coming through trade-production linkages that include the transfer of production tech-
nologies, knowledge spillovers and learning by doing; segmentation and fragmentation
of the production process among the member states; the increasing returns, economies of
scale, market expansion, redistribution and reallocation of labour at the regional level etc.
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Chapter 1
Post-Soviet Trade of Central Asia
and Russia trade: Back to Big
Brother.
Abstract
By looking at over 200 post-colonial trade relationships of the world countries for the
period of 1948-2006, Head, Mayer and Ries [78] conclude that typically trade between col-
onizers and its colonies erodes by 60% after three decades of independence of colonies.
Post-Soviet Central Asia gained its independence from Russia 24 years ago, however, its
trade has only been improving since 1995, especially in the light of the Eurasian Economic
Integration. As a highly-specific application of the HMR [78] study of post-colonial ties,
Russia-Central Asia trade may appear to contradict the predictions or imply that there are
interesting factors at work.
In this paper we investigate causes of deviation of Russia-CA trade from predicted trade
erosion, and to do so we decompose the region's trade into `gravity' components (such as
dyads and monads), and analyse dynamic changes in the components since the Soviet
time. Our findings show that the presence of Soviet built socio-economic CA-Russia ties
was stronger in the first decade of coexistence of Russia and Central Asia and was reflected
through trade specialization, regional trade agreements, transport and infrastructural link-
ages, the commonly spoken Russian language and visa-free labour migration. However
in the second decade the ties began to weaken significantly. The improvement in trade 
which doesn't follow predictions of HMR  was due non-colonial type of factors, such as
sharp increases in GDP levels for both regions associated with improvement of the global
economy and economic ties with the World (especially with EU and China), FDI inflow
and an improvement in the terms and volumes of trade of the main exporting commodi-
ties of the regions. Nevertheless, our further analysis of intra-industry trade between CA
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and Russia during post-Soviet years shows that there is still a high presence of Soviet built
socio-economic ties in Russia-CA trade relations.
1.1 Introduction
The post-Soviet republics of Central Asia (CA), namely, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajik-
istan, Turkmenistan & Uzbekistan form an excellent testing ground for the dynamic effects
of changing regional trade relationships with the former `Big Brother', Russia. We can
view the CA-Russia relationship as a highly-specific application of Head, Mayer and Ries'
(HMR [78]) study of post-colonial ties. HMR [78] examined the effect of independence on
the post-colonial trade of 220 countries (including post-Soviets) between 1948 and 2006.
Their work suggests that typically trade between a colony and its metropole (colonizer)
erodes by 60% after 30 years passes since independence of the colony. By contrast, while we
lack accurate data on the Soviet break-up years, trade between the Central Asian Countries
(colonies) and Russia (metropole), during the 1995-2011 (post-colonial) period increased
almost 11-fold (from 2.1 to 23 billion U.S. dollars) and their shares in total bilateral trade
actually increased. Admittedly this is after the immediate post-Soviet trade collapse, for
which data are less reliable. Why has trade been increasing, apparently contrary to the
finding of erosion of post-colonial trade elsewhere? One answer is that CA economic ties
with the Big Brother, Russia, even now after over two decades of independence, are still
strong, as CA was colonized by Tsarist Russia and subsequently by the Bolsheviks for
more than a century. In this context, whether a new Russian-led `unbreakable union of
free republics' (i.e. Eurasian Economic Union) is giving new breath to (re)establishment
of Soviet economic ties and to fostering CA-Russia trade and cooperation in production is
as yet unclear.
To investigate these issues, we analyse post-Soviet CA-Russia trade flows from the
perspective of the theoretical gravity framework, which explains trade flows in terms of
monadic (country-specific) and dyadic (country-pair-specific) factors. Our gravity es-
timation results show that among dyadic factors, colonial ties, border and transport
costs and among monadic factors GDPs, RTAs and Globalization factors are statisti-
cally and economically significant. We further decompose trade flows into monadic and
dyadic components through the tetrad method (HMR[78]) and analyse dynamic changes
in the components over the period 1995-2011. The dynamics show the dominance of the
dyadic component (including Soviet built socio-economic CA-Russia ties) in trade in the
first decade of coexistence of Russia and Central Asia by the continuation (or enhance-
ment) of Soviet like trade specialization (the CAC supply production inputs and Russia
refines them), terms of trade via regional trade agreements, transport and infrastructural
linkages, common use of the Russian language and visa-free labor migration. However in
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the second decade the (dyadic) ties began to weaken significantly but their trade continued
to improve (which contradict predictions) because the growth of the monadic component
linked to sharp increases in GDP levels for both regions, but also to the improvement of
global economic state and economic ties with the world (especially with EU and China),
FDI inflow and an increase of prices and volumes of the main exporting commodities of the
regions. Additional comparative analysis of intra-industry trade between CA and Russia
during Soviet and post-Soviet years (using Grubel-Lloyd Index) show that there is, perhaps
surprisingly, still a high presence of Soviet built socio-economic ties in Russia-CA trade
relations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides an overview of trade between
each CAC and Russia in the post-Soviet period. Section 1.3 discusses the theory of post-
colonial economic relations between former colony and colonizer countries. Section 1.4
discusses some of the (Soviet created) economic ties between Russia and CAC and the
shape of the ties in post-Soviet period. Section 1.5 outlines the theoretical framework of
this study followed by the gravity concept of trade relations and its components, plus the
database which we use in Section 1.6. Section 1.7-1.8 provide results and interpretations,
and draw conclusions.
1.2 Post-soviet trade between Central Asia and Russia trade
Since 1991, the CAC and Russia no longer comprise parts of a single planned economic
system and have taken their own independent paths towards market economies, although,
more or less trade in both regions has taken a similar time path. This is observable from
the dynamics of trade flows (Figure 1.1 ). The CAC and Russia both faced huge trade and
production hardships with the Soviet collapse and subsequent hyperinflation in 1991-1997.
In the early years of independence, trade between the CAC and Russia fell by tenfold (e.g.,
Sinitsina [167]). Later, in 1998-1999, trade between the regions deteriorated by about 50%
as a result of the Russian financial crisis, following the Asian crisis, and this fall was further
enhanced by the reduction of investments from the West as Russian and then CA's Bank
Ranking Rates fell (e.g., Westin [182]). By contrast, the period 2000-2007 was much more
fruitful as world demand for primary exports goods (oil, gas, cotton, metals) increased.
This fed through into GDP growth in these primary exporter economies. Volumes of
CA-Russian trade increased over fivefold. The 2008 crisis had both direct and indirect
effects on CA-Russian trade and economic wellbeing. The exposure of Kazakh banks to
the global financial crisis spread to the other CAC. Further with formation of the Eurasian
Customs Union and improvements of global economic state, trade between the regions
brought economic recovery and further increase to trade relations.
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Figure 1.1: Russian and Central Asian total trade (in billions of US dollars)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2013
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After the Soviet disintegration, Russia's position as the `Big Brother' in CA gradu-
ally began to lessen as the EU, China, Turkey and Iran emerged as new regional players.
CA, possessing large hydrocarbon deposits, caught the attention of the world giants. This
resulted in an increase in trade volumes with more distant countries (Figure 1.2 ), while
Russia, from being the major trading partner for all CA in the early 90s, fell to second
and even third place in terms of its total share in CA exports and imports. For instance,
Russia became the second major trade partner for Kyrgyzstan (after China), for Turk-
menistan (after Iran), Kazakhstan (after the EU) in the second decade of independent
development (i.e., 2000-10 years). Mogilevskii [120] also reported falls in the Russian share
in total exports of Kazakhstan (from 25% to 10%), Tajikistan (from 25% to 10%) and
Turkmenistan (from 40% to 27%) and, on the import side, of Kazakhstan (from 45% to
38%) and Turkmenistan (from 15% to 10 %).
Despite the loss of its position in some aspects, Russia was able to keep its position
and even increase its trade share with CA in other aspects during the same period of
time  for example, its share in Kyrgyzstan's exports (from 15% to 20%) and those of
Uzbekistan (from 15% to 35%). The Russian share in imports by Kyrgyzstan (from 22%
to 35%), Tajikistan (from 10% to 30%) increased and for Uzbekistan show almost no sign
of change. Besides, if we take trade shares for the period 1995-2011 than we see that
trade shares are steady with some periodic fluctuations. Figure 1.3 shows that the share
of Russia in total CA imports was around 25% and, in total exports, around 20% in early
years of independence. The share of the CAC in Russian imports was about 8% and in
exports it was around 4%. Moreover, nominal values of trade between CA and Russia
has increased 11 times between 1995 and 2011. Despite a significant trade drop after the
initial Soviet collapse, hyperinflations in the region and further trade flow diversification
to non-CIS areas, CA-Russian trade is still fairly strong compared to other similar post-
colonial trade relations in the world. Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc [61] found that CA-Russian
trade was still relatively 30 times higher than `normal' in 1998. HMR [78] also agree that
after independence countries of previous colony-colonizer relationship trade more with each
other than with countries that previously had no colonial ties.
1.3 The prediction of post-colonial trade erosion
In the last century, over 200 countries gained independence from their colonizers. This
was the case especially after the World War II with French, British, Spanish and Por-
tuguese colonies gaining independence. For example, Algeria was a colony of France from
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Figure 1.2: CAC's trade share for 2000-2010 period (by countries).
Source: Mogilevskii [120]33
Figure 1.3: Dynamics of the Russian share in CA trade and CA share in Russian trade (in
% terms)
Source: CIA Factbook
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1830 to 1962. When Algeria gained its independence from France, trade with France was
around 80% of its total and after 30 years this fell to 6%. Similar patterns were observed
throughout the other similar post-colonial relations. Such phenomena also receive support
from Viner's1 concepts of trade diversion and trade creation effects. After independence,
a colony (as well as colonizer) begin to build new economic linkages with countries from
a non-colonial pool of countries, as a result, a post-colonial country reduces its economic
relations with the metropole (ex-colonizer) in favor of more optimal trade partners and,
consequently, the colony's trade gradually begins to decline with its ex-colonizer and, in-
stead, trade volumes with non-colonizer countries began to gradually grow. By applying
a gravity formulation, which is highly consistent with the concept of post-colonial erosion,
and utilizing a sophisticated, time-varying adaptation of Anderson and van Wincoop's
(AvW [6]) multilateral trade resistances, HMR [78] found that a country's trade with the
colonizer, typically, erodes by 60% after 30 years of independence (Figure 1.4 ).
Being geographical neighbors to each other, at any point of history people of the Central
Asian and Russian regions have been in constant interaction. This covers the periods of
the Mongol Empire, Ottoman Empire, Tsarist Russia, of course, the Soviet Union, and
now the fledgeling Eurasian Union. Each period left its marks by creating economic,
social, cultural or political ties between the peoples of the region. However, over time old
ties are gradually replaced with new ties. In the current, Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) period, Russia and the CACs have their own distinct territories, independent
governing and economic systems. However, old economic ties between Russia and the CACs
survived, re-branded or re-established from the Soviet period. Of course, two decades
of sovereignty is probably not enough time to erase the ties that were built during 70
years of coexistence under Marxist ideology, plus massive industrialization, migration,
collectivization and linguistic reforms. If during the Soviet period, 95% of trade of CA and
Russia was with each other (and with the other USSRs), then, probably, behind enhancing,
instead of eroding, post-Soviet trade between the two regions are re-establishing ties are
playing some role which we need to address further.
1.4 Soviet ties in post-Soviet Russia and CA relations
1.4.1 Specialisation ties
Central Asia specializes in exporting to Russia products such as oil and gas (from Kaza-
khstan, Turkmenistan & Uzbekistan), ferrous and non-ferrous metals (Tajikistan, Uzbek-
istan, and Kazakhstan), agricultural raw materials (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan),
1See Viner [180]
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Figure 1.4: HMR's prediction of post colonial trade erosion
Source: Head, Mayer & Ries (2010)
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radioactive and chemical elements (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan & Uzbekistan), cotton fibre
and textile goods (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan & Uzbekistan), chemical products (Uzbek-
istan & Kazakhstan), machines and equipment (Kyrgyzstan & Uzbekistan). Russia exports
products such as energy products (to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan & Uzbekistan), foodstuffs
(Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan & Uzbekistan), fabrics and clothing products (Kyrgyzstan, Tajik-
istan & Uzbekistan), metals (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan), agricultural raw materials (Tajik-
istan, Kyrgyzstan), machinery and transportation equipment (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan &
Uzbekistan). Some studies explain such a trade specialization pattern based on physi-
cal specificities such as resource endowments, comparative advantage in producing certain
types of goods, geographic and climatic conditions. This is indeed true. In fact, Kazakhstan
& Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are well-endowed with oil and gas; a convenient climate
allows Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to produce goods made of cotton fibre, Kazakhstan
to produce grain and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to grow fruits and vegetables; Kyrgyzs-
tan has some gold mines and mineral reserves; Tajikistan possess the water resources to
generate hydro-electricity.
Other important aspects to point out with regard to the trade specializations of CA
and Russia include, firstly, traditional trade specializations of each region formed during
the Soviet period. Soviet and post-Soviet trade between Russia and CA observed across
commodity groups shows that little change in the structure and trade specialization of each
region. The statistical data compiled by the USSR statistics agency, Goscomstat, (Table
1.1 ) show which type of commodities were traded by Soviet CA and Russia: Kazakh SSR 
electricity, coal, metals, chemicals, machine building, food products; Uzbek SSR  natural
gas, electro-energy, machinery, wood and paper products; Kyrgyz SSR  foodstuff, textile,
hydro-electro and oil energy, mining products; Turkmen SSR  oil and gas, chemicals, wood
and paper products; Tajik SSR  light and food industry products, aluminum, hydro-electro
energy; and RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) has been producing all
the types of products and in large volumes that are ready for consumption or exploitation,
for example, production of petroleum, clothes, motor vehicles and so on using production
materials (oil, cotton, metals etc.) delivered from all the USSR, including the CA.
Second, it seems that CA and Russia both export similar types of goods to each other.
However, most goods exported from the CA are relatively low skill intensive products or
of raw (extracted but unprocessed) form, and, in return, the majority of CA imports from
Russia are processed or refined either (finished or intermediate) type of good requiring high
and medium skill intensity and knowledge. Similarly, studies that analysed trade special-
ization of USSR regions also make similar conclusions that CA, during the Soviet years,
as a captive market, served as a supply point of inputs for Russian industrial production
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and in return received ready-for-consumption goods made of their own raw materials. For
instance, Dowling and Wignaraja [42] state During the Soviet period, the Central Asian
republics were required to supply raw materials, energy, and intermediate inputs to the
Russian Federation as part of the integrated production system. The Russian Federation
supplied finished manufactured goods to the Central Asian republics and other regions.
Besides, Central Asian states were net importers while Soviet Russia was net exporter.
According to Fisher [63], Russian inter-republic trade balance was positive with +9% of
NMP at domestic prices while the balance was negative (-20%) for Central Asian countries
in 1987.
1.4.2 Production ties
In the initial period following WWII, the Soviet Union turned itself into one of the largest
industrial economies of the World. However, with reformation into the CIS, the region
has never regained its former importance. By the end of 70s, the USSR had a 15% share
of World GDP of which Russia produced about 60-70%2: in other words, about 10% of
global GDP. Now, in comparison, joint CIS production share is 3 times smaller and makes
up only 4-5% of World GDP.
Both the success and failures of the USSR were partially due to the centrally planned
production system. In early period of the Soviet Union, massive collectivisation and fur-
ther industrialisation reforms that undertook in all corners of the USSR with introduction
of collective farming and industrial manufacturing. The administration of the USSR pro-
duction was provided from Moscow by a few state institutions with their large bureaucratic
apparatus and subdivisions spread through the entire USSR. Those institutions were the
Gosplan, that provided medium to short run production plans and objectives, the Goss-
nap3, more of an executive body allocated inputs and outputs of production, and the
Gosbank, the only bank (until 1988) which monitored production and administered pay-
ments, price setting, and budget planning policies. Such an administration scheme showed
its effectiveness very quickly. Before and after WWII, the real production growth of the
USSR averaged an annual rate between 11-17% (Harrison [71]). However, the top-down
production system had its own downsides, which were undermined by the authorities. In
the pursuit of scheduled quantities, the quality of production had suffered as there was al-
most no consumer-manufacturer link and the heads of the institutions ignored production
issues occurring in the regions (Kontorovich [97]). As a result, eventually, the production
growth begun to diminish gradually until economy started to experience stagnation in the
2Based on the World Bank [196] statistics, for 1989-1991 period, RSFSR's Net Material Production
(NMP) is 444 565 mln. Rubles out of the total USSR's NMP, 725.6 mln. Rubles. In the same WB report
it is shown that between 1970 and 1989 the average share of RSFSR in coal production is 54%, in natural
gas production is 71%, in crude oil production 91%.
3The Gossnap first formed and appear in some literature as Narkomprod
39
late decades of the USSR.
Since the Soviet collapse, Russia and the individual CAC have attempted to develop
their new production ties and sell their goods in the world and each other's market,
however, due to poor quality reputation, border costs and restrictions on each other's pro-
duction inputs, their production has continued to suffer. High transportation costs from
the landlocked CA or even from industrial areas of Russia (i.e., from Ural or Siberia)
only made their goods more uncompetitive in the world market. Because of the spatial
geographic allocation4 of Soviet production vertical previously, the costs arising in the
borders between Russia and CA (and within CA borders) in the post-Soviet period also
negatively affected the production system of either region. In terms of quality, Russian and
CA products lagged far behind similar products offered by Japan, USA or EU, and this is
mainly because their goods were based on in the industries inherited from the USSR and
yet using the Soviet production standards (GOSTs). CA could only offer the same type
of goods (materials and minerals in raw form or agricultural and intermediate goods that
required further processing) that they could produce based on Soviet industries and infras-
tructure but to bring their products to the shelves required further processing (i.e. large
investments to build new industries) for which nor CA neither Russia had capital in early
transition period. Fortunately, since 2000, an increase in World prices and demand for
energy resources allowed oil-based CA and Russia to boost volumes of production without
necessarily intensifying skill and knowledge use. Attempts to develop intensive produc-
tion such as economic liberalization reforms, policies to create a competitive market and
foreign FDI inflow, special innovation programmes, in both regions, still cannot outweigh
corruption, political, managerial and marketing inefficiencies (Collins [30]).
Current regional integration processes (to form the Eurasian Economic Union) suggest
that Russia and some CA countries have realized they have `hidden' potentials to develop
their production and economy as a whole if they stick together, in other words, step by
step eliminate border and other policy related obstacles facing industries of both sides to
partially re-establish previously lost Soviet ties and establish new economic ties as well
with improved institutional framework, production standards and create larger internal
4Current Russia-CA economic and border related issues possibly come from the geographic allocation
of Soviet industries. Most of the Soviet industrial vertical was placed on the territory of current Russia,
part of it closer to main sources of production inputs (in territory of Central Asia). With the collapse
of USSR, industries which formed full cycle of production were place in territories of separate countries.
An illustrative example is the USSR machine building industry. The Kazakh SSR, instead of producing
machinery goods near its locations of ferrous metal extraction places (in the East Kazakhstan), sends
sent 90 % of ferrous metals (in raw or low skill intensive product form) to the Russian machinery indus-
tries for production of final goods. Such allocation of the production vertical is also inefficient in terms
of overland transport costs. This is also explains partially why we observe that the RSFSR produces
twice the share of machinery products (high skill intensive products) than the Kazakh SSR does in Ta-
ble 1.1. Similar geographic bias toward Russia and similar geographical allocation of USSR industries
are quite clearly observable from Soviet industrial maps which are available on Texas University website
https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth.html
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market to sell their goods. Sinitcina [167] agrees that the CA and Russia are important for
each other because Russian exports of manufactured goods, such as foodstuffs, machinery
and transport equipment, and more recently textile. . . based on importance for the Rus-
sian economy, imports from CAC can be categorized energy products, first of all natural
gas, intended primarily for re-export to Ukraine and other east EU (but Former Soviet)
countries; raw materials and intermediate products scarce in Russian or more competitive
than Russian products in some regions of Russia, mainly cheaper ores and metals and coal
from Kazakhstan, cotton from Uzbekistan, clothing from Kyrgyzstan, fruits and vegetables
from Tajikistan. . . Russia is an important trade partner for Central Asia that makes up
over 50% of Uzbekistan's and 1/3 of Turkmenistan's gas exports. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan depend to Russia for 43% and over 30% of imports . . . Russia still remains
an important trading partner for all of them due to its leading role as a sales market for
goods produced by Central Asian extracting and manufacturing industries, as well as their
agricultural sectors, which are significant employers.
1.4.3 Economic ties via mutual FDI
Over the post-Soviet period, FDI inflow between CA and Russia had been growing. In
Figure 1.5, investment flows presented from Russia to CAC and from CAC into Russian
economy. As data suggest, FDI flows from Russia to CA increased nine times and from CA
to Russia twice during 2005-2010 period. However, FDI growth has heterogeneus manner
from one country to country. For instance, Russian investment to Kazakhstan was about
200 mn US$ in 2005 which is than increased six times by 2010, and for the same period
investment flows in opposite direction doubled (from 750 mn $ to 1500 mn $). Russian
FDI for the rest of CA, except Kazakhstan, pretty much at the same level for each given
year in the table.
One other interesting aspect of this data is that investment volume is much larger from
CAC to Russian economy rather than in opposite direction which we would expect the way
around based on sizes of economies5. However, in average, investment from Kazakhstan
to Russia is relatively twice larger. The proportional share of investments from Russia to
each CAC differs. The largest share of investment is to Kazakhstan (about 70-80%), than
at some declining rate, follow Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. There is no data
available about investment flows to Turkmenistan, unfortunately. Regarding investment
that is coming from CA to Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyzgyzstan are the main investors,
respectively, 80% and 17% of total investment.
Regarding FDI by sectors, most of Russian investment comes to CA resource abundant
sectors. CA is well endowed with resources such as oil, gas and other energy related sectors,
however, distribution of the resources aren't the same across CACs (see Table 4 from
5Russia is about ten times larger than Kazakhstan in size of their economy.
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Figure 1.5: Investment flows
Source: Sinitcina [167]
Introduction part). Major Russian investment to Kazakhstan comes via large oil and gaz
companies such as Lukoil and Rosneft to extract oil from reserves such as Kashagan, Tangiz
and Karashyganak of Caspian shelf. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are abundant with gas
and, therefore, Russian' Gazprom and ITERA invest in the gas sector in those countries.
Although, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are less known for their energy resources, Russian
Gasprom is investing into expropation projects in those countries. Russian investments
come not only into energy sectors, but also to other sectors such as mineral resources
sector. Kazakhstan has various type of such mineral reserves. For instance, Kazakhstan is
one of the largest holder of uranium reserves (near Balkash sea), and Russian Rosatom is
the main investor.
1.4.4 Migration ties
Central Asians and Russians were alien to each other before the colonization period. Cen-
tral Asians were Turkic Nomads while Russians were Orthodox Slavs with totally different
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cultures with different languages, religions, mentalities and lifestyles. However, today each
10th citizen of Russia is Central Asian (17.8 million) and of CA citizen is Russian (6.72
million)6. These people (indigenous Russians and Central Asians), without taking into
account temporary labor legal and illegal migrations, have migrated to each others' terri-
tories, mainly, during Soviet years (and after), settled permanently and lived as long as at
least one generation have been born (Table 1.2 ). These migrants form `diasporas', which
create long lasting social and cultural connections between the regions and have an impact
on economic and political relationship between Russia and CAC.
Peyrouse [131] states that in the earlier years of the Soviet Union, 1.7 million Slavs
moved to Central Asia. The number of Slavs, mainly Russians, doubled during WW2 with
reallocation of industries from its east borders to CA to secure them from German forces
and continue supply of Soviet Army with military goods. However, the major influx of
Russians was after WW2. In 1953, under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union began its Virgin
Lands Campaign, aimed at boosting agricultural production by expanding onto underuti-
lized lands of Central Asia (mainly Kazakhstan). By the 1960s, due to the campaign,
USSR agricultural lands increased by 46 million hectares where mainly grain was grown.
Of course, to cultivate such huge amount of lands, besides capital investments, labor forces
were required. Anderson and Silver's (1990) study of Soviet Union population growth and
diversity shows that the Russian population in Central Asia rose from 20.6 to 42.7 % during
the 1950-70s.
In later years, in the 1980-90s, Russian migration to CA slowed down and even began
to reverse, reflecting the production slowdown in CA. The collapse of the USSR caused
another wave of Russian (much lesser Ukrainian, German) outflow who wished to receive
permanent residency in their home lands. In total, from 1979 to 1999, the share of Rus-
sians in Kazakhstan dropped from 40.8% to 30%; in Kyrgyzstan from 25.9% to 12.5%;
in Uzbekistan from 10.8% to 3%; in Tajikistan from 10.4% to 1% and in Turkmenistan
from 12.6% to 2%. The majority of those who left were were well skilled, educated and
young people. While by 2000s outflow of Russians seems to be slowed down, migration of
indigenous Central Asians began. Those migrants were temporary labor forces from CA
with low per capita GDP (from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). Between 1995
and 2010, indigenous CA seeking for job in Russia increased 10 times, from 0.12 to 0.87
million. According to Sinitsina [167], in 2000s, 12.3 million legally and 5-8 million illegally
migrated to Russian from the CAC. Reasons she provide for CA to seek job in Russia are
a visa-free border passage and diasporas.
6CIA Factbook 2013
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1.4.5 Language ties
Language is a key to a culture, but, in trade a difference in languages is an obstacle and
imposes additional trade costs (for example, translation or information costs). However,
this seems not to be an issue in current CA-Russia relations. The Russian language is
not just a lingua franca in CAC-Russia diplomatic meetings and business negotiation, but
also an important part of life in Russia, of course, and in CA. Even though the CA have
their own titular languages and enough time past for them to put their own languages into
daily life use, the Russian language still seems to be popular in everyday life, as well as in
media, in education, in employment and so on.
However, the communal use of the Russian language by CA was not the case before the
USSR. With the exception of Tajik which is of Farsi origin, the CA languages belong to
the Turkic language system with some differences in dialects and word choice. In writing,
they mainly used Arabic and Latin scripts, but under the Soviet rule they all shifted to
the Cyrillic alphabet. Because of some language dialects among CA, each CA SSR had to
adopt new letters in order to use Cyrillic in writing and reading. Further reforms focused on
implementation of Russian language into education system, work and daily communication
that eventually resulted in tradition and popularity of Russian language across CA.
Arguably, while the Russian language brings the CA nations closer to Russia, it may
have made the CA nations more distant from each other. Currently, 70% of CA citizens
(Russians or indigenous CA) make use of Russian language in their daily life rather than
other Central Asian languages; however, this percentage varies across countries. If by 1989,
in Kazakhstan 64%, in Kyrgyzstan 38%, in Tajikistan 31%, in Turkmenistan 28% and in
Uzbekistan 27% of populations had good command of the Russian language, in current
days, the role of the language in some CA countries has decreased.
After independence, CA's language policies aimed to enhance their national identities
and reduce the use of the Russian language (but not by all CA). This was the principal
policy for Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. They have claimed that their tit-
ular language is the state official language, and the Russian language is the inter-ethnic
language. Turkmens and Uzbeks shifted from Cyrillic to Latin script in 1993. As a re-
sult, the Russian language in those countries is mostly used in big cities rather than rural,
and it had an impact on their education system as well. For instance, the proportion of
Turkmen schools that taught in the Russian language declined by 71% by the end of 90s.
Comparing Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the Russian language is more freely used in
Tajikistan, which encouraged bi-linguism (Russian and Tajik). The situation with the use
of the Russian language in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is much better. This is partially
explained by the fact that both countries have a higher population of Russians, 4.4 and 0.6
million, respectively. Both choose to have two official languages, the local, titular and the
Russian language. The use of Russian language was not limited to the education system,
45
in media or public affairs and it is still more used than titular languages (unless it is non-
Russian populated area). However, in both countries nowadays a tendency is observed to
encourage citizens to learn and use the titular language. Especially this is now a principal
requirement for freshly arriving government employees who are criticized in not knowing
(or poorly speaking) in the titular language. The situation seems to be improving in Kyr-
gyzstan where according to 2009 census; 4.1 million citizens now speak in Kyrgyz and 2.5
million citizens in Russian language. Lately, the parliaments of both countries have been
discussing shifting to Latin script following the practice of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
1.5 Theoretical framework and the methodology
HMR [78] utilized the gravity framework to analyse post-colonial trade erosion. We pro-
ceed in similar fashion. A modified form of Newton's gravity equation, the model predicts
the strength of bilateral trade flows based on economic sizes and physical (plus psychic) dis-
tance between trading regions. In the recent decades the gravity model has been grounded
well using various theoretical frames (major ones are offered by Anderson and van Wincoop
[6], Bergstrand [20], Deardorff [34], Eaton and Kortum [45], Chaney [27] and Helpman et
al. [80]). Irrespective of what theoretical foundation is chosen they seem to all agree with
the following expression of gravity model:
xij = gmimjdij (1.1)
where xij is nominal exports from country i to country j, g is global component, mi
and mj are, respectively, exporter (i) and importer (j) specific monadic components, dij is
ij specific dyadic component. Further to derive each component, we choose Anderson and
van Wincoop (AvW [6]) type of theory based gravity framework:
xij =
yiyj∑
j
yj
(
tij
PiPj
)1−σ
. (1.2)
1.5.1 The theoretical gravity model and its components
The monadic component
The monadic component (mi and mj) is the set of unique attributes that are only in
possession of exporter (i) or of importer (j) explaining gravity force of trade between that
particular exporter and importer regions. The monadic component of any i or j is made of
positive (yi,j) and negative (P
1−σ
i,j ) attributes and the component is equal to:
mi,j =
yi,j
P 1−σi,j
(1.3)
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Theoretically speaking, a positive attribute (yi) is the economic size of country i, which
equal the sum by country j of consumption of goods (produced in country i) at a price
(pij) that differs from j's domestic price level by the inclusion of a trade cost (tij):
yi =
∑
j
cijpij (1.4)
Region j's economic size (yj) is calculated analogously. It is common practice in a
gravity analysis to weight the economic size using the nominal GDP of the country.
A negative attribute of (eq. 1.3) is the multilateral resistance to trade (MRT) term,
the central contribution of AvW [6]. The outward trade resistance of exporter region i, Pi,
is price index that take into account the weighted aggregate values of observable traded
costs (
∑
j
tij) and income share (
∑
j
θ
1
1−σ
j ) across all possible import partners and take the
form of CES unit cost functions:
Pi =
∑
j
P σ−1j θjt
1−σ
ij
 11−σ
where σ is the CES elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods. The
CES elasticity of substitution parameter should be larger than one but exact values may
change as preferences and trade opportunities change. Some studies try to estimate (e.g.,
Chen and Novy [28]) or calibrate (e.g., Balistrery and Hillberry [17]) the CES elasticity
parameter, yet it is common for many studies to introduce it exogenously. The inward
trade resistance of importer region j, Pj , is derived in similar fashion as for Pi, i.e., Pj =(∑
i
P σ−1i θit
1−σ
ji
) 1
1−σ
. Both inward and outward MRT terms are not directly observable,
though gravity studies provide methods7 to proxy them.
The global factor (g) is the World economic size, which plays a role of a scale parameter
in the gravity equation which is in a sense also monadic terms as it is equal to the sum of
nominal incomes by importers (j):
g =
1∑
j
yj
(1.5)
In the era of globalization and intense integration, a country builds more trade linkages
with other countries (through liberal reforms, trade agreements or trade unions etc.) and
becomes a part of bigger economy (global or regional economy). This way a country with
its economic size (yj) forms a part of world economy size (
∑
j
yj) and depending on the
7AvW [6] proposed an iterative procedure to estimate MRT terms based on non-linear least squares
but because of its complexity it was overshadowed by simpler proxies such as remoteness or fixed effect
dummies.
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countries economic size relative to world economic size and nature of networking, changes
in (1.5) can affect the l.h.s. of (eq. 1.1) as positively and as negatively.
The dyadic component
The dyadic component (dij) is a trade cost associated with physical and psychic distance
(and quality) in each unique (specific) exporter-importer (ij ) set:
dij = t
1−σ
ij (1.6)
where trade costs, tij , are assumed symmetric in both directions, and take an iceberg
form (e.g., Samuelson [160]):
tij =
∑
m
(
zmij
)γm
In equation above, zmij is a function of bilateral physical and psychic trade barriers
(transport cost, tariffs, quotas, language etc.) and the parameter γm. The geographic dis-
tance between trading countries i and j can serve as proxy of transport cost, but psychic
distance is unobservable and usually if some of its attributes (such as language barrier,
adjacency, colonial history etc.), found to be important in a study, are measured using
through dummies. For instance, HM to capture the effect of independence on trade rela-
tions of colony and metropole used year dummies.
1.5.2 Procedure to decompose trade into gravity components
The gravity model is simple, but has strong predictive power, and has been extensively
used for empirical studies since its first implementation by Tinbergen [176]. Use of the
gravity equation in international trade area involves not only the physical specifics of
trading regions but also with psychic issues (unobservable parameters such as multilateral
resistances (MTRs), Armington elasticity levels, or trade costs associated with policies,
dissimilarities in languages etc.) as at the end trade is between people. Luckily, researchers
who faced the issues have developed extensions to measure unobservable trade costs (e.g.,
AvW [7], Head et al. [78], Jacks et al. [86]) or MTRs (e.g., AvW [6], Baier and Bergstrand
[16]) under the gravity framework. Although they are all relatively new yet they offer
techniques to measure components of trade under the gravity framework which is useful
for our purpose.
One gravity consistent extension is the tetrad method, notably used by HMR [78] to
analyse the time varying effect of independence on trade between a metropole (colonizer),
colony and siblings (other colonies). Unlike HMR [78] we use the tetrad method to de-
compose trade into above discussed country-specific (monadic) and country-pair-specific
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components (dyadic) components which will be explained further.
This method allows us to capture time varying bilateral effects (for instance, caused
by changes in tariffs or non-tariff measures) on trade volumes by eliminating (by division)
all importer, exporter, and global (time) effects as well as fixed bilateral effects (such as
physical distance). In addition to exporter i and importer j countries, we need to take
another two countries, one as reference exporter l and another as reference importer k.
So by taking a tetrad of (1) with ij, ik, lj and lk sets and denoting it as , it can be
represented as
Φ(il)(jk) =
xij/xik
xlj/xlk
, (1.7)
which then through elimination of monadic terms (
yiyj∑
j
yj
(
1
PiPj
)1−σ
), can be reduced to the
tetrad of dij
Φ(il)(jk) =
dij/dik
dlj/dlk
, (1.8)
where dij = t
1−σ
ij is a measure of observable and unobservable trade-cost factors. Since
it is assumed that dij terms contain the trade elasticity, no assumption about the level
of CES elasticity needs to be imposed which is crucially important since its level is not
exact. Using tetrad of dij , it is feasible to measure dij econometrically by taking logs and
inverting (eq. 1.8):
ln
(∼
dij
)
= ln
(
Φ(il)(jk)
)− ln (dlk) + ln (dik) + ln (dlj) . (1.9)
The global component, g, which is approximated using global GDPs level and time-
invariant dyads which is measured with geographic distances, plus taking into account that
time-varying dyads (1.9) allow us to obtain aggregate monadic components separately from
(eq. 1.1) as shown below
ln
(∼
mij
)
= ln (xij)− ln (g)− ln
(∼
dij
)
. (1.10)
Because of (eq. 1.3), we can assume that (eq. 1.10) contain all the exporter (i) and
importer (j ) specific attributes (including MRTs).
1.6 The data and empirical models
1.6.1 Estimation models
We estimate the log-linear form of the gravity model as:
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lnxijt = a0 + a1lnyit + a2lnyjt + a3lndistij + a4langij + a5colij + a6bordij+
+a7llocki + a8llockij + a9lntrfijt + a10RTAijt + Ii + Ij + It + εijt, (1.11)
where lnxijt is log of bilateral exports; lnyit and lnyjt are, respectively, exporter's and
importer's nominal GDPs in logs, the geographic distance (lndistij) proxy for transport
cost, lntrfijt
8 stands for tariff barriers, and the following are binomial dummies to capture
effects of historic (common language and colony), geographic (sharing borders, one and
both landlocked), and economic linkages (both in RTA) effects on trade.
1.6.2 Data
The panel data is bilateral by country pairs which was originally used at the start for
decomposition purposes, and covers Russia and 5 CA countries plus other 31 `most trading'
countries over the period 1995-2011 with 23 274 observations. Sadly, data from 1989-
1992 are either missing, or if reported, are unreliable; these problems also apply to the
data for the period till 1994 which is characterized by hyperinflation. Bilateral trade
flows and tariff rates, in 2007 US dollars were obtained from WITS9. This contains both
the COMTRADE and TRAINS bilateral databases, both of which contain some of the
necessary data, as COMTRADE covers only WTO members, while TRAINS covers all
CA countries, but aggregates the EU into one single region. GDP levels were obtained
from IMF's International Financial Statistics Database, while geographic distances between
capital cities of the countries and standard gravity dummies for common colonial history,
language, borders were obtained from CEPII. Additional dummies for landlockedness and
RTA membership were constructed manually and included to the model. Further details
about countries and industries and about each variable are in the descriptive statistics
section (Table 1.3-1.4).
1.6.3 Estimation methods and issues with estimation
The most common way of estimating the gravity equation is the Dummy Variable Least
Square (DVLS). The DVLS estimator works the same way as the Fixed Effects estimator,
8Taking log of 1+tariff is necessary to account for the cases with zero tariffs in our data.
9World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) is a publicly available bilateral trade data source from
http://wits.worldbank.org/
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Table 1.3: List of countries in the dataset.
so DVLS is a fixed effects estimator, except the fact that it also provide with the estimates
of time invariant variables. Many recent studies that review and test various gravity
estimation method such as Shephard [161], Head & Mayer [79] or WB [193] state that
country pair fixed effects is the most reliable and simple method to estimate gravity of
trade flows.
To perform gravity estimation with the DVLS method, of our base model (eq. 1.11)
we add fixed effect dummies
lnxijt = a0 + a1lnyit + a2lnyjt + a3lndistij + a4langij + a5colij + a6bordij+
+a7llocki + a8llockij + a9lntrfijt + a10RTAijt + a11Iit + a12Ijt + a13It + εijt, (1.12)
where additional variables are Iit is exporter-year, Ijt importer-year and It year binary
dummies proxy Pit, Pjt and Y wt for theoretical consistency.
Feenstra [59] state that DVLS is not the only econometrically correct way of measuring
the gravity equation, but it also theoretically consistent, as the use of fixed effect dummies
control for multilateral resistant to trade terms which are signified after AvW [6] study.
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Table 1.4: Descriptive statistics of variables in the dataset.
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Despite theoretical soundness, DVLS cannot deal with certain econometric issues such as
endogeneity, or selection of zero trade bias, and thus can be and should be re-estimated
with another methods which we introduce below. In some cases, RE probably a convenient
estimator comparing to FE 10, therefore Heckman test should be used to find out whether
fixed effects should be placed or not.
Dealing with endogeneity bias
A range of studies ( Egger et al.[50] & Baier et al.[16]) stress that policy variables in gravity
works are potential cause of endogeneity bias, and therefore our estimates using DVLS can
be inconsistent. For instance, in our gravity equation (eq. 1.11), we have some variables
which we might suspect to be potentially endogenous: variables for RTA and tariffs. RTAs
are unlikely to be purely exogenous: Countries are likely to form RTAs with partners with
which they already trade a lot (WTO [194], p. 118). or current values of tariffs might
be endogenous to import penetration, it is unlikely that past values of tariffs are subject
to the same problem (Shepherd [161], Grossman & Helpman [70]). The usual way to deal
with endogeneity, it is to use IV approaches like TSLS, Hausman-Taylor (1981) technique
or GMM (Generalized Method of Moments). However, if the chosen IV does not hold
double standard11 then TSLS estimates will even more misleading then DVLS (Shepherd
[161]). GMM estimates vary depending on number of lags involved (WTO [194], p. 118).
Dealing with zero trade issue
Another argument usually provided in the recent literature against DVLS estimation is
zero-trade bias. In process of taking natural logs of trade data, zero values drop out
from observation, and DVLS doesn't take them into account during estimation, which is a
source of bias as the estimates are based on positive trade values appearing in a database
used. In the case of large missing or zero trade data in gravity estimation, the Poisson
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood, Heckman Sample Selection, Probit or Tobit are possible
solutions as those methods naturally takes zero trade values, deal with heteroskedasticity
and log abnormality of the error term. Silva & Tenreyro [166] also stress that PPML
despite of presence of large values of zero trade still can provide robust estimates, and
further Shepherd [161] state that PPML is more desirable rather then DVLS when policy
variables are included to the gravity regression. In their work, for instance, Head et al.
[78] identifies that 529,663 observations out of 1,204,671 biletaral trade data is zero (which
is almost half of their data) and employs PPML and Tobit along with the DVLS method.
As pointed out in Martin et al. [115], however, PPML could yield severe biases when a
10See Egger [50]
11(1) strongly correlated with potentially endogenous independent variable and (2) excludable in the
second stage of the TSLS (i.e., not correlated with εijt )
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large number of zero trade values are involved. In our case, however, we have 4,342 zero
trade values of total 23,274 observations which is not as severe as HM [78] case. WB [193]
find that PPML is usually provide with upward lifted estimates which can be very tricky
for interpretation but still the method can be used as the check point estimator.
Dealing with sample selection bias
While PPML accepts zero trade values, there is still a probability of zero trade value
to be non-zero positive trade value. Due to the missing/unreported trade values, PPML
estimated results could be misleading. The other method, DVLS instead ignores zero trade
values and also could be misleading. Shepherd [161] explains this as the violation of the
first assumption of OLS. He state that when the sample (left after dropping zero explained
variables) is not drawn randomly, and probability of being selected is an omitted variable
bias (since explained variable correlated with the other explanatory variables). Thus there
is a need for a method that corrects for selection bias (without assuming zero trade costs
are real zero trade costs or ignoring them).
Such a method is the two step Heckman sample selection procedure12. The Heckman
sample selection method corrects for, as the name implies, the non-random selected sample
bias through the introduction of an additional selection equation (besides our trade model)
where based on set of explanatory variables on the RHS explains possibility of LHS of the
equation to be positive (if OTCI is missing). This is done in two steps.
In the first step, a probit estimator used which calculates the inverse Mills ratio (λ) to
estimate the probability of selection variable omission from the gravity model, and inserts
an extra variable that solve the omitted variable bias.
Prob(I = 1 | Z) = Φ(Zκ), (1.13)
where I = 1 if xij > 0, and I = 0 otherwise; Φ is the cumulative distribution function
of the standard normal distribution, Z is a set of explanatory variables on the RHS of
the gravity model, κ is a vector of undefined parameters. Based on probit estimation,
probability of zero/undefined xij of being positive or not predicted.
In the second step, using predicted probabilities (from the first step) of xij is being a
positive value as an additional explanatory variable, the self-selection bias of the gravity
model will be corrected. Assuming simply that xij = βvij + eij , missing trade cost can be
estimated by using Probit estimates from the first step:
E [lnxˆij | v, I = 1] = βv + ρσeλ(Zκ), (1.14)
where ρ is the correlation between unobserved factors of trade e and unobserved propensity
12in Stata it is heckman command with the option two steps
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to trade ; σe is the standard deviation of e. In this case testing H0 : βλ = 0 | H1 : βλ > 0
becomes testing for sample selectivity as σe > 0, and ρ > 0 then βλ > 0.
It is important to make sure that error terms are jointly normal when Heckman sample
selection method is used. Goldberger [68] argue that if the errors are jointly abnormal,
then HSSM estimated coefficients are inconsistent. As can be see from the studies, all
methods of estimation have their advantages over the other methods and some limitations.
Following the relevant literature we run tests for non-stationarity and co-integration
and report the results in Table 1.5 which shows that some variables (GDPs and RTAs) are
non-stationary in levels but stationary in first differences. Furthermore, there seem to be
no issues with cointegration of variables.
1.7 Results and discussions
1.7.1 Estimation results
Estimation results are presented in Table 1.6 where control variables are categorized by
gravity components: the global component captured by a constant term; the monadic com-
ponent by importer's and exporter's GDP; time-invariant dyadic components are distance,
landlockedness, share common borders, common language, and the common historical col-
onizer and the time-variant dyadic component are the product of gravity tetrads. The
estimates in columns 1 to 5 of Table 1.6 are obtained using (1) Dummy Variable Least
Squares (DVLS) with robust and cluster option, (2) DVLS with AR option, (3) Poisson
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator, (4) Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS),
and (5) First Differencing model (FDE) respectively.
Regarding signs, estimated coefficients across different estimators show a logical re-
lationship with the dependent variable in Table 1.6. Trade is positively associated with
both exporter and importer GDPs as well as with the dummies for a common language,
and with the countries being members of the same RTA, while in contrast, distance, land-
lockedness, and tariff rates are negatively correlated with trade. However, we observe some
sign disagreements of coefficients (depending on estimator in use) such as unexpected signs
on colony variables in the PPML column. The common border is found in many gravity
papers to have positive correlation to trade, but only TSLS column confirms it.
Regarding magnitudes (in Table 1.6), estimated coefficients across all estimators are
similar which enables us to confirm a range of predictions. DVLS (RC) and DVLS (AR)
coefficients are more similar compared to TSLS or PPML ones, indicating that serial
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Table 1.5: Non-stationarity and cointegration test results
Note: (a) null hypothesis is variable is non-stationary, and (b) null hypothesis is no
cointegration.
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Table 1.6: Gravity regression estimates
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are *** p<0.001, **
p<0.01, * p<0.05
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correlation is not a severe issue (as expected for short time-series panel). Controlling for
endogeneity changes some coefficients slightly (GDPs, distance, and border), but inclusion
of zero trade values produces even more change in coefficients for most variables. This
is notable from the number of observations in the DVLS and TSLS cases (19,522) and
in the PPML case (23,273). Inclusion of more observations indeed gives more precise
estimates, and, in fact, we observe quite a significant change in coefficient values. Despite
the improvements in estimates due to inclusion of zero trades it is hard to rely on PPML.
Besides, PPML goodness of fit is only 59%, which is lower than the other estimators' fit
(which have R2 around 81-82%). FDE compared with DVLS provides coefficients almost
twice smaller  a regularity, which has been pointed out in Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk [186].
Starting with more statistically significant variables, geographic distance (proxying
transport costs and other distance related factors) leads to a 16-22% decrease in trade
if transport costs increase by 10%. Similar results are obtained by Suvankulov and Guc
[171]. Usually gravity studies estimate a distance coefficient close to one but for CA-
Russia trade it is higher. The huge distance of CA and major industrial areas of Russia
(in Ural and Siberia) from the major trade centres creates a big obstacle and high costs
for their goods to be competitive in world markets. The effect is exacerbated further by
the fact that CA is a landlocked region, having no direct access to sea corridors and a
long common border line with Russia and dependence on rail corridors passing mainly
through Russian territory. Further, our estimates show that a 13-35% or 10-51% trade
drops when one (exporter or importer) or both traders are landlocked respectively. A
common border negatively affects trade - trade drops by 0.3-1%. The negative impact
of the common border between Russia and CA might be explained by high extra costs
associated with crossing territories of neighboring countries in order to export or import
goods. In that respect, it is worth pointing out that CA countries impose extra obstacles
to each other's trade and transit through their territory, especially when they are double
landlocked (like Uzbekistan) meaning that a country is not only landlocked, but surrounded
by other landlocked countries. Observable policy barriers such as import tariffs are still
play significant role. Except the PPML results, we find that tariffs are statistically and
economically significant as increase in tariff rate by 1% causes only about 1.9-3.8% trade
drop.
On the other hand, while geographic factors work against trade, monadic, global and
some other dyadic variables enhance their trade. A 10% increase in anexporter's GDP
increase trade by 0.6-4.8%, while an increase in the importer's GDP increase leads to
3.9-7.8% increase in trade meaning that importer's GDP is more important for trade.
This finding makes sense when we consider the fact that overland transportation costs
in trade of CA-Russia are very high and these are passed (afforded) usually to importers
(AvW [7]). Besides both regions are well endowed with energy and minerals therefore their
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trade volumes are highly and positively correlated with their production volumes. World
economy with upward turns in its prices and demand for resources and goods offered by
the regions has only increased trade volumes by average of 80% despite of some hardships
seen during earlier years of independence (when the region experiences USSR collapse
and transition shocks), then the 1998 Russian crisis, and 2008 Global crisis. Bilateral
economic relations improved over time which is confirmed by unit level positive increasing
relationship between time-varying dyad and trade.
1.7.2 Dynamics of trade components
Following the previously described procedure; we were able to decompose trade flows be-
tween CA and Russia (Figure 1.6 ). There are three plots presenting the dynamics of the
fitted log of trade flows (green lines) and dyadic ties of CA with Russia, with itself, with
siblings and with the rest of the partners for 1995-2011 period.
The Metrapole-Colony case: economic ties declined over time but trade in-
creased
Russia and Central Asia trade flows and relations are presented in part a of Figure 1.5.
Trade had contracted gradually in 1990s, but then after 2001 started growing sharply with
its pick in 2008. Economic ties (represented by dyadic curve) show that the ties have
been relatively higher in the first decade rather than second decade. Especially they have
been high during 1996-1999, and two sharp declines in dyads right after 1999 and after
2008. The changes in trade and dyads coincide with major events occurred or affected
their trade relations. In the early years of independence CA and Russia were interested in
building trade relations with developed non-Soviet countries. Despite several attempts at
establishing stronger economic ties via regional trade agreements during 1996-1998 such
as the EurAzEC, the FTA-CIS, or the EAEC organisations, they were more formal rather
than practical organisations but, even so turned the relations among the group of countries
into a complex spaghetti bowl-like system. Improvement of the global economic state at
the start of 2000s, has increased trade and dyadic relations between CA and Russia by
increasing their GDP levels, FDI inflows into energy and other extraction sectors growth,
enlargement of commodity transit through each other's territories. The global economic
downturn in 2008 reduced their trade sharply and also dyadic relations (which perhaps
paradoxically coincide with Jacks et al. [86] findings which show that trade costs have
increased during that period).
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The case of siblings: Intra-Central Asian trade and economic relations declined
In the next plot, part b of Figure 1.5, trade flows and dyadic (economic) ties of 5 CA
countries presented. The notable feature here is that both (trade and economic ties) are
declining over time with more or less similar dynamic patterns. After 1996, both, intra-
regional trade and economic ties drop which could be accounted for by hyperinflations
observed during 1995-96 is southern parts of the region (i.e. in Turkmenistan and Uzbek-
istan plus political instabilities in Tajikistan). With the wave of regional negotiations and
trade agreements from 1996, trade and economic relations began to improve until 1999
(Russian crisis) and further declined until then next crisis (in 2008). To note here that
while CA-Russia (and also as we observe later with ROW) trade ties have been improving,
internal trade and economic relations have been reducing. This can be the case, as in a
number of commodities, CA countries compete mainly with each other, impose trade and
policy obstacles. For instance, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in gas sector, Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan in the oil sector, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in cotton sector.
Another interesting feature we observe is that while CA trade sharply declined (in 2008-
9) and then recovered (in 2010-11) making a V-shape, during the same time, intra-CA
trade made an A-shape implying that trade diversion (from ROW and Russia) and trade
creation (among CA countries) effects occurred.
Colony and ROW: economic ties and trade are improving
The last plot, part c of Figure 1.5 presents trade flows and economic relations of CA with
the rest of trade partners (excluding Russia). During 1995-2002, trade flows were declining
at an aggregate level while economic relations were being establishing. Most of the CAC
took radical steps to restructure their economies into market oriented economies during
that time, and did not represent an attractive economic environment to foster trade yet
(high level of corruption, low quality of produce, underdeveloped transport infrastructure,
and political instability in south parts etc.). Starting with 2002, trade values of the CAC
with the rest of the world began to improve. The unexpected downturn of the dyadic
curve from 2003 to 2006 (when trade volumes were increasing) and upturn during 2007-
2009 (when the world was in financial crisis and trade made a V-shape) doesn't mainly
explain trade dynamics: by contrast monads do. With stable improvements of prices
for main produce of the region (such as oil, gas, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, cotton
and other produce), the region become more attractive for developed regions of the world.
World demand, new production technologies coming with FDI and bigger MNEs, especially
for energy and mining, cotton and other sectors improved CA trade with the rest of the
world (especially with EU and China).
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1.8 Conclusion
In this empirical study, we have attempted to analyse trade between CA and Russia in
1995-2011 period. Russia colonized CA over 150 years ago and CA become independent in
1991 only. Head, Mayer & Ries (HMR [78]) study finds that in post-colonial period, colony-
colonizer trade erode by 60% in 30 years. However, if we consider that the relationship
between Russia and CA is a colonizer-colony one, than we find that in post-Soviet period
their trade does not comply with HMR predictions. Under the gravity concept we have
decomposed trade patterns into monadic and dyadic components. Further we compared
the dynamics of each component with dynamics of variables over time. As HMR study
predicts, CA-Russia economic ties were cooling over the last two decades and dropped
by 40% (relative to its level in 1996), however trade which has taken an upward trend
is not explained by dyads but by monads. Our conclusions are based on the fact that
in the post-Soviet period, trade between the CA and Russia trade has diverged from the
expected post-colonial decline because of increasing GDPs and deeper integration with the
world economy. Economic, political and social ties such as traditional trade specialization
(CAC supplies production inputs and Russia refine them), Soviet infrastructural linkages,
commonly spoken Russian and labour migrations are become traditional part of CA-Russia
relationship that are inherited from Soviet era are yet highly present in CA-Russia trade as
can be observed from intra-industrial trade and specialisations. Integration to the World
market, increase of demand for goods and investments for energy sectors of CA, economic
co-operations of Russia-CA industries, easing tariff and NTBs via multilateral regional
trade agreements are the main driving forces behind Russia CA trade.
One possible reason why Russia-CAC post-Soviet trade does not comply with HMR's
[78] prediction is the assumption that Russia-CA colonial relations are the same as other
former European colonial relations. Indeed, we find strong arguments that allow putting
CA-Russia relations as standard colonial relations such as distant control of CA region from
Moscow, exploitation of CA' human and natural resources for industries needs of Russia,
reformation of titular language and education systems with Russian one etc. However,
unlike in `standard' colonial relations, Russian-CA relations were based on an ideological
doctrine (of Marxism) about social equality among USSRs and union of free republics.
Besides, unlike European colonies that were separated from colonizers by oceans and seas,
Russia and CA are geographical neighbours with large overland border between, plus pos-
sess large amount of natural resources and population.
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Chapter 2
Openness and isolation: The trade
performance of the Former Soviet
Central Asian countries
Abstract
Previous studies characterize some of the Former Soviet Central Asian countries (CAC)
as more open (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) and others as more isolated (Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan) depending on their trade-over-GDP level. Being an open or
isolationist economy has resulted respectively in more or less suitable environment for busi-
ness and investment. We investigate the drivers of CAC trade performance by measuring
contributions of country-specific properties and networking factors in 185 bilateral CAC
trade flows over the period 1995-2011. We find that, even though all CAC's trade has
increased greatly since 1995, for the more open economies (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan)
trade changes are mainly explained by networking (bilateral) factors while for isolationist
economies (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) changes in trade are mostly explained
by country-specific properties.
2.1 Introduction
While much of the literature on post-Soviet transition has focused on the experiences of the
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation, the Central Asian
Countries (CAC) have received relatively less attention1. There is no study focusing on
the trade determinants and performance of CAC, even though it has been recognized that
there is a strong correlation between success in transition from plan to market and foreign
1Some notable exceptions are Rumer ([155, 156, 157]), Burghart and Sabonis-Helf [26], Pomfret [134,
135], Starr [169], Hausmann et al. [74], Dowling and Wignaraja [41, 42], and UNDP [191] which focus on
general economic development and political issues.
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trade performance (Kaminski et al., [91]). In addition, the international business (IB)
literature has not paid enough attention to the developments in Central Asia after Soviet
Union disintegration and there is no study focusing on the business environment in the
CAC and their trade performance2.
Much of the existing (economics) literature has tended to treat the CAC as a relatively
homogenous region. However, after more than two decades of independence, important
differences are emerging. In terms of trade performance, the trade/GDP ratio over the
period 1995-2011 is much higher for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (38% on average) than for
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (26% in average). This ranking also corresponds
to that in the 2013 World Bank Doing Business report (Table 2.1), which reflects the
ease of doing business, tax collection, investor protection, access to credit, trading across
borders, corruption, economic freedom and competitiveness. Kazakhstan (49th out of 183
countries) is the highest ranking CAC, followed by Kyrgyzstan (70), Tajikistan (141), and
Uzbekistan (154) while Turkmenistan is not ranked at all. This perhaps illustrates the
close ties between trade openness and overall politico-economic reforms.
The standard transition literature emphasizes a combination of initial conditions and
the reform policies adopted during the transition period (Falcetti et al. [55] present a
good review). Both initial conditions and, especially, reform policies vary substantially.
Trade performance clearly reflects, in part, initial conditions, such as resource abundance,
geography, transport infrastructure, specialization, colonial ties, and so on (Elbourgh-
Woytek [51], Grigoriou [69], Levy [107], Pomfret [139], Sinitsina [167], Suvankulov & Guc
[171]) as well as national business culture (Wu et al. [183], Buck et al. [25]) or corporate
governance (Filatochev et al. [62]). These are quite heterogeneous, as we discuss below.
However, there is also a strong contrast in terms of reforms enacted since the mid-1990s,
as measured by the EBRD transition indicators (Stark and Ahren [168]). It is not easy
to disentangle the effects of varied initial conditions from those of ongoing reforms, and
this is made even harder by a changing global and regional environment which impacts the
different players to varied degrees (Levy [107]).
In the paper, we develop a IB inspired theoretical framework to motivate hypotheses
and investigate what factors are more important for each individual CAC by measuring
proportional share of country-specific properties and networking factors in bilateral trade
flows, utilizing the gravity concept (e.g., Head et al. [78], Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk [186])
that explains bilateral trade in terms of country masses (country-specificities) and dis-
tances (networking). By taking a ratio of the ratios of bilateral trade, we can separate
2The IB literature has a few examples of papers on disintegration and rebuilding of networks between
former Soviet republics (e.g., Davis et al, 1996), but these papers are now rather old. Pittman [133] covers
Central Asia, but from the limited perspective of transport system restructuring.
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country-specific from networking (bilateral) factors. Our analysis of 185 CAC bilateral
trade observations, based on a 37 country panel covering the 1995-2011 period shows that:
(i) networking factors explain 50% or more of changes in Kazakhstan's and Kyrgyzstan's
trade flows and 5-14% of changes in Turkmenistan's, Uzbekistan's and Tajikistan's trade;
(ii) 75% of changes in the 185 bilateral CAC's trade flows are mainly explained by country
specific properties, i.e., monadic driven trade; (iii) 25% of the 185 bilateral CAC's trade
flows are explained by networking (bilateral) factors such as transport costs, landlocked-
ness and RTAs, i.e., dyadic driven trade; (iv) open CAC are more sensitive to global and
regional changes compared to isolationist CAC.
2.2 Context, theory and hypotheses
2.2.1 The CAC context
All CAC became independent in 1991. Similarities in initial conditions reflect their history,
geographic closeness and cultures. CAC populations originate from the same Turkic tribes.
Historically, all were colonized by Tsarist Russia and belonged to the Soviet Union for over
74 years. All are geographically landlocked. CAC differ in terms of neighbors, land sizes
and landscape, size of population, endowment of natural resources, and historic production
specialization. Kazakhstan possesses the largest territory, borders with Russia and China
and has relatively better rail and road connections left from Soviet times. It is well endowed
with oil, coal, metals and agricultural land. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are
mountainous, smaller in size and population and have mountain borders with China and
Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has a relatively large population, possesses substantial natural gas
reserves and good conditions for cotton production. Turkmenistan is much more sparsely
populated, but well-endowed with natural gas.
Pomfret [137] among others concludes that transition reforms proceeded faster in Kyr-
gyzstan and Kazakhstan and slower in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. EBRD
transition indicators (Table 2.2 ) show a similar ranking in terms of privatization and price
liberalization - policies which are an important stage of ongoing transition reforms (Bar-
low and Radulescu [18]). Although Uzbekistan did well with price liberalization in the
mid-1990s, it kept enterprises under state control and has been slow with other reforms.
Gas-rich Turkmenistan has been reluctant to make substantial changes in its economy, al-
though after the death of the president Nyazov in 2006 the country has begun to liberalize.
Tajikistan went through a civil war (1992-1997) and since then has been slow to implement
reforms.
The CAC faced huge trade and production hardships with the Soviet collapse and
subsequent hyperinflation in 1991-1996. Within a year of independence trade with Russia
fell tenfold (Sinitsina [167]). Later, in 1998-1999, CAC were hit by the Russian financial
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crisis. Despite these circumstances, countries were already beginning to diverge in terms
of international integration  particularly, though not exclusively with Russia. Already
by 1998 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had joined several major RTAs with
Russia, including the CISFTA in 1994, EurAsEc and SCO in 1996 while Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan were only observers (see Figure 2 ). CAC trade with Russia was damaged
substantially by the 1998 crisis, especially those countries which had engaged in integration
(Westin [182]). The more isolationist Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had less exposure. The
period 2000-2007 was more fruitful as world prices for the CAC's primary export goods
(oil, gas, cotton) accelerated and volumes of trade and FDI inflows, mainly from China and
Europe, increased. The main beneficiaries were the more open economies, but Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan also benefited from a global boom and increasing global gas demand,
negotiating with China and Iran to reduce their dependence on the Russian market. The
2008 crisis had both direct and indirect effects on the CAC's trade and economic wellbeing.
The exposure of Kazakhstan's banks to the global financial crisis spread to Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan which had more limited financial links with
other CAC, Russia and rest of the world where originally less affected by the crisis.
2.2.2 Theory and hypotheses
A game tree of openness and trade: actors and interactions
The degree of openness or isolation of an economy can be seen as the outcome of the
interaction of decisions of a number of actors in response to their environment and to each
other. The principle actors in any economy constitute consumers/voters, government,
MNEs and local firms: however, we should also note that the specific postSoviet environ-
ment tends to include important roles for ethnic (particularly Russian) minorities and for
the politically-connected oligarchs who rose during and just after the fall of Communism.
Broadly speaking, Figure 2.1, below, shows a game tree outlining the interactions of these
actors.
Trade policy is set by the governments, and may take the form of multilateral liber-
alisation or regional integration (the latter being increasingly favoured by the intended
development of the Eurasian Union). Governments also set the regulatory environment
governing trade and FDI, and have influence on the legal environment, as well as influenc-
ing the quality of transport linkages and border efficiency. The presence of multinational
agreements and RTAs shows that governments interact with one another: particularly their
neighbors (and the rest of the world).
At the same time, however, the trade performance of an economy depends upon the
decisions of other actors (at micro level), notably firms. If the larger local firms and MNEs
respond to liberalisation by expanding trade greatly, then the country will see an increase
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in competition and specialisation gains from trade, in turn benefiting consumers. The more
elastic is firms' response, the less will be the `beggar-my-neighbour' incentive of a country
to protect its economy for terms-of-trade reasons (Edwards [49]). Firms' responses will,
of course, reflect remoteness and transport networks. Limao and Venables [108] find that
trade performance is affected by high overland transport costs of goods. Historic business
networks (Rauch and Trindade [145]) and their collapse and re-emergence (Davis et al. [32])
and colonial ties (Head et al. [78])3 also play an important role. To the extent that MNEs
drive the trade response, their liability of foreignness (Zaheer [185]) can be an important
factor as well. However, Yildiz and Fey [184] argue that in transition (and emerging)
countries the liability of foreignness is relatively less important due to ability of NMEs to
bypass local suppliers, customers' favourable stereotypes and curb of appeal brought by
the MNEs, and possibly host governments' desire for FDI and foreign technology (e.g.,
Bevan et al. [24]).
Depending upon the response of firms, there will be gains in income (perhaps with
offsetting losses in security) to voters (in Figure 2.1, defined as theta which will increase).
However, in countries of limited democracy with powerful oligarchs, the lobbying power
of the latter is also crucial: if oligarchs' power is based in exporting industries (such as
through the control of natural resources), they may favour trade expansion, while if they
control import-competing industries they will resist growth in trade or FDI (in Figure 2.1,
(1-theta) will increase). In line with standard political economy bargaining theory, we
can see the decision-making by government as reflecting the relative bargaining weights of
voters and oligarchs, which will be dependent on the political and institutional makeup of
the country.
The actors in the CAC
Governments: A recent IMF Survey (IMF [190]) finds a strong correlation between politi-
cal regime and trade policies of the CAC. While all countries have relatively authoritarian
regimes, there are still considerable differences in political systems. Kyrgyzstan and Kaza-
khstan are somewhat more liberal compared to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Kaser [93] and Luong and Weinthal [113] link the CACs' economic performance to varia-
tion in political regimes, as Kazakhstan is characterized as populist with soft autocracy,
Kyrgyzstan as dualist with electoral democracy, and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turk-
menistan as centralist with hard autocracy. Reflecting this, economic liberalisation of
each CAC is at different stages. There are many other related country-specific features
(majority and minority population make up, liberalisation level, FDI level and so on) that
affect CAC trade performance. Some CACs (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan)
3Acharya et al. [1] assert the impact of colonial ties between former Soviet countries on current trade
patterns.
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have a higher level of government intervention and state control in their economies com-
pared to others (Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) where the economy is more liberal and
relatively more influenced by regional or global economic conditions.
Firms: According to Pomfret [138], Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, relative
to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are among the slowest of the transition economies to re-
form, with firms facing less competition and softer budget constraints compared to Russia,
let alone the EU Accession states. Nevertheless, the CAC, as other transition countries,
have experienced radical transformations in their political and business landscapes due to
the wave of deregulation and liberalization of their economies after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union (Hoskisson et al. [83], Filatotchev et al. [62]). These dramatic economic
and political changes affecting CAC firms can be seen as regulatory punctuations lead-
ing to radical environmental change (Haveman et al. [75], Perez-Batres and Eden [130]).
Firms' strategic responses to radical environmental change are an important factor for the
aggregate trade performance of the CAC.
To better understand firm responses to regulatory punctuations in the CAC, we find
useful insights in the IB literature on liability of foreignness, and particularly the extension
to this concept by Perez-Batres and Eden [130] who introduced the parallel concept of
liability of localness. Eden and Miller's [46] definition of liability of foreignness focuses
on the socio-political and relational hazards associated with being a stranger in a strange
land. Similar to the liability of foreignness facing potential MNE incomers (e.g., Zaheer
and Mosakowski [185], Eden and Miller [46]), the ongoing transition reforms are producing a
degree of `liability of localness' (Perez-Batres and Eden [130]), with local firms less familiar
with operating in a globalised and marketised environment. Thus, liability of localness
is about the added costs faced by local firms, adjusting to now being different from
then; the competitive landscape facing the firms has shifted markedly, necessitating new
strategies for survival. Local firms need to learn the `rules of the game' under liberalisation
(Dunning [44], Miller and Pisani [119]).
Perez-Batres and Eden [130] demonstrate that emerging market firms with interna-
tional experience in developed countries can better interpret their home market evolving
institutions which in turn lessens the emerging market firms' liability of localness. In a
related analysis D'Aveni and Macmillan [33] show that under strenuous situations, such as
regulatory punctuations, firms focusing their attention on the external environment out-
performed those focusing their attention on the internal aspects of the business. Their
argument rests on the notion that most internal aspects of the business are not neces-
sarily aligned with the new business landscape and need to change. Alternatively, firms
that focus on the internal aspects of their business, during strenuous situations, may be
operating under the assumptions of past cognitive, normative, or regulatory structures.
Given the prevailing privatization methods in CACs such as buyouts by local managers
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and give-away deals (Filatotchev et al. [62]) many firms with incumbent managers have
focused their attention on the internal aspects of the business thus facing high liability of
localness.
Furthermore, under uncertain political and economic condition such as after the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union, many CAC firms would necessarily have not understood their
new institutional environment and this misconception (Scott [162]) has hindered their abil-
ity to function. According to Levitt & March [106], the greater the uncertainty, the more
likely organizations are to engage in exchange relations with those with whom they have
transacted in the past and with those of similar status. Thus, in the CAC given that many
firms were trading or had closer organisational links with firms from other Soviet Union
countries, especially Russia, it is likely that trade patterns after political independence
and market liberalisation will remain strongly associated with the former Soviet Union
countries, and in particular Russia.
In summary, the implication for our theoretical framework is that the liability of local-
ness produces a position where oligarchs and state-actors in industries opening to foreign
competition may lose. In turn, the weakness of local firms  the liability of localness -
increases the profit-shifting motives for protectionism (Bagwell and Staiger [12]), and also
increases the risks of protectionist lobbying by oligarchs.
Voters and the role of minorities: Although Russian-speaking minorities have shrunk
considerably since 1989 estimates from 2007 suggest that there were still 4 million ethnic
Russians in Kazakhstan (25% of the population) and 500,000 (or about 10% of the popula-
tion) in Kyrgyzstan. By contrast, the formerly sizeable Russian populations in Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have shrunk to less than 3% of the population4. Given that
the role of language ties is often emphasised by gravity studies as a driver of trade, it is
likely that Russian minorities will stimulate policy towards openness  at least in the form
of RTAs with Russia (and Belarus). This is magnified by the increasing foreign policy
assertiveness of Russia vis a vis ethnic Russians beyond its borders5. Ethnic composition
and pressure from Russia may both explain why Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzia are more open
 yet more biased towards Russia  in trade than other CAC.
The environment and specificities of CAC: The CAC are large in area, though sparsely
populated, and are all landlocked. This reduces trade potential, compared to countries
with sea ports. Raballand [142] emphasizes the variation in landlockedness of each CAC.
Adding to this are issues of transport infrastructure and logistics services in CAC (Grigoriou
[69]). Reduced trade potential also reduces the potential benefits to a country from trade
liberalisation. Again, Kazakhstan, which has industrialised border areas closer to the
Russian Urals, may have more trade potential than countries further to the South.
4http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/OP297.pdf
5http://www.eurasiareview.com/06082014-post-crimea-central-asian-fear-putins-stick-analysis/
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Resource endowment has an important influence on trade performance. Auty [10],
World Bank [195], Pomfret [136], Felipe et al. [60] all point out that there is a strong
correlation between the resource abundance and trade performance of the CAC. Turk-
menistan and Kazakhstan can be viewed as much richer in resources than the other CAC;
while this has a clear effect on trade outcome (the recovery in resource prices from 2000
boosted these economies), the effect upon policy is harder to determine, since Kazakhstan
is relatively open and Turkmenistan isolationist.
Historical environment also affects current performance by government and firms. The
role of inter-firm networking is explored in Davis et al. [32] for the case of decline and re-
emergence of Soviet era ties in Estonia  but similar networking factors apply to Central
Asia. Historically poor governance may make effective trade reforms difficult. Tai and Lee
[174] emphasise bureaucratic barriers to trade: investors spend 20% (in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan) and 48% (in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) of their time to deal
with unnecessary bureaucracy. Using the 2010 World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI),
Mogilevskii [120] points out the heterogeneity of governance efficiency; out of 230 countries,
Kazakhstan ranks 138, Kyrgyzstan 171, Tajikistan 187, Uzbekistan 199, and Turkmenistan
201. The importance of governance environment for trade is also emphasized by Wu et al.
[183].
Hypotheses: expectations and feedback in the openness game
The non-government actors will affect government policy via three routes. The first is
through direct feedback: the various players will support or oppose reform depending
upon their perceived self-interest: their influence will depend upon the political reality and
bargaining power. The second is through expectations (affected by uncertainty), as in any
forward-looking game expected gains will determine the nature and degree of lobbying.
The third is the interaction of different lobbies between countries, given that the benefits
of trade liberalisation are usually greater when the countries act concertedly.
The history of post-Communist transition countries½¦ reform process is also important
in determining whether a country is likely to engage in further liberalisation. Based on
EBRD data, Barlow and Radulescu [18] find, for example, that reform is more likely to
continue and spread to other areas in economies where there is early privatisation of small
business. This may well feedback through differences in the lobbying balance within the
economies.
Trade outcomes (the relative size and changes in trade for each CAC) can be seen
in Table 2.3. Crucially, observed trade in all CAC has recovered sharply in the period
since 1998. The common factor is that incomes in the Central Asian region grew sharply,
spurred by growing demand from its main export market (Russia) and, in resource-rich
countries, by rising mineral prices. While Kyrgyzstan may have seen lower export growth
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Table 2.3: CAC exports, imports and inner trade
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (2013)
than, say, Turkmenistan, this difference can be explained by the fact that the latter is a
major gas exporter, at a time when fossil fuel demand was buoyant, while the former is
resource-poor.
Clearly, observed changes in trade volumes reflect the complex interactions represented
in the openness game tree: the key role of gravity analysis that follows is in decomposing
and quantitatively explaining the outcomes. Following on the discussion in our theory
section and to help interpret in a structured way our gravity analysis results we formulate
four hypotheses:
 H1: The observed recovery in trade volume (outcome measures of global integration)
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is not necessarily driven by falling trade costs (policy measure), but may reflect other
country specific or environmental factors.
 H2: Networking (bilateral) factors have strongly boosted trade in the more open
CAC, whereas the more isolationist countries½¦ trade has grown in spite of, rather
than because of, trade policy.
 H3: The countries which have opted for stronger regional integration with other CIS
states are also more open towards the Rest of the World (RoW) than the isolationist
CAC.
 H4: Cyclical fluctuations in the trade of the more open CAC are more closely linked
to those of the RoW while isolationist CAC trade is only weakly affected by ROW
processes.
2.3 Methodology and data
2.3.1 The Tetrad method
We continue our analysis with the concept of gravity. However, this time, we make emphasis
on dyads.
In previous chapter, we used tetradic measures of dyads over time to analyse colonial
ties of CAC with Russia. In this chapter, to analyse heterogeneity among CAC in terms
of investment, business climate and economic performance, we use those tetradic measures
but in a different manner. Firstly, we do not aggregate the dyadic measures by regions
(like in previous chapter) but use them at the level of country pairs. Further, because a
tetraded dyadic measure is also regarded as a trade cost measure (with the help of reference
trade flows used to compute them), the tetradic measure is therefore equated to trade cost
variables from gravity model presented in previous chapter. Thus, our model takes the
following form:
ln (tij) = a0 + a1lndistij + a2langij + a3colij + a4bordij + a5llocki + a6llockij
+a7ln1trijt + a8RTAijt + Iit + Ijt + Iijt + uijt. (2.1)
In (eq. 2.1), the geographic distance (lndistij) proxy for transport and distance related
cost, tariff6 stands for observable policy cost, and further binomial dummies capture effects
of historic (common language and colony), other geographic (sharing borders, one and
6Taking log of 1+tariff is necessary to account for the cases with zero tariffs in our data.
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both landlocked), and economic linkages (one and both in RTA) effects on trade cost, Iit
is exporter-year, Ij is importer-year and It represents year binary dummies to proxy Pit,
Pjt and
∑
j
yj , respectively, for theoretical consistency, and finally uijt is an error term. In
the equation above time constant variables such as lndistij , unlike time variant ones, have
no time subscript t.
Because, we assume that product of tetrading stands for trade costs, the derived values
from tetrading - the dyads - can be a proxy for bilateral factors (i.e., for tij), it is also
meaningful to run gravity model of the following simple form:
lnxijt = a0 + a1lnyit + a2lnyjt + ln
(
Φ(il)(jk)
)
+ Iit + Ijt + Iijt + εijt. (2.2)
2.4 Estimation results
2.4.1 Gravity model results
Results for both models are presented in Table 2.7, where in part a, regression results of
(3.4) with a dependent variable is log of exports and in part b, estimation output of (3.3)
with log of tetrad as explained variable. The estimates in columns 1 to 5 are obtained using
(1) Dummy Variable Least Squares (DVLS) with robust and cluster option, (2) DVLS with
AR option, (3) Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS), (4) Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) estimator, and (5) First Differencing model (FDE) respectively.
Regarding signs, estimated coefficients across different estimators show a logical rela-
tionship between the explained variable and explanatory variables and agree with correla-
tion matrix results; trade is positively associated with both exporter and importer GDPs,
and with dyadic term that stand for aggregate trade costs. One would expect a negative
sign in front of the log of tetrad term which is logical (i.e., distance is negatively correlated
for instance). However, in HMR's expression of the tetradic term which we follow, the
trade elasticity term hasn't been adjusted for that (i.e, instead of powering with (σ − 1)
like Novy (2007) did to obtain an overall trade cost measure, the trade elasticity stay the
same as (1−σ)). In part b therefore the log of tetrad term as log of export has a similar cor-
relation with trade cost variables. In other words, as expected, signs of common language,
and with the countries being members of the same RTA are positive, while coefficient sign
of distance, landlockedness, and tariff rates are negative.
Regarding magnitudes, estimated coefficients across all estimators are similar which
enables us to confirm a range of predictions. DVLS (RC) and DVLS (AR) coefficients
are more similar compared to TSLS or PPML ones, indicating that serial correlation is
not a severe issue (as expected for short time-series panel). Controlling for endogeneity
changes some coefficients slightly (GDPs, distance, and border), but inclusion of zero trade
values produces even more change in coefficients for most variables. This is notable from
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Table 2.4: Tetrad regression estimates
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are *** p<0.001, **
p<0.01, * p<0.05
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the number of observations in the DVLS and TSLS cases (19,522) and in the PPML case
(23,273). Inclusion of more observations indeed gives more precise estimates, and in fact
we observe quite a significant change in coefficient values. Despite the improvements in
estimates due to inclusion of zero trades it is hard to rely on PPML as its goodness of
fit is only 59% and lower than the other estimators' fit of 81-82%. FDE compared with
DVLS provides coefficients almost twice smaller  a regularity, which has been pointed out
in Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk [186].
Both statistically and economically significant variables: tariffs, distance and
landlockedness
A 10% increase in distance leads to a 16-22% decrease in trade. Similar results are
obtained by Suvankulov and Guc [171]. Usually gravity studies estimate the distance
coefficient equal to one but the geographic distance is indeed important factor when we
talk about CAC trade. The huge distance of CAC from the major trade centres creates a
big obstacle for their goods to be competitive in world markets. The effect is exacerbated
further by the fact that CAC are landlocked having no direct access to sea corridors. A 13-
35% or 10-51% trade drops when one (exporter or importer) or both traders are landlocked
respectively. Except the PPML results in Table 2.7, we find that tariffs are statistically
and economically significant as increase in tariff rate by 1% causes only about 1.9-3.8%
trade drop.
Only statistically (but not economically) significant variables: RTA member-
ship, GDP levels and common border
To reduce trading costs CAC join RTAs which is beneficial only to those who are in the
same RTA. A 10% increase in RTA leads to a 5-16% trade increase, while if only one
country is a RTA member trade drops by 0.6-17%. A 10% increase of exporter's GDP
increases trade by 0.6-4.8%, while 10% importer's GDP increase leads to 3.9-7.8% increase
in trade meaning that importer's GDP is twice as important in the case of CAC. This
finding makes sense when we consider the fact that overland transportation costs in trade
with CAC are very high and these are passed to importers (AvW [7]). In contrast to other
gravity studies, a common border negatively affects trade - trade drops by 0.3-1%. This
might be explained by the fact that we considering trade of landlocked countries which have
to pay extra costs associated with crossing territories of neighbouring countries in order to
export or import goods. Except the PPML results, we find that tariffs are statistically but
not economically significant as increase in tariff rate by 1% causes only about 0.2% trade
drop.
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2.4.2 Gravity decomposition results
There are 185 (5 CAC by 37 partners) country pair trade relations decomposed into
monadic (country-specific) and dyadic (networking) components. By plotting these over
the period 1995-2011 (Figure 2.2 ), we can observe changes in the trade flows and bilateral
relations over time. For simplicity trade and dyads obtained only by DVLS estimator and
using France and Germany as reference importer and export respectively are reported. We
find that in 17 years of independence each CAC improved its trade with all countries in
the pool (37 countries including intra-trade) and country-specific and networking factors
increased their influence. The changes vary from country pair to country pair though, but
it is still feasible to categorize results into two groups as follows.
Monadic driven bilateral trade
In this group of country pairs, a gap appears between trade flow and bilateral trade com-
ponent (dyad) which becomes wider over time. This happens because the slope of growing
trade flows is greater than that of the dyadic component. 136 country-pair relationships
(or about 75% of all bilateral trade) fall into this category. The example of country-pair
trade dominated by monadic factors is shown in Figure 2.2 (plot a).
Dyadic driven bilateral trade
In this group of country pairs trade is increasing at the same rate as dyadic costs do while
monadic component is constant over time. 49 (or about 25%) country-pair relationships
fall into this category. The example of dyadic driven country-pair trade is shown in Figure
2.2 (plot 2).
The aggregate dyadic and monadic component shares in bilateral trade of each CAC
are reported in Table 2.9 and show remarkable heterogeneity in trade behaviour. Detailed
information on all 185 country pairs is reported in Appendix 2 where bilateral trade of
each CAC in logs is presented along with its split into dyadic and monadic components.
The detailed country-pair results can also be obtained from the authors.
Comparing our estimates of dyads (networking effects) with results from the alternative
method of Novy, which assumes a trade elasticity equal to 8, they produce similar dynamic
changes in dyads and overall trade costs over time. This similarity confirms that tetrading
can be successfully employed for decomposition analysis in the case of CAC.
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Figure 2.2: Illustrative example of Monadic-driven and Dyadic-driven trade by country
pairs
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Table 2.5: Summary of Dyadic and Monadic driven trade
Note: Details of each country-pair trade monadic and dyadic makeup in Appendix 2
2.5 Discussion and conclusions
Our study confirms the four hypotheses set in Section 2.2. First of all, while all CACs
have experienced growing trade since the end of the 1998 Russian crisis, this does not
mean that the countries are homogeneous. In fact, while they share aspects of culture,
history and landlockedness, CAC show considerable variety in initial conditions (size, pop-
ulation, resource base, specialisation). Moreover, in terms of transitional reform, there is
a considerable 20 divergence between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, in the reformist camp,
and the other CAC. Reform in terms of trade tends to be strongly correlated with other
transitional reforms.
Secondly, we note that trade has grown considerably in all countries, reflecting the rise
in Russian and regional incomes (following stabilisation and oil/gas price recovery). Oil
and gas exporters have particularly benefited. However, the evidence is that the more
isolationist states have simply relied on these, possibly fortuitous factors to boost their
trade, whereas the more reform-minded states have achieved considerable trade growth
through reducing trade costs. Hence, the growth and fluctuations in trade of the more
isolationist economies Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are driven by changes
over time in monadic variables (primarily GDP) while trade partnerships of more open
economies Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are driven roughly equally by dyadic variables
(changes in trade costs) as well as monadic variables.
Globalization vs. regionalization
In the era of globalization, countries build more trade connections that raise income and
welfare. However, there are also some negative implications: not just in terms of trade
diversion where integration is regional, but also in terms of vulnerability to shocks. For
example, during the 1998 Russian crisis The Euromoney Risk Ranking for Russia went
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up from 78 (in December 1997) to 129 (in September 1998). Observing this situation,
Fitch IBCA lowered Russian International Credit Rating from B+ to CCC-. As a result,
Russian interest rates increased from 3% to 6%. This had a strong impact upon the CAC,
both through monadic effects (GDP in a major export market reduced), and through
trade costs (since access to finance is important for trade). Kazakhstan, with a common
border with Russia, was more exposed than Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and was hit by the
crisis harder (Westin [182]), although even the isolationist CAC were dependent on Russia
as the primary export market for their gas, as dictated by pipeline routes. Financial
shortages reduced CAC-Russia trade in both directions by 40%. Furthermore, the debt-
to-GDP ratio, in early 1999, rose more sharply for small open CAC, Kyrgyzstan (54%)
and Tajikistan (90%), and less for large and more diversified Kazakhstan (17%) while for
isolationist Turkmenistan (1.7%) and Uzbekistan (- 4.4%) the effect was negligible (Pastor
and Damjanovic [129]).
Transport links and RTAs
The CA location in the heart of Eurasia is strategically important but imposes a disad-
vantage in trade. Overland transport costs of goods average $1.380/1000km, almost 10
times higher than by sea ($190/1000km) raising trade costs by 60% as found by Limao
and Venables [108]. Since 90% of CAC trade is by rail, Leamer and Levinsohn [102] rightly
assert that distance matters and it matters a lot. According to the Eurasian Development
Bank Report (EDB [188]) CAC main trade flows go in three main directions:
(i) to Russia and Europe via the Trans-Asian-Railway (Tashkent/Bishkek  Dushanbe
 Almaty - Moscow/Kiev) or TRACECA (Bishkek  Tashkent  Almaty  Aktau  Baku
 Batumi);
(ii) to Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia via the Central-Railway (Almaty/Bishkek 
Tashkent  Ashkhabat  Turkmenbashi  Tehran  Istanbul);
(iii) to China and Asian-Pacific Region via the East-Trans-Asian-Railway (Tashkent -
Bishkek/Dushanbe  Dostyk  Lianyungang).
Raballand [142] found that the trade of landlocked Former Soviet Union countries fell
by 80% compared to coastal ones during 1995-1999. Landlocked CAC had to negotiate
with bordering coastal states, as well as other landlocked states controlling routes (Grigo-
riou [69]). For example, Uzbekistan is virtually surrounded by other landlocked countries.
Trade barriers imposed by (coastal) Russia to landlocked CAC were very high (Djarkov
and Freud [39]). Even though Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan share a border with
coastal China, trade is impeded by the Himalaya-Tibet massif, and the only convenient
geographic corridor to China is the Djunghar Gate of Kazakhstan. Note that the infras-
tructure and rail roads to China were built during the Soviet era mostly with strategic
considerations (Grigoriou [69]), and partly reflect poor Soviet-Chinese relations since the
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late 1950s. Furthermore, Pittman [133] finds that reforms to the monopolistic freight rail-
ways in the Former Soviet Union have slowed to a halt over time, and that even the more
reform-minded countries (the Baltics, Russia and Kazakhstan) have not followed the path
of Western reforms.
While our study finds RTA membership to be statistically insignificant, it potentially
allows CAC to lessen transport and transit costs as well as to improve regional transport
infrastructure and create transport corridors. However, the complexity of regional trade
partnerships often creates additional obstacles. Moreover, most of the regional RTAs have
had relatively little practical importance (Acharya et al. [1]). The major exception is the
Eurasian Custom Union (EACU) which unifies the external tariffs of Kazakhstan, Russia
and Belarus. Mogilevskii [120] demonstrates the EACU effect by pointing out that the trade
turnover between Kazakhstan and Russia increased by 28% between 2010-11, while for the
same period growth rate of trade between the CU and Other CAC is 19%. Kyrgyzstan is
likely to join the EACU next year and Tajikistan is currently negotiating its membership.
However, Kassenova [94] reports that despite the EACU formation, Kazakhstan still faces
high Russian NTBs. Furthermore, there are serious questions outstanding, especially for
those CAC reluctant to reform like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan who are not showing
any sign of interest in the EACU.
Other important factors of trade
Other factors of importance are the conditions of access and use of CA transport infrastruc-
ture (Grigoriou [69]), CAC access to sea ports (Kulipanova [100]), transit systems in the
region (Raballand [142]). Trade barriers, indeed, are reaching beyond the transport and
border costs, and as mentioned in AvW [7] also include policy costs (tariff and non-tariff
like quotas), cost of information and currency exchange, finance, distribution costs and
trade costs associated with unobservable barriers linked to cultural and historic ties. In-
deed, trade costs as estimated in our gravity formulation will include any costs of business
regulation and/or corruption. Evans et al. [53] suggest that political systems, differences
in education, production, market and industrial structure should be considered as primary
factors of trade. Dow and Karunaratna [40] examine 37 different studies to identify main
psychic distance factors. They find that culture, language, education level, religion, time
zone, industrial development, and political systems are most common factors used in trade
studies. Of these factors, the latter two are likely to be most relevant for the CAC. Inherited
from Soviet days the main industries and infrastructure in CAC are quite outdated, but the
energy rich CAC (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) using oil and gas revenues
have been able to modernize their industries, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan developed
their agrarian sectors. Regarding the political system, IMF Survey [190] finds a close cor-
relation between relatively liberal (more accurately less authoritarian) political systems
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like in Kyrgyzstan are linked to less restrictive trade regimes compared to Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan. To conclude: we find a relationship between being an open/isolationist
country and having dyadic/monadic driven trade with other countries. Open CAC (Kaza-
khstan and Kyrgyzstan) trade performance is mostly explained by time varying bilateral
factors while the trade performance of isolationist CAC (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan) is affected mostly by country-specific properties.
Appendix 2: Decomposed CA trade, by country-pair
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Table 2.6: Trade of Kazakhstan (by its partner) decomposed into monadic and dyadic
components
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Table 2.7: Trade of Kyrgyzstan (by its partner) decomposed into monadic and dyadic
components
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Table 2.8: Trade of Tajikistan (by its partner) decomposed into monadic and dyadic com-
ponents
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Table 2.9: Trade of Turkmenistan (by its partner) decomposed into monadic and dyadic
components
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Table 2.10: Trade of Uzbekistan (by its partner) decomposed into monadic and dyadic
components
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Chapter 3
Consequences of Asymmetric Deeper
Eurasian Economic Integration
Abstract
A period of new Eurasian Regional Integration has already begun in parts of the For-
mer Soviet Union. Following the experience of European Union, the `troika' (namely, Kaza-
khstan, Russia and Belarus) are working toward establishment of a Eurasian Union. The
troika have taken serious steps, in a speedy manner, toward the formation of an Eurasian
region (the Eurasian Customs Union, the CIS Free Trade Agreement, and the Single Eco-
nomic Space, and the Eurasian Economic Union). However, whether all the members and
the entire region will achieve the gains from fast EU like integration and the union will be
marked as successful one is yet being questioned. Studies believe that the union has more
of a political rather than an economic motivation, that could result in negative economic
externalities rather then gains.
This study attempt to assess the impact of asymmetry and symmetry in bargaining in
deeper Eurasian regional integration. The analysis is carried out using the modern multi-
country multi-sector CGE approach with suitable specifications with a number of trade
costs measures using the gravity concept. The novelty in this study is the use of implicit
trade costs obtained using Overall Trade Cost Index (Novy [125]) which then has been
decomposed into policy (tariff and non-tariff), non-policy (markups and value added costs)
and transport costs econometrically. We firstly performed shallow integration scenario
simulation with actual changes in tariff rates from 2009 to (expected rates for) 2015 of
the troika, rest of CIS and aggregate ROW multilaterally. Further we used Overall Trade
Cost Indices for EU and CIS countries from the WB-ESCAP trade costs database to make
assumptions regarding multilateral changes in NTBs, border, transport and other costs in
two deeper integration scenarios of equal and unequal (bias toward Russia) treatment
of members.
90
Based on the results of simulation work, we can conclude that if there will be equal
treatment of members of the new integration, the members will likely benefit from the gains
and positive externalities of deeper integration in the future. However, if we take account
of the Russian bargaining power and future asymmetric treatment of members, smaller
members Kazakhstan, Belarus, plus other joiners are less likely receive expected gains.
This work does not take account of other changes in policies (Russia's WTO assessment,
sanctions against Russia by the Western Bloc, impact of situations in Ukraine-Russian
borders etc.) but changes in trade costs (NTBs, tariffs, transport and border costs and
value added costs).
3.1 Introduction
A new period of Eurasian Regional Integration has already begun in some parts of the
Former Soviet region. Following the experience and standards of the European Union,
the post-Soviet `troika', namely, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, are working toward the
establishment of the Eurasian Union that is aiming to foster economic ties not only of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but also of the other countries of the Eurasian
continent. The troika have proven the seriousness of their intentions to form the Eurasian
Economic Union in an EU-like stepwise fashion by, first, forming a customs union in 2010,
by setting free trade zone covering the CIS region in 2011, by launching a common market
space within the territory of the troika in 2012. The culminative step is the formation
of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015. However, there is still ongoing work that will
continue to be considered even after the formation of the union. The important issues
of our concern are the European Union (whose success the Eurasian Union is imitating)
which is facing economic difficulties lately and, Russia which is once again acting as a
Big Brother of the (re)union. Hence we ask questions  what would be the consequences
of EU-like deeper integration and the impact of concentration of political and economical
power in Moscow to the future of the Eurasian Union?
The theory of regionalism shows that the reforms that are being undertaken to form
the Eurasian Union will have various types of economic impacts and externalities. The
volume of literature analysing the further Eurasian integration, is increasing, but currently
this literature still falls short in terms of bringing all possible economic effects from the
new regional formation in the Former Soviet space. Moreover, we find that the empirical
analysis suffers from a relatively weak methodological and theoretical base, especially those
studies conducted in the CIS area1. Most studies use an unsuitable framework to analyse
the new regional formation, and capture only part of the possible impacts and externalities.
CGE studies quantify possible future benefits and fair distribution of gains from the union
1Libman [109] review relevant ot Eurasian Integration literature and draw similar conclusions
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for separate member or non-members of the union only assuming that tariffs and other
trade restricting measures will be reduced within the union and toward other countries
without taking into account about how economic barriers will change in the rest of the
World toward the union as a response. Thus, to assess costs and benefits from deeper
Eurasian integration, it is necessary to assume multilateral policy changes as within the
union and in the world which have not been reflected in the literature yet. By multilateral
policy changes we mean changes in policies related to the regional deeper integration of
the troika toward members and non-members, but also policies undertaken by the non-
members of the union toward the union members in reaction. This is especially true in the
light of growing tension between the West and Russia which is trying to form the Eurasian
Bloc. Studies acknowledge that the troika's integration is based on the real example of the
EU integration with some mimicking of the EU institutional framework and the process
(stages) of integration but in a speedy manner, however we aren't aware of any study
(to our best knowledge) that assesses the suitability of the EU integration model for the
Eurasian region and we know of no study that quantifies possible outcomes of such EU like
integration of the Eurasian region so far. Taking into consideration the all those missing
angles of the integration in the existing literature, in this study we attempt to find answers
by quantifying the impact of the deeper Eurasian Economic Integration.
This study (we believe) is significant in terms of its contribution to the literature on
regional integration on the economic modelling for policy studies. Firstly, the study at-
tempts to assess the possible impacts and externalities of the new regionalism theory and
old regionalism practice to analysis of the Deeper Eurasian Economic Integration for the
entire region (i.e. not only the troika but CIS as a whole), including possibly gains from
the externalities of the integration that are coming from trade linkages with production,
consumer expenditure, spillovers etc. The analysis is carried out using an updated version
of a multi-country, multi-sector CGE approach that has been used previously to study
EU enlargement. The other contribution (which is also the novel part in this study) is,
firstly, the use of implicit trade costs (estimated using the theoretical gravity equation)
and, secondly, modelling techniques of the trade costs, which are econometrically decom-
posed into policy (tariff and non-tariff), non-policy (markups and value added costs) and
geographic costs. The use of gravity-estimated costs in a CGE study is not novel (see,
LeJour [104]). Trade cost measures used in the study are improved the overall trade cost
measure popularized by Novy ([126, 127]) which first appeared in Head & Ries [77] paper.
The desirable feature of the measure is theoretical consistency and support from empirical
findings. The method of producing trade cost measures has been employed in a number of
studies (Jacks et al. [86] Rudolph [153]).
We modelled several scenarios in this study, namely, (in Scenario 1 ) enlarging the
Eurasian bloc to five members (so the core Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus are joined
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by Kyrgyzstan and Armenia) and applying appropriate customs rate and border related
changes which occurred due to the ECU and CIS FTA formation; (in Scenarios 2a and
2b) we still assume that the Eurasian bloc has those 5 members and provides the major
expected changes due to the Single Economic Space (SES) and EEU formation such as
multilateral changes in trade cost structure, that includes policy restricting non-tariff,
transport and value added measures (assuming that the framework and economic system
of the EEU will eventually restructured and look like the current EU one, treating all the
members equally (Scenario 2a) and unequally with bias toward Russia in Scenario 2b).
The results obtained from the simulations suggest that the FTA and the ECU formation
had small economic impact (comparing to expected impact from the deeper integration)
but not all the members and not in many aspects of each region will have been net beneficia-
ries. Further inference is that, unless there is equal treatment of members, the formation of
the SES and the EEU will not be worthwhile for the 'smaller' members, and bring long run
negative consequences for the entire region. Considering the issues related to bargaining
power, asymmetry and aggressive political of Russia, the distribution of gains from inte-
gration is likely to be less fair to Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia (and other
possible joiners) (considered in in Scenario 2b). Thus the important message is that the
regional integration would be successful if members are treated and gains are distributed
fairly: in other words that there is no political and economic power concentration occur
only in one member.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 is the overview of the trends of the
occurred and the coming Eurasian Integration stages. Section 3.3 is the theoretical frame-
work based on predictions from the theory of regionalism and the vision of the barriers
that are expected to be overcame from international trade theory. Section 3.4 discusses
how we approach the research task and describe methodology. Section 3.5 describes our
CGE model, derivation of the trade costs, the econometric decomposition of trade costs.
Section 3.6 contains our assumption upon simulation scenarios and the outcomes, and final
section draws conclusions.
3.2 The Eurasian Regional Integration
3.2.1 Economic motivations for the integration
Despite of the significant efforts of the FSU countries to liberalize their economies, the
countries face obstacles in their way that can not be overcome by the efforts of separate
countries in the region but all together. Those obstacles are linked to the policy barriers
that restrict free movement of goods, services, labor and capital; linked to adoption of
different standards and norms in production; linked to the poor organisation of institutions
and infrastructure at regional level. All the barriers at the end negatively affect economic
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Table 3.1: Trade restrictiveness indices for CIS countries
Source: IMF
relations and need to be eliminated, as all of these obstacles incur some monetary costs.
Formal trade barriers
By formal trade barriers we mean direct actions taken with the aim to restricting free trade.
Those barriers are still relatively high in trade with the CIS region. Elbourgh-Woytek [51],
by looking at actual and potential trade of CIS countries in the first decade of post-Soviet
existence, concludes that the countries do not trade enough (comparing to other regions)
and this is partially due to formal trade barriers exercised in those countries. In the same
study, Elbourgh-Woytek [51] showed that the average trade restrictiveness (using IMF
measures) for the CIS region (3.8) was almost twice as high as the Central and Eastern
European countries (2) in year 2002. We also find that trade restrictiveness of majority
of CIS countries are still high, but have been falling over time. In Table 3.1, IMF's trade
restrictiveness indices are presented for CIS countries. Trade restrictiveness indices capture
formal barriers such as trade taxes. Among CIS, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia,
Uzbekistan still have high formal entry barriers for imports. If to compare the rates with
the EU ones (in Figure 3.1 ), formal trade restrictions of the CIS in average and of the EEU
(i.e. the troika) are still higher than the rates for the EU by 25% and 50%, respectively.
The current regional integration commitments have increased formal trade barriers for
some members, however, in the long run it is expected that the international integration
commitments should lower the barriers. The indices (in Table 3.1 for Central Asian coun-
tries) are similar to what Mogilevskii [120] reported prior to the ECU formation, except for
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Figure 3.1: Formal barriers: EEU, OCIS & EU
Source: IMF
Kazakhstan where the rate was 6.2% (which have gone to 9.1% after the ECU formation).
Indeed, several studies highlight that Kazakhstan has almost doubled its tariff rates to
meet the tariff rates of Russia and Belarus. Peyrouse, Boonstra and Laruelle [132] stress
that due to increase of import tariffs of Kazakhstan in 2011, some neighbours who trade
more with Kazakhstan were affected negatively, for instance, Kyrgyz wholesale trade fell
70-80%. Because of the losses, Kyrgyzstan chose to be in the ECU, and Armenia too,
and the countries are negotiating their jointment currently but their joinment will increase
their tariff rates at least twice which will also negatively impact on CIS regional trade.
However, Pomfret [140] claims that, because Russia is now a member of the WTO, and
will have commitments to make, it will reduce its formal barriers toward the ROW (so will
do Kazakhstan if the country joins WTO soon), and this eventually will have a positive
effect on trade of the members with neighboring non-member countries. Shepotylo and
Tarr [163] mention that Russian applied tariffs on average will reduce to 7.6% level by 2020
(implying that the rates of all the members of the Eurasian Bloc will be at similar level
too).
Informal trade barriers
The role of informal trade barriers is much larger than the role of formal ones in the
regional and international trade of CIS zone. UNCTAD define a range of the informal
trade barriers such as sanitary and phyto-sanitary norms (SPS), technical barriers to trade
(TBTs), price and quantity control, para-tariff, anti-competitive, finance, subsidies, various
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Figure 3.2: The Market Access Overall Trade Restrictiveness Indexes
Source: Kee, Nicita and Olarreago [95]
restrictive and discriminatory measures. According some studies2, the majority of NTBs
exercised in the CIS region are represented in the form of the licensing, import and export
quotas and subsidies, SPS and TBT measures, protective and rent-seeking measures. Kee
et al. [95] produce the Market Access Overall Trade Restrictiveness indices (MAOTRI)
for over hundred countries covering CIS too in year 2009 that represent ad valorem cost
of the informal trade policy barriers. In Figure 3.2, we provide with the MAOTRIs for
CIS countries. From the given estimates, it is clear that informal trade barriers to access
the market of some CIS countries are very high. For instance, to export to Uzbekistan or
Turkmenistan will add an extra 28-30% trade costs which, to Russia or Georgia is only
about 5%. Of course, those measures represent only known informal barriers.
Non-tariff policy barriers exercised at the borders are also an important type of non-
tariff obstacle. In the latest WB ranking of Trade Across Borders, Kazakhstan, Russia and
Belarus are ranked respectively as 185, 155 and 145 out of 189 countries where ranking
starts from countries with the efficient cross border trading and finishes with the most
inefficient ones (like Kazakhstan). As can be seen, the troika, but specifically Kazakhstan
relative to the other members has the most inconvenient cross border trading in terms
of transport costs, time spent in border and number of documents required. The WB
[193] study adds also that this is due to the weak institutional base with very bureaucratic
customs procedure, unnecessary bribe-seeking inspections and red tapes. Porto [141] finds
2WB [193] and Maliszewka et al. [116]
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that trade costs make up 24.6% of Moldovan trade where 63% is originated in the country
and the rest (36.5%) caused by external formal and informal trade barriers. He also
adds, in the example of Moldova which is trapped by Romania and Ukraine, that the
landlockedness of Moldova imposes unofficial extra costs of about 1.3 in trade with CIS
countries (comparing to 0.1% with the EU countries).
Standards
The existing standards of production and the recognition of each other's production stan-
dards and norms is also seen as an informal barrier. Most of the production standards
are GOSTs (GOsudarstvennyi STandart) in the troika (and in the other CIS counries)
inherited from the Soviet era. The GOSTs are quite different from the international or
EU standards as they only provide the technical instructions rather than sanitary and
phyto-sanitary norms. This is the part of the problem, the other issue is that the coun-
tries have been adopting or replacing the GOSTs with international/European standards
independently. Due to the difference, getting official approval for the trade goods (that
have been produced under the GOSTs or international standards), is not easy, especially
in international trade of CIS countries with non-CIS regions, and goods are subject to ex-
amination and certification which are of course not free of charge. For instance, WB [193]
reports that Russia requires that many products imported into Russia have a certificate of
conformity issued by its Federal Agency for Technical Regulation and Metrology. Russia
does not recognize internationally accepted certified products and undertakes their testing
and mandatory certification in accordance with Russian standards. Certificates of product
conformity issued in Kazakhstan for Kazakhstani exporters will often not be recognized in
Russia.
Transport costs
Transport related obstacles (which are surely explain main part of the trade costs) are
nonetheless significant. In fact they explain the main part of trade barriers in ad valorem
terms. Porto [141] provides estimated Transportation and Distribution costs for CIS coun-
tries. He finds that overall average T&D costs is 15.5% of the value of trade, which by
74% is explained by transportation cost (i.e., 11.6% of 15.5%). The territory of the mem-
bers jointly is immense and internal trade occurs mainly via overland transportation (rail
transport mostly). Some studies estimate that overland transport costs are ten or twenty
times higher then the over sea transport costs in trading (Limao and Venables [108]). This
is probably the main explanation why the Trade Across Border Indices are very high for
the troika, especially for landlocked Kazakhstan (Table 3.2 ). Additional costs (especially
for this region) occur due to inherited, outdated and costly Soviet built transport system
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and poor transport logistics. Over the years of independence, the countries have not been
much concerned about modernising the transport and logistics infrastructures.
Besides the physical features that explain why transport costs are high, the other is-
sue which might be pushing up costs is the ownership of transport infrastructure. The
main transportation locomotives in the countries are state owned or passed to (monopo-
list) transport companies (with 100% government participation) of the countries that set
up inefficient conditions, procedure and high costs for private users of containerized rail
transportation and discourages development of small and medium business in the coun-
tries. lack of clarity and uncertainties regarding the transportation of physical goods, also
discourages investors. If we take into account the finding of Raballand & Andresy [143]
that 90% of all traded goods in the region are transported via railroads than transportation
play a significant role in economic relations of the region.
3.2.2 Eurasian deeper integration
All the issues addressed above require the serious attention of the countries in the region.
The IMF's Regional Economic Outlook [190] claims that regional integration among the
FSU could facilitate economic growth, increase trade volumes and economic co-operation,
improve market competition and consumer welfare if tariffs are eliminated, NTBs reduced
and harmonized, and regional institutional framework improved. The CIS leaders looked
at the EU experience in tackling similar obstacles via deeper regional economic integration,
which is seen as a form of solution. Thus, the new wave of the regional integration in the
Former Soviet space has already began to take place in the form of the Eurasian Union by
adopting the model of EU integration. The `troika' expect that through new Eurasian
integration, they are able to foster economic ties among the members of the union and
with other countries in the region and the continent. There are also some ambitious plans
of this integration aimed, through improvement of institutional framework, adoption of
international standards and reduction of trade barriers, to integrate with other neighboring
regions in the continent (i.e., with the EU and China), and the rest of the World via the
WTO membership. The integration is currently progressing in a rapid manner to achieve
that goal, and has evolved from a free trade zone, further through a customs union and a
common market to culminate as an economic union.
The Eurasian FTA
After the USSR dissolution, CIS countries were left with broken economic ties and were
facing many problems for their further development that partially had to do with the
establishment of new economic relations neighbors and with the rest of the world. They
soon realized that they needed to negotiate the terms of economic and other relations.
A number of attempts of negotiations, especially during 90s, had small practical impact
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(Acharya et al. [1]) and turned CIS trade relations into a complex system with hub and
spokes agreements (Freinkman, Polyakov and Revenco [66]) and looked like a spagetti
bowl (Kaminski and Mitra [92]). Evans et al. [53] argue that because of such complexity
of regional trade relations causes trade diversion, there are limited gains and net welfare
loss for the region.
The idea of forming an FTA covering the entire CIS was initiated in early 1990s to
resolve such complexities in agreements. All 11 members of the CIS in 1994 formed the
CIS Free Trade Area where they agreed not to impose tariff and other non-tariff restrictions
on each others traded commodities. However, the agreement hasn't been officially ratified
by the majority and has had no practical use. Further, throughout 1990s, there were a large
number of trade agreements among CIS countries (but they were mainly bilateral in their
nature and they mostly were concerned about trade restrictions in some specific sectors).
As a result, there were over 100 bilateral and multilateral trade agreement in force, and
such a number of agreements created more obstacles to trade rather than solving real
problems. In 1999, another attempt was made by signing a protocol to establish a free
trade regime covering entire CIS region, however, the outcome was similar to that of the
CISFTA agreement.
Only after almost two decades since the first agreement has been made, the region was
ready for practical work to solve the problems all together, and the free trade agreement
reinforced (in October of 2011) but this time as a part of Eurasian integration with the
WTO principles, and soon after ratification of the agreement was reached by the majority
of the members. However, some CIS countries such as Georgia and Turkmenistan decided
not to take a part of the Free Trade Zone this time, although in December 2013 Uzbekistan
found the FTA convenient and also chose to be part of it. This agreement simplified the
complex system of previous bilateral agreements and provided free movement of goods
within the territory of the CIS by eliminating the import and export customs duties,
quantitative restrictions (quotas), discriminatory and protective measures (e.g., sanitary)
within the region. However, the area is not yet entirely ready to be a free trade zone
as member-countries exclude some of the main traded commodities from FTA items that
continue to be a subject for customes duties. For instance, Russia and Kazakhstan excluded
respectively 100 and 40 commodity items from the FTA, on which customs duties apply
on export. Sinitcina [167] argue that the exempted commodities are oil, electricity and
natural gas, construction related materials (raw wood, metal and cement), and also some
processed agricultural goods.
The Eurasian Customs Union
Establishment of the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) can be viewed as the next step of
economic integration but has been proceeding in parallel with the creation of the EFTA.
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In October of 2007, the agreement to form the ECU was signed by the leaders of Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Russia. By the beginning of 2010 the legal framework for functioning of
the union had been set and from July of 2011 the ECU started to function in practice.
A common customs area was created with no customs duties or economic restrictions on
reciprocal trade within the territory of the troika. To provide common customs policy a
supranational body, the ECU Commission, had been established with a weight based
voting system (where half of the total votes were Russian, and the rest of the votes split
between the other two members evenly). With the launch of the ECU, import tariffs of the
three countries were harmonized into a common tariff system by ratifying a customs code
plus internal border control which have been removed. Revenues from import tariffs of all
members will be summed and divided among members based on agreed shares (to Russia
88 %, to Belarus 5% and to Kazakhstan 7% but this is subject to periodical reviews).
Some documentary work and negotiations on the non-tariff measures was also put into the
process. The WB [193] study states however that harmonization of tariffs is achieved by
70-80% and ful harmonization will be reached in 2015. According to the reports, while
Russia and Belarus lowered their tariff lines, in Kazakhstan approximately 60 per cent of
tariffs were increased.
The Single Economic Space
Further, the troika had began the creation of a common market covering its territory.
By the end of 2009 the leaders of the troika had their plan already to create what they
called the Single Economic Space (SES) of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. By the end
of 2012, the SES came into effect with the aim to achieve the so-called four freedoms,
i.e. the free movement of goods, capital, services and people within the SES zone and
to establish core of institutional framework of the regional integrated area. To achieve
the four freedoms, the members agreed to pursue coordinated macroeconomic policies in
financial, transportation, energy, trade, industry, agribusiness and other key sectors. To
perform the reforms the Eurasian Economic Commission had been established. Unlike in
the case of the ECU Commission, key decisions will be taken based on the one country
one vote principle. Dragneva and Wolczuk [43] see one country one vote feature of the
institutional formations as one of the core elements for fair, just, and unbiased decision
making process in the region.
The Eurasian Economic Union
The Formation of the Eurasian Union (EEU) is the final anticipated step that is in force
from January 2015, and the agreement for creation of the EEU has been signed by the
troika in May of this year, 2014, already. Expected reforms associated with the EEU
will take a form of deeper integration of the economies of the troika and continue the
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work which hasn't been accomplished during ECU and SES stages. There is also expected
enlargement of the union is as Armenia and Kyrgyzstan seen as the next likely joiners to
the union in the near future (with their tariff and border related reforms at to be changed
first). However, the main expected reforms will be related to the following areas:
 Continue to work on harmonisation of technical barriers, non-tariff measures, intro-
duction of common production standards covering all the member countries;
 Elimination/reduction of non-tariff barriers by improvement of the legal framework
of the union and by provision of the common macroeconomic fiscal and monetary policies;
 Improvements of communication, logistics and transportation infrastructure to facil-
itate trade and cooperative production, also labour and capital factor mobility;
 Further work on the institutional framework of the union to facilitate further inte-
gration and economic activity through regional development funds; establishment of new
regional institutions with specific functions at the supranal level to, for instance, provide
competition and industrial policies, labor and migration relations, financial regulation etc.
3.2.3 The impact of the integration
The short-run performance of Eurasian integration appears to be not bad in the light of
recovery from global crisis, although there are members who are earning the benefits and
some members that are paying the costs. The statistics show that compared to 2009,
trade turnover in 2011 within the ECU rose by 3/4 (62$ bn.). Several studies find small
(or temporary) trade creation/diversion effects for the members. Regarding the impact
for separate members, some studies conclude that Kazakhstan is now paying more as the
consumer prices increased, but that Belarus benefits from Russian FDI inflows, and Russia
gains from additional exports and expansion of Russian companies into the markets of
Kazakhstan and Belarus. The WB [193] study quantified possible costs and benefits for
Kazakhstan in the Customs Union. In their current scenario, Kazakhstan would lose 0.2
% in real income per year plus the external tariffs doubles but main part of tariff revenues
are going to Russia (as the revenues distributed based on agreed % shares, not what is
coming to each member), the earnings of labour and capital also fell, and moreover, there
was larger trade diversion from the EU and the ROW.
To illustrate the impact of the ECU policy we use tariff figures from Mkrtchyan's [122]
study. In the Table 3.3 we present the tariffs for the troika in year 2009 and 2010, in other
words, for the year before and after the tariff harmonised policy occured. As can be seen,
before the ECU formation, Kazakhstan had relatively half the tariff rates of its co-members
of the union. As a result of the tariff harmonization, Russian and Belorussian tariffs have
fallen by about 10% while Kazakhstani tariffs grew by 58%. While Russia reduced its
specific tariffs (-19%) more than ad-valorem tariffs (-7%), Belarus and Kazakhstan made
more or less similar commitments of each category of tariffs, respectively, -10% and +60% in
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Table 3.3: Comparing the MFN tariffs: pre and post-ECU case
average. Further to note, Kazakhstan also had almost three times more imported product
types that are tariff free comparing to Russia and Belarus but after the policy had to
oblige with tariffs another 452 line of products (taking into count that total number of the
product lines is 5052).
Isakova & Plekhanov [85] argue that a sharp trade expansion and rapid growth may be a
reflection of post-crisis recovery trends unrelated to policy. They also conclude that benefits
of the policy to Kazakhstan (and likely other members of the union) have been limited
comparing to the other two members. For Kazakhstan, imports from China saw a more
significant decrease (imports from the EU, the CIS & the ROW were largely unaffected)
in response to higher tariffs, and imports from Russia and Belarus increased, although the
increase was relatively small. Interestingly, Isakova & Plekhanov [85] found that imports
from non-member CIS countries for the ECU also declined, suggesting that despite the
formation of the EFTA, these countries cannot be seen as net beneficiaries of the trade
diversion effect. The possible explanation for the evidence could be increase of non-tariff
restrictions in trade between CIS countries based on the membership. Isakova & Plekhanov
[85] provide some evidence of them, for example, the time for trucks to clear in the Kazakh-
Kyrgyz borders has lengthened significantly. Mkrtchyan [122] also mentions that Kazakh-
Kyrgyz border control tightened as there was a widespread smuggling of cheap Chinese
products into the ECU zone. However, unlike Isakova & Plekhanov [85], Mkrtchyan [122]
finds that the overall impact of the non-tariff barriers of the ECU on non-ECU members
(although by non-ECU members meant not only the CIS but the other trade partners) is
positive.
Dragneva and Wolczuk [43] raise the issue of the asymmetry in bargaining power in
the union. Russia, as the former Big Brother and the current undoubted leader of the
integration, might be influencing the other (smaller) members' decisions taken in the union
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for its own use. The smaller members won't be able to deviate from the Russian course
as they will be concerned about their territorial safety (considering the case of Ukraine in
the case of having disagreement with the Big Brother) or possible losses if Russia uses its
economic means (sanctions, restrictions and other discriminatory policy) to accept its rules
of the game. Because during the negotiations on the common external tariffs, Kazakhstan
mostly agreed to accept Russian tariff rates which weren't optimal for Kazakhstan, now as
the WB [193] study confirms the country is paying the costs of the integration. Some studies
suggest that Kazakhstan is seeking long run benefits and was ready for the commitments,
while others suggest that the country had no choice but to accept to join under the given
condition of Big Brother. If there will be no further reduction of expected non-tariff
barriers, the WB study find that Kazakhstan will lose another 0.3 % in real income per
year plus losses from further increase in external tariffs, and larger trade diversion from
the EU and the ROW. However, over the years, Russia has given up its influence on
Former Soviet members to some degrees to the other world powers. On the Western,
Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan have been increasing their economic ties with
the EU countries. The presence of the EU but also China and the US has been growing
in the Central Asian region since its independence from Soviet Russia. Besides, the new
institutional framework of the EEU will also impose an obstacle to Russia exercising its
bargaining power over smaller members. Dragneva and Wolczuk [43] argue that because
of the one country - one vote feature of the Eurasian union, in taking major policy
decisions in favor of Russian gains, smaller members can outvote Russia.
While some studies attempting to identify pros and cons of the integration based on
what is done or expected, there is a body of growing literature which is concerned about
the possible gains (or losses) for a certain country in the region from (not) joining to the
Eurasian integration group. For example, Hartwell [72] claims that the EEU group will
succeed even without Ukraine but only if all Former Soviet Central Asia becomes a part
in the part of the union. Demidenko [36] agrees in the last point. Using the GLOBE
CGE model, Demidenko finds that macroeconomic indicators of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan will improve if they join the EEU. Dragneva and Wolczuk [43] state that
voluntarily from Central Asian countries (without taking Kazakhstan into account) only
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could join. However, both countries are economically weak and
possibly less attractive for the current members of the union. Besides, from the recent
activities, it has become clear that only Kyrgyzstan is likely to join the union. Further, to
note that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are now supplying their gas to China and Iran, and
express no interest in returning to their Big brother, Russia. By looking at eastern parts
of the CIS, Knobel [96] argues that Armenia and Moldova trade more with the ECU and
therefore deep integration into the EEU would be beneficial for the civilised development
of a unified labor market. Armenia is most likely to join unlike Moldova which like Ukraine
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is more biased toward integration with the EU.
3.3 Theoretical framework
3.3.1 The theory of Regionalism
The EEU integration is highly associated with the concept of regionalism (rather than
unilateralism or multilateralism). The clear sign of regionalism is when separate nation
states of a particular geographic region unite with each other to pursue a collective goal
to establish an area with common economic, and further social and political standards.
In this regard, the EEU initiative can be seen as if it is in its first stage to establish a
common economic platform by eliminating physical, protective, discriminatory barriers,
creating a system of supranational institutions, introducing common economic standards
and norms (as if they are one large country made of smaller distinct states). There is a
number of gains and productivity growth coming through trade-production linkages that
include the transfer of production technologies, knowledge spillovers and learning by do-
ing; segmentation and fragmentation of the production process among the member states;
increasing returns, economies of scale, market expansion, redistribution and reallocation
of labor at the regional level etc.
A good example of regionalism is the European Union. The EU is a highly integrated
region that has gone through over half century of evolution. The first stage appeared as
early as 1950s, when group of 6 countries established the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) with the purpose of prevention of possible war among the members in the
future, but also to eliminate competition between the countries in coal and steel markets.
They also established a set of supranational institutions to make optimal management,
to take decisions which were fair to all, to solve any disputes in the region. The second
stage of European integration was the evolution of the ECSC into the European Economic
Community, and subsequently the European Economic Union with the common external
customs rates and a common market for all mmebers and further its expansion through the
other 6 joiners. After rounds of enlargement, the next stage of deepening was the Euro-
pean Union in 1993 with establishment of the single economic space with four freedoms
(free mobility of labour, capital, goods and services). At the current moment, the EU
has 28 members, a body of supranational independent institutions (such as the European
Commission, the Council of the EU, the Court of Justice of the EU, the European Central
Bank, the European Parliament and other institutions).
The current regional integration of the Eurasian Bloc of countries mimics the EU
regional integration. The troika also decided to take a stepwise process of deeper integration
(although not exactly in similar way) with formation of the regional free trade area, then a
customs union, a single market and an economic union (for now) with gradual enlargement.
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Comparing the previous attempt of Marxistic regionalism in the Former Soviet space,
which turned into a failure, the EU-like regionalism had been tested in practice and shown
its effectiveness. To rely to the theory of the regionalism and EU practice, the the following
set of reforms should be taken in the integration zone:
 Harmonisation of technical barriers, non-tariff measures, introduction of common
production standards covering all the members;
 Reduction of non-tariff barriers by improvement of the legal framework of the union
and by provision of common macroeconomic fiscal and monetary policies;
 Improvements of communication, logistics and transportation infrastructure to facil-
itate increased trade and production, also labour and capital factor mobility;
 Further work on the institutional framework of the union to facilitate further inte-
gration and economic activity through regional development funds; establishment of new
regional institutions with specific functions at the supranational level to, for instance, pro-
vide competition and industrial policies, labor and migration relations, financial regulation
etc.
3.3.2 The barriers & Iceberg costs
Wouldn't it be great to buy Mattel's Barbie doll in the US for the same price as in China?
This is an example provided in Feenstra [57] that illustrate how the price of the doll
manufactured in China with the price of $1 by the time arrived to the USA, its price
shifts to $10. Indeed, in practice, there are some costs are always added while a good
produced in region i reaches final consumers in region j. If trade barriers are high than
trade costs are also high, and at the end, it could drive exporting firms out of market due
to uncompetitiveness of final price on their produce. This is one of the main reasons why
countries negotiate with each other to bring those additional costs to the minimum and to
engage into various types of regional formation, such as in our case, the Eurasian Economic
integration.
The standard assumption is that the price of a commodity at the place (region i) it
is produced cost pi price, and while it arrives to region j, its price (pj) increases for tij
amount, where tij > 1:
pj = tijpi
This tij usually includes observable and unobservable costs incurred due to transporta-
tion, tariffs, quotas, restraints, TBT and SPS norms, various required documentations,
inspections and other formalities, advertisement, distribution, etc. costs.
Another standard assumption that the trade costs (tij) are often viewed as iceberg
costs, following Samuelson [160]. As an iceberg crossing the ocean losses its fraction simi-
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larly when a trade good shipped across countries it losses a fraction (i.e., trade cost). The
smaller barriers on the way of the iceberg, the less it melts and vice versa. There are
some other assumptions about trade costs exist (see Rudolph [153] for instance) however,
for our theoretical framework, the iceberg cost assumption is suitable.
3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 The CGE approach
We previously mentioned that the deep regional integration is associated not only with
policy changes but also with externalities of integration coming from the technology trans-
fer, productivity increases, and economies of scale with possible Smithian and Ethierian
type gains. To reflect such aspects, the most convenient tool is the Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) approach. The approach is quite a flexible tool to incorporate a body
of theory (or several theories) also, and to model various specific features and dimensions
needed to capture outcoming impacts and externalities of a specific deep integration pro-
cess. Besides, the CGE approach has become a workhorse tool for prediction of possible
consequences of a regional integration (or other policy change) if the development proceed
in a certain scenario.
With respect to capturing the impacts of regional integration, the CGE studies of
the last decade attempt to incorporate structures of the modern trade theory rather than
standard trade theory. This is because, despite of having the elegant structure, the standard
trade theories such as the Ricardo-Viner-Meade (RVM) or Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
(HOS) are found to be very simple, too stylized and limited to capture two-way trade, the
discussed externalities and gains from the integration. There later appeared what is known
as the Armington specification, which has the desirable feature of imperfect substution
and product differentiation by the origin to allow to two-way trade as well as including
insights of the RVM and HOS (however it cannot capture linkages with historical trends or
establish link between trade and economic performance). Robinson et al. [151] argue that
the Armington specification cannot adequately reflect trade share changes which occured
in the EU regionalisation as it misses production or expenditure effects on trade shares
(because trade shares are determined by relative prices).
The recent trade theories such as the Melitz or the Dixit-Stiglitz (DS) formulations can
capture above discussed externalities arriving from the deeper integration better than the
standard trade models, and aree thus more suitable for analysis of regionalization. The
DS structure assumes there is Chamberlinian monopolistic competition introduced by the
number of identical firms and consumers marked with `love-of-variety' demand feature,
thus two-way trade even in the presence of trade barriers with the gains from the variety
and the economies of scale. The Melitz model incorporates firm productivity differences
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to the DS formulation. Further, there is a greater support from the empirical findings at
a micro level in favor of the modern trade models (Falvey [56]).
3.4.2 The Overall Trade Cost Measure
The gravity of trade
Because the majority of existing trade costs are unobservable, various direct and indirect
measurements are used in the literature, however, estimation of trade costs is not an easy
task and the measures have some limitations. Anderson and vanWincoop [7] review various
measures to estimate international policy barriers, transport costs and wholesale and retail
distribution costs and they find that paucity of good data (on policy barriers), poor quality
of existing measures and lack of theoretical base are some of the main reasons of inaccurate
measures of trade costs. Bagai and Wilson [13] add that the lack of harmonized definitions
and measurement tools can lead to different measures of the same trade barriers. For
instance, they argue that the World Business Environment Survey estimates an average
clearance time of 11 days for Uzbekistan while UNESCAP reports 5 days. Further, they
find aggregate various data sources are a very problematic task, and even impossible. A
more recent study, Chen & Novy [28] finds mixed bag and stringency issues of direct trade
cost measures (based on count, dummy, frequency or coverage ratios) and inconsistent use
of them in several studies. They argue that notification data that is used, for example,
in Disdier et al. [37] to compute coverage and frequency ratios to explain trade flows
cannot tell which measures were applied and the duration of application and thus was too
inconsistent to address heterogeneity across countries based on the measures.
Because of the difficulties with obtaining direct measures of trade costs and some other
limitations addressed above, we choose to go with the theoretical framework that can
allow us to obtain implicit measures of the overall iceberg trade cost measures. The
theoretical framework is the concept of the gravitational nature of trade that works in a
similar way to Newton's law in physics. In the recent decades the gravity model has been
grounded well using various theoretical frameworks (offered by Anderson and van Wincoop
[6], Bergstrand [20], Deardorff [34], Eaton and Kortum [45], Chaney [27]). Irrespective of
which theoretical foundation is chosen they seem to all agree with the following expression
of gravity model:
xij = GwMiMjDij , (3.1)
where xij is nominal exports from country i to country j, Gw is global component, Mi and
Mj are, respectively, exporter (i) and importer (j) specific monadic components, Dij is ij
specific dyadic component.
In a gravity framework, the trade costs are often viewed as iceberg costs previously
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discussed. Using the AvW [6] type of expression, we can present the trade costs as
tij = D
1
(1−σ)
ij , (3.2)
where σ is the Armington substitution elasticity between the products of different nations.
HM (2014) point out two important features of expression of gravity as above. The most
obvious one is the insistence that each term enter multiplicatively. A second important
feature is that this definition requires that third-country effects, if there are any, must
be mediated via the i and j multilateral terms. This form of the gravity equations is
consistent with Anderson and van Wincoop's [6] theory and overcomes the common gold
medal mistakes - omission/ignorance of inner and outer multilateral resistances (that are
part of Ms) in intuitive/naive gravity equations (Baldwin and Taglioni [14]).
The Head-Ries-Novy Overall Trade Cost index
There is a number of trade cost estimation tools born from the gravity structure and
some of the most common ones are discussed well in HM [78], although, we proceed with
introduction of the particular method of our interest. The method first used in Head and
Ries' [77] study which showed how it is possible to separate out dyads by cancelling all the
terms out in eq (1) except D by taking a ratio of outer trade flows over inner trade
flows of any i and j trading pair:
Dˆij =
(
XijXji
XiiXjj
) 1
2
=
(
(dii
GwMiMj) (djj
GwMiMj)
(dij
GwMiMj) (dji
GwMiMj)
) 1
2
=
(
DiiDjj
DijDji
) 1
2
(3.3)
This term gives theoretical approximation of bilateral dyads if one is ready to assume
symmetry in dyads (Dij = Dji), and frictionless inner dyads inside the countries (Dii =
Djj = 1). Eaton et al. (2011b) call it the HRI (Head-Ries Index) which can be used to
assess the overall level of trade integration between any two countries. The problem with
the HRI is that it cannot be calculated without a measure of inner trade (Xii and Xjj) .
In principle, this can be proxied using production minus total exports of a country or an
industry.
Using the AvW [6] expression of dyadic term, Dij = t
1−σ
ij , and making small change in
(eq. 3.3), Novy [125] re-expresses the HRI as
tˆij =
(
XiiXjj
XijXji
) 1
2(σ−1)
=
(
DiiDjj
DijDji
) 1
2(σ−1)
= tˆji. (3.4)
By making an assumption about elasticity of substitution, σ, and still as HM [77] re-
lying on gravity assumptions on trade costs - inner trade costs are equal to unity and
bilateral trade costs in either direction are the same - the index above gives a geometric
mean of overall trade costs involved in any particular i and j country pair. Novy calls this
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the Overall Trade Cost Index (OTCI) and not the actual trade costs as it is only gives
simple but theoretically sound measure of all the trade costs for a given pair of trading
regions, i and j. Further, Novy [127] derives the OTCI from gravity equations of other
theoretical frameworks. The intuition is that the higher the trade volume inside the re-
spective countries relative to the trade volume between the two countries, the higher is the
bilateral trade cost, and vice verse. OTCI can be turned into ad valorem tariff equivalent
for trade costs. With this measure, Novy [127] addresses a solution to some drawbacks of
various existing trade cost measures noted in several studies related to theoretical consis-
tency (AvW [7]), the possibility of aggregation of various trade costs (Bagai and Wilson
[13]) and the possibility of obtaining trade cost measure from available data (WB [193]).
Modifying the Overall Trade Cost Index
To get the proofs, in the AvW gravity theory, it is simply assumed that outer trade
costs are equal to each other (i.e., tij = tji) and inner trade costs are equal to one (i.e.,
tjj = tii = 1). The assumption of outer trade costs equity imply that the ratios of the
outer trade costs is equal to one:
(
Xji
Xij
) 1
1−σ
=
(

GwMjMiDji

GwMiMjDij
) 1
1−σ
=
(
Dji
Dij
) 1
1−σ
=
(
tji
tij
)
= 1 (3.5)
The same implication can be made about the inner trade cost ratio:
(
Xii
Xjj
) 1
1−σ
=
(

GwMiMiDii

GwMjMjDjj
) 1
1−σ
=
(
Dii
Djj
) 1
1−σ
=
(
tii
tjj
)
= 1 (3.6)
How true are the assumptions in practice? Using real bilateral trade data from the
TRAINS, we calculate the trade cost ratios (based on eq. 3.6). The database in use contain
bilateral trade flows between 37 countries for the period of 1995-2011 (total number of
observations is 23273). Because of the unreported trade flows in the database, 6442 (out of
expected 23273) trade cost ratios are zeroes. In Figure 3.3, we have frequency distribution
and summary of the trade cost ratios which show that most of trade cost ratios are close
to one which is in agreement with the assumption that outer trade costs between any
country pair are the same. Due to the large number of ratios obtained (16831), in Table
3.4, we present trade cost ratios only for the troika. In part a of the table, bilateral trade
cost ratios for Russia (where Russia is country i on one side, and CIS/ROW countries are
country j s). The same logic applied for partb (Kazakhstan=i) and part c (Belarus=i). The
implications from the given trade costs ratios is that if any trade cost ratio is bigger than
1 then importing to country i is relatively costly then exporting from it, and vice versa.
So, for instance, in part 4a, we observe that export of Kazakhstan to Russia was relatively
cheaper in the 1990s (for 1996, the ratio is 0.88) which increased over time increased and
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Figure 3.3: Frequency distribution of trade cost ratios
exporting to Russia become costly (the ratio in 2009 is 1.12).
An elegant way of obtaining the gravity equation from CES structure by Anderson and
van Wincoop [5] is by assuming that trade costs of either direction between any trading
partner is the same, i.e. equal to one. However, as can be seen from the ratios, trade
costs are not equal to one in all cases. Every third trade cost ratio (presented in Figure
3.3) isn't actually equal to one. Some of them are as low as 0.29 and some as high as 3.35
but there might be some level of bias due to the data which might not represent the exact
values of trade or incorrectly aggregated. When it comes to trade cost ratios of countries
of our interest (i.e. CIS countries), there is almost none of ratios is equal to one. Still,
there is a possibility that the theoretical assumption of equal trade costs between any two
regions might not be useful when it comes to practice.This mean that trade costs between
any country pairs in practice cannot be the same from one direction to opposite one:
(
Xij
Xji
) 1
1−σ
=
(

GwMiMjDij

GwMjMiDji
) 1
1−σ
=
(
Dij
Dji
) 1
1−σ
=
(
tij
tji
)
6= 1 (3.7)
Why cannot trade costs be the same between any ij points from one direction to another
in practice? Possibly, country i uses a different transport type or different transport channel
to country j market than what country j uses to deliver its goods to the market of country
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Table 3.4: Ratio of the trade cost measures
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i. Possibly, the cost of tariff taxes differ from one to another direction. Such a trade cost
difference can be also rooted in distribution costs which are different in any two country
(indeed, it is in practice cannot be true).
Because we find that in practice, it is more realistic to assume that (eq. 3.7) rather
than (eq. 3.5), in Novy's fashion (given in eq. 3.4), it won't be possible to rely on the
assumtion of equal costs (eq. 3.5) and derive the geometric mean of the trade costs between
any ij pair. This requires us to estimate ij and ji trade costs separately. Thus, we modify
(eq. 3.4) to correct it for the assumption of unequal trade costs between ij pair from either
direction:
tˆij =
(
XiiXjj
XijXij
) 1
2(1−σ)
= ... =
(
DiiDjj
DijDij
) 1
2(1−σ)
. (3.8)
The main difference of this trade cost measure from HMN measure of trade costs (eq.
3.4) is that we take ratio of outer3 trade flows of ij direction only leaving the rest the
same. This allow us to obtain (if to yet assume that inner trade costs are equal to unity)
the ij trade cost only (not the geometric mean of ij and ji trade costs). Similarly trade
costs of opposite direction can be obtained by replacing trade flows of ij set to ji set, but
because we have a balanced trade database, this is unnecessary to do.
Using the original and modified versions of the HMN method, (eq. 3.8), we calculate
bilateral overall trade cost measures for the troika. In Figure 3.4, we plot OTCI of the
troika that show that variation of their bilateral trade costs over time. Now using a
modified version of OTCI, we can see that trade costs between each pair of troika members
are not the same. Trade costs for imports from Kazakhstan to Russia (0.6) were lower
relative to imports from Russia to Kazakhstan (0.8) in 1996, however over time the cost
of Kazakh exports to Russia grew by 1.4/0.6% (1.4) while exporting to Kazakhstan for
Russia fell by 0.7/0.8 (0.7). In Kazakh-Belarus trade, exporting to Belarus become costly
for Kazakhstan, while trade barriers for Belarus to export to Kazakhstan reduced over
time. With being able to obtain OTCIs for a few years in Belarus-Russia trade, we still
can observe that trade costs are much higher for Belarus to export its commodities to
Russia. OTCIs (grey lines) obtained using original HRN method are the same for each
presented pair (and for all the pairs we calculated) which are showing general trend of trade
costs between the pair countries, but not the difference between trade costs. Besides, from
the HRN-OCTIs in the plots, they represent the geometric mean of trade costs obtained
using a modified method. However, when we look at the trade costs by aggregating and
average out for each separate country, we observe that the measures obtained using two
methods are not the same (see Table 3.5 ). A further difference between the method in
3By outer trade cost meant trade costs occured during trade between i and j, and in opposite direction
too. And, by inner trade costs it meant the costs that occur during trade within territory of each country
i and j, i.e. domestic trade costs.
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measuring trade costs can be seen in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 where we provide bilateral
OTCI for the troika with each CIS country.
3.5 Models and Data
3.5.1 The CGE model
Policy simulations are carried out using a multi-country multi-sector static CGE model.
The model has been previously used in Edwards [48] for assessment of the EU enlargement.
In the model we have 11 regions, 10 aggregate sectors and 2 factors of production (Table
3.8 ). In World Bank [193], they used 4 regions (Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and aggregate
ROW) with 29 sectors and 3 factors of production (natural resources along with labour
and capital). However, it is clear that there are two more additional potential members of
the union, Kysgyzstan and Armenia. Further, CIS countries that aren't members of the
EAU have more economic ties with EAU members, thus, it will be sensible also to look
at the deeper intergration impact of each CIS country too. Our motivations to restrict
number of sectors to ten is reasonable to keep square like share of SAMs for each region,
and simplify our analysis. We also aggregate factors of production into two aggregate types
(capital and labor).
Production is nested where the bottom level of production is a Leontief function for
intermediate goods, and the top level of producion is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate function
for final goods. Regarding the factors of production, both, labour and capital, are fixed
for each country, mobile between sectors, but not internationally (however, in the long-
run, capital is mobile internationally). Firms are of identical size, imperfectly competitive,
earn supranormal profit (by adding markups into the price). The number of the firms
different for each region and in each industry from each region. The number of the firms,
introduced exogenously, is kept fixed. This is done because the number of firms that vary
endogenously is the long run assumption (as fixed costs are unavoidable in the short run).
The consumption of domestic and imported final goods and intermediate goods is the CES
aggregate function. The elasticity of substitution is also introduced exogenously and is
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Figure 3.4: OTCIs of the troika
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Table 3.5: Average OTCIs for each CIS: OHRN vs MHRN
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Table 3.6: OCTIs using original HRN method
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Table 3.7: OCTIs using modified HRN method
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Table 3.8: The list of regions and sectors in the model
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equal to 5. It is a reasonable level of elasticity of substitution based as many studies find
its range somewhere between 4-12 (Anderson and van Wincoop [6]). Further, we have
tariffs and some trade costs. Trade costs are of two types, rent-seeking and resource costs.
Rent-seeking costs are the costs associated with non-tariff policy barriers (such as licensing
cost) and because they bring revenue they are modelled as tariffs. The resource costs are
transportation costs (not the transport margins but gravity estimates of distance related
costs including transportation), non-tariff policy barriers (different from rent-seeking ones)
and value added trade costs (associated with what resellers' addings).
3.5.2 The decomposition of trade costs
The trade cost equation
The majority of trade costs is known to us, and has been revealed and discussed in depth in
many papers previously. Even with having the implicit trade cost measure (like OTCI), its
practical use is limited to tell us about its make up due to its all inclusive nature. Without
knowing its make up (major components), its tariff equivalent components, especially
policy related costs in regional and international trade of CIS countries, it is difficult to
perform analysis of policy changes in the region due to deeper integration. Thus we were
further tasked with identifying trade cost components, their proxies and a decomposition
of procedure. Novy [125] calculates the OTCIs based on (eq. 3.4), and estimates them
using three groups of explanatory variables such as geographical (i.e., distance, border
adjacency, landlockedness and island factors), historical (common language and colonial
history factors) and institutional (tariffs, FTA and Exchange rate volatility factors). We
also perceive three major groups of trade cost factors: geographic, policy and value added.
The first source of trade costs is transport related costs, that very depending on the
type of transportation used, geographic features of transportation channel and the quality
of transport related infrastructure. According to USCC [192], air is twice as costly as
overland transportation, and overland transportation is four times more costly than sea
transportation in the case of China-EU trade. In the CIS or Eurasian Bloc of countries
context, sea is not an option as countries of the region are located on one continent with
no sea/ocean separating them. Russia shares common borders with Kazakhstan and Be-
larus. Most of their trade (by 90%) occurs via rail transport and thus their trade more
costly, compared with if trade would occur over sea. Of course, geographic features would
less affect trade of services in the light of development of electronic and internet based
technologies and means of communication in economic relations, but it still matters, that
is also depends on specifics of each service though. Further, landlockedness is the issue
for landlocked members of the union as it adds extra costs in international trade. Kaza-
khstan is landlocked, and to trade with the EU, the country has to use transport by means
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of Russia, for instance, and pay transit costs, and usually needs to use other associated
services for transit of its goods via the Russian transport system. This explains mainly
why containerized cost to Kazakhstan is over 3000$ compared to Russia where it is 1800$.
Another issue related to transportation system in Eurasian region is that it is based on the
Soviet transportation system. Even after over two decades, the transport system still based
on rail tracks from Soviet era partially modernized but outdated, inefficient, and costly
(comparing to existing similar transport means in the developed world). Further, due to
the use of different gauges, it causes problems with rail transportation of commodities say
from China or the EU, meaning that there are further costs at the places where Soviet
gauge meets international gauge based railroads.
Another category of trade costs relates to trade policies and measures used in trade
(that have less to do with the physical obstacles but are still hard to make clear cut).
According to the WTO, there are technical and non-technical categories of policy barriers
associated with trade costs. Technical policy barriers are SPS, TBT and pre-shipment
inspections and formalities. Based on a survey (Racine [144]), SPS and TBT are indeed the
main policy barriers in the Eurasian region. The non-technical policy barriers are licensing,
tariffs, quotas, protective, prohibitive measures, price-control, financial and investment,
restrictive, dicriminative, anti-dumping and other measures which are also in practice of
Eurasian trade relations.
The final category of trade costs, which is less covered by existing studies, is the costs
occuring by adding extra value on top of commodities purchased somewhere on the way
from manufacturer to final consumer by resellers, redistributors, refiners, repackagers and
other, lets call, middle men. In their famous study, Anderson and vanWincoop [7] provide
approximations of trade cost composition, in the context of industrialized countries. They
report that trade costs are on average 170 % which include 55% costs for distribution and
retail sales (transportation, 22% and border costs, 44%). This is 1/3 of all trade costs or 1/5
of part of final consumer price. These costs, of course, include the revenues of middlemen
(or companies) specialising on distributing and retailing of traded goods. Possible there
are more issues involved, such as market structure and competition issue, type of sector or
traded product, government regulations etc. Those costs exist in all market systems, and
the Eurasian region is not an exception. This costs also needs to be approximated and
taken into count in policy analysis. Thus we arrive to our trade cost model. We express
our trade cost model in log form as
lntˆij = β0+β1lndistij+β2landxij+β3lockj+β4ln1trij+β5RTAij+β6NTBij+β7Ii+β8Ij+eij ,
(3.9)
where on the LHS, lntˆij is the ad-valorem of the overall trade cost measure (based on eq.
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8); on the RHS, transport related costs are proxied with geographic distances (lndistij),
dummy for overland trade only (landxij) and a dummy for landlockness (lockj); policy re-
lated costs are proxied with log of weighted tariffs (ln1trij
4) and a dummy for membership
in the same RTAij , and a dummy for NTBij ; other trade costs occurred due to exporter
or import captured with fixed effect dummies (Ii and Ij), and eij is error terms. Inclusion
of fixed effect dummies has become normal practice in gravity analysis to capture unob-
servable heterogeneity involved with importers, exporters, time period or pairwise. To also
note that we have no time dimension in this model (which is desirable) as we have data to
obtain NTBs dummies for one year only.
The estimates of OTCI components
Previous empirical studies5 employ a variety of econometric methods to estimate trade
costs, however, we concentrate only on the estimation methods that are frequently used
in estimation of gravity-based trade cost measures. Novy ([125, 127]) uses OLS with
fixed effect dummies to estimate OTCIs mainly. Head, Mayer and Ries [78] - along with
DVLS - use PPML to estimate tetraded trade flows (which represent time varying dyadic
components, i.e., trade cost measure). Indeed, DVLS is, in a sense, a fixed effects estimator
which is proven to be the most reliable estimator (Feenstra [59], Redding and Venables
[146], Head & Mayer [79]). The use of fixed effect dummies allows us to control for
unobserved heterogeneity of exporters and importers during the econometric estimation
procedure6. However, as we shall see further, DVLS provides some inconsistent estimates
due to the presence of zero trade costs. In such cases, PPML is found to be the most
suitable tool for estimation in the presence of large number of missing or zero explained
variables (Martin & Pham [115], Head, Mayer and Ries [78]). Also, PPML produces
unbiased estimates even in the presence of heteroscedasticity, however, Martin and Pham
[115] and some other studies find that PPML results stand out from the other methods
with relatively higher coefficient estimates. Moreover, like DVLS, PPML also takes fixed
effect dummies and thus control for unobserved heterogeneity issues. However, trade costs
cannot be zero. Due to the missing/unreported trade values, using the HRNI there is
always the case of getting zero trade cost measures. Thus, PPML that naturally accepts
zero dependent values could provide with misleading estimates too. DVLS instead ignores
zero trade cost estimates based on positive trade cost measures in estimation procedure.
Shepherd [161] explains this as a violation of the first assumption of OLS and as a result
estimates could also be misleading. He state that when the sample (left after dropping
4We included 1 to the tariffs as most of them is zero)
5Herrera [81] review various estimation methods and compare their estimates. He draw a list major
types of estimation methods in the gravity literature, namely, truncated OLS, OLS plus one, Tobit, Panel
fixed effects, Heckman two step, PPML, NLS, FGLS, GPML and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein method.
6This is also gives theoretical consistency to trade cost estimation procedure as the dummies stand for
the multilateral resistances terms.
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zero explained variable) is not drawn randomly, and the probability of being selected is an
omitted variable bias (since the explained variable is correlated with the other explanatory
variables). Thus there is a need for a method that corrects for selection bias (without
assuming zero trade costs are real zero trade costs or ignoring them). Such a method
is the two step Heckman sample selection procedure7. The Heckman sample selection
method corrects for, as the name implies, the non-random selected sample bias through
introduction of additional selection equation (besides our trade model) where based on a
set of explanatory variables on the RHS explains the possibility of the LHS of the equation
to be positive (if OTCI is missing). This is done in two steps.
In the first step, a probit estimator is used, which calculates the inverse Mills ratio (λ)
to estimate the probability of selection variable omission form the trade cost model, and
inserts an extra variable that solve the omitted variable bias.
Prob(I = 1 | Z) = Φ(Zκ), (3.10)
where I = 1 if tij > 0, and I = 0 otherwise; Φ is the cumulative distribution function
of the standard normal distribution, Z is explanatory variables on the RHS of the trade
cost model, κ is a vector of undefined parameters. Based on probit estimation, there is a
probability of zero/undefined tij of being positive or not predicted.
In the second step, using predicted probabilities (from the first step) of tij is being a
positive value as an additional explanatory variable, the self-selection bias of the trade cost
model will be corrected. Assuming simply that tij = βXij +eij , the missing trade cost can
be estimated by using Probit estimates from the first step:
E
[
lntˆij | X, I = 1
]
= βX + ρσeλ(Zκ), (3.11)
where ρ is the correlation between unobserved factors of trade costs e and unobserved
propensity to trade ; σe is the standard deviation of e. In this case testing H0 : βλ = 0 |
H1 : βλ > 0 becomes testing for sample selectivity as σe > 0, and ρ > 0 then βλ > 0.
It is important to make sure that error terms are jointly normal when the Heckman
sample selection method is used. Goldberger [68] argue that if the errors are jointly abnor-
mal, then HSSM estimated coefficients are inconsistent. As can be see from the studies, all
methods of estimation have their advantages over the other methods and some limitations.
Thus, estimation of the model has been provided with all the methods. Estimation results
are presented in Table 3.9.
Estimated coefficients across chosen different estimation options are relatively similar.
7in Stata it is Heckman command with the option twostep
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Table 3.9: Estimation results
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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The chosen variables explain 70% on average of the trade cost measure. The resulting
coefficient estimates for the variables have expected magnitude and correlation with the
trade cost measure. Trade costs increase with distance, overland trade, landlockedness
factor, and with NTBs, while the costs reduce with the membership of trading countries
in the same RTA. All of the variables statistically significant determinants of trade cost
measures at 1% level in PPML column, and the other methods confirm that most of the
variables are very significant statistically. However, NTB isn't significant in DVLS esti-
mation, plus it has a negative sign which is in contradiction with the coefficient estimates
of other methods. HSSM finds that tariffs are significant at the 5% level only. As can be
seen from the coefficient values, NTBs, distance and landlockedness are more important
determinants of trade costs. The impact of distance on trade costs can be compensated
with the RTA membership.
Bilateral trade data to calculate the OTCIs comes from the COMTRADE database
for 2009 covering 37 countries with 1369 observations. Because some of trade data is zero
or missing, we obtained only 1101 trade cost measures (meaning that 1/5 of the trade
cost measures is zero). Further data to proxy variables on the RHS of the model comes
from various sources. The weighted tariff rates come from the TRAINS database. The
geographic distances are from CEPII. Dummies for overland trade, landlockedness and
NTBs are constructed by us. In construction of dummies for NTBs, Kee et al. [95] Mar-
ket Access Overall Trade Restrictiveness (MAOTRI) measures are used, excluding tariffs
(MAOTRI_t). In their study, MAOTRI are ad valorem estimates of trade policy distor-
tions that are faced by exporters, and in estimation of MAOTRI over 29 different NTB
measured presented in TRAINS database is used. To note that MAOTRIs are consistent
with the theory of Trade Restrictiveness developed by Anderson and Neary ([3, 4, 5]).
Comparing estimated measures
In columns 1-6 of Table 3.10, we present our estimates of trade cost components for CIS
countries. In column (1), we have mean of ad-valorem level of MOCTIs (based on eq. 8),
and, in columns 2-6, separate components of the OTCIs (eq. 4), namely, policy related
tariff (2) and non-tariff (4) costs, geography related costs (5) and value added costs (6).
Column (3) includes all MOTCI components except tariffs. Decomposed components of
each OTCIs are based on the Heckman method estimates. In further columns (7-13), we
present trade cost measures provided by other studies. The OTCIs in column (7) with its
decomposition into tariff (8) and NTB (9) parts are for the same country group from the
WB-ESCAP database8. Since they use the HRN method, the WB-ESCAP estimates are
the most closest estimates we can compare with. The WB-ESCAP OTCIs are relatively
higher than our MOTCIs. This could be the result of assuming that trade costs aren't
8publicly available at http://artnet.unescap.org/databases.html
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the same between any country-pair (i.e., tij 6= tji) in our measures, unlike WB-ESCAP
assume that tij 6= tji. Besides, they use much larger data9 to construct OTCIs. For the
same reason their aggregate NTB measure (9) is larger in average from our aggregate NTB
(3). However, tariff measures are lower than our tariff measures. In further columns (10-
13), we have policy related trade cost measures for CIS countries from study by Kee et
al. [95]. Those policy cost measures are so-called the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index
(OTRI representing policy trade costs on imports) and the Market Access Overall Trade
Restrictiveness Index (MAOTRI represent policy trade costs applied on exports) which
are theoretically consistent measures with justifications from Anderson & Neary ([3, 4, 5]).
Unlike our method that could be viewed as top-down method of measuring trade costs
implicitly from trade, the OTRI and MAOTRIs measures based on directly observable data
on different trade cost measures, thus can be viewed as bottom-up measures. Kee and
his team have estimated tariff and non-tariff components of OTRIs (10-11) and MAOTRIs
(12-13), and they can be viewed as equivalents of our tariff (2) and non-tariff policy barrier
(4) costs. Their tariff and non-tariff measures are in average lower than our respective
estimates. In case places, components of OTRI are zero or unreported. Such differences
are of course expected as different methods and theoretical concepts are used. Although
there is a possibility that measures of (MA)OTRIs are undermined in the Kee et al. [95]
study due to using available data on trade restricting measures. That there are some
shortcomings in the existing measures of trade restriction has been signified in a number of
studies10. Further, papers that review existing trade cost measures like Anderson and van
Wincoop [7] or Bagai et al. [13] find that available trade restriction measures are limited
in the number of countries, years or sectors they cover. Fugazza et al. [67] also argue
that OTRIs estimated by Kee et al. [95] are only capturing part of NTBs, namely, prices,
quantity measures, monopolistic measures and technical regulations.
9Their database cover OTCIs for 178 countries between 2005-2011.
10Count based measures suffer from a mixed bag issue when standards added up to each other with
matter of their importance (Swann [172]). Notification data that is used to compute coverage and frequency
ratios to explain trade flows (e.g., Disdier et al. [37]) is inconsistently measuring heterogeneity accross
countries in terms of what measures applied and the duration of application. A five-point scale based
measures of standards and regulations used in European Commission [189]) to study the overall effectiveness
of EU policies in removal of TBTs does not indicate how many standards or regulations, nor how stringent
they are. Implicit measures to capture the presence of the amount of standards and regulations by using
dummy or countr variable, frequency, or coverage ratios, but their stringency remains hard to evaluate.
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3.6 Simulations and results
3.6.1 Simulation scenarios
We have three scenarios of possible development of EEU integration. The first scenario
represents the ECU/CISFTA formation case with introduction of appropriate changes in
the tariff rates and elimination of internal border barriers within the territory of the troika
(and two other possible joiners, Kyzgystan and Armenia). In two further scenarios, which
are seen as the SES/EEU formation cases, we provide changes in the structure of non-tariff
policy barriers, and also changes in transport related and value added costs based on the
EU experience.
Scenario 1
In Scenario 1, we consider tariff and border changes due to the EEU formation. The
benchmark custom rates for each region in the model are in weighted tariff rate forms
for the year 2009 (i.e., for pre-ECU/CISFTA period) and the counterfactual tariff rate
are for the year 2012 (i.e., post-ECU/CISFTA period). The tariff data is taken from the
WITS database (with the use of the GTAP classification option). Because by the year
2012 harmonization of the tariffs among troika members is done by about 80% (but full
harmonization is expected to be reached before 2015), and because in this scenario we
want to have full tariff impact, we applied further slight changes in the tariff rate for the
members. The WB [193] study reported expected full changes in the tariff rates by 2015 for
Kazakhstan which we used to adjust tariff rate for Kazakhstan in our counterfactual case.
Further, we have another two regions in the model (Armenia and Kyrgyzstan) which will
be also joining the union soon, and their tariff structure will go through the harmonization
stage. However, since we are using weighted tariff rates, their post-ECU tariffs will not
be the same as of the troika. We approximate % change in weighted tariffs of Armenia
and Kyrgyzstan based on the % change for Kazakhstan as pre-ECU tariff rates of the
two countries were more or less close to the rates of Kazakhstan. The benchmark and
counterfactual aggregate weighted import tariffs of CIS and ROW are given Table 3.11-
3.12.
Scenario 2a
In Scenario 2a, we assume that mainly the institutional, transport and communication
developments, and harmonization of NTMs and the standards occur. Firstly, we intro-
duce trade costs (other than costs arising from the tariffs) which are tariff equivalents of
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Table 3.11: CIS trade weighted import tariff changes
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Table 3.12: ROW trade weighted import tariff changes
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the decomposed OCTIs (non-tariff policy costs, transportation costs and the value added
costs).
Regarding the non-tariff policy related costs, most CGE studies model them as resource
costs that will dissipate, however, part of the non-tariff policies are in the form rent-seeking
measures, thus it is convenient to assume that only some part of the non-tariff policy costs
will dissipate. To proxy the share of rent-seeking non-tariff policy costs, we used Fugaza
et al. [67]. In their study, they provide the proportion of rent-seeking of non-tariff policy
barriers by industry types (although the industrial split introduced in their paper is not
entirely the same as ours). The proxied non-tariff policy (with the split into rent-seeking
and resource costs), transportation and value added costs for each region in the model are
presented in the Table 3.13 which are assumed as the benchmark trade costs. However,
we model the costs related to rent-seeking non-tariff policy barriers as tariffs meaning that
they bring revenues, while the other type of costs are modelled as resource costs.
To capture the impact of deeper integration, we introduce changes in trade costs. To
identify in what way and by how much the costs change, we used the WB-ESCAP trade
costs database. The database cover trade costs for year 2009 (pre-ECU period) for EU and
CIS countries separately, and also include the OTCIs decomposition into tariff and non-
tariff components. Note that these measures are the geometric means of NTBs between
each country pair which is not what we want. Further, the NTBs from the database
contain all the other costs (leaving tariffs out) and includes policy, transport, border and
other possible trade costs. In Table 3.14, we have the NTBs measures from the database
for the EU and the CIS countries for the year 2009 from the database. As can be seen,
the mean of NTBs of the EU and the EEU group are different in many ways. We assume
in this scenario that due to further deeper integration the NTB structure of the EEU will
be restructured in the way we observe for the EU. This assumption is possible as the EEU
integration is based on the EU integration experience. We use only % differences between
the NTBs of the EU and the EEU to reflect possible changes in the policy related NTB
costs of the EEU. Because WB-ESCAP NTBs contain transport, policy and value added
costs, the changes will be evenly over our benchmark NTBs related to transport, policy
and value added costs.
Scenario 2b
Costs and barriers in trade will be lower for bigger members compared to smaller members
of a union. In Figure 3.5, we present the level of OTCIs for EU countries averaged for
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Table 3.13: Benchmark transport, policy and value added trade costs
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Table 3.14: Trade cost structure: EEU vs EU (based on the WB-ESCAP data)
period of 2005-2011 (based on WB-ESCAP trade cost database). It can be seen that some
EU countries (such as Germany, UK, Netherlands, Italy, France and Belgium) have lower
trade cost relative to the other EU countries. For instance, trade costs added on top of
import or export commodity from/to Germany (58%) are almost three times lower than
respective trade costs to Cyprus (160%).
In Scenario 2b, we apply percentage differences between the NTBs of the EU from
the EEU (like in the Scenario 2a). The important difference (from Scenario 2a) is that
members of the union will not be treated equally this time. In the previous case, we use
the means of EU and EEU NTBs without differentiating members with the groups in other
words treating all the members the same way, however, this time we do.
By looking at country pair trade costs of separate EU states (from the WB-ESCAP
database), instead of region-pair trade cost measures of aggregate EU region as in Scenario
2a, we noticed that the NTBs for bigger EU countries (namely, UK, Germany, Italy and
France) are smaller than smaller EU members (the other EU states). Considering the
asymmetry of sizes of the EEU members, it is reasonable to assume that the structure
of the Russian NTBs will change to (or become like) that of the bigger EU members
while the structure of the NTBs of the other members of the union (which are treated as
smaller ones) will become relatively similar of the NTBs of the smaller EU states. We
think that such a scenario is a realistic one, as Russia, indeed, has bigger bargaining power
thus its NTBs will be lower than its level for smaller members of the union. In Table 3.15,
we provide with NTB structure of bigger and smaller EU states along NTB structure
of the bigger (Russia only) and smaller EEU states. Similarly as in Scenario 2a, we
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Figure 3.5: OTCIs of EU countries (for 2005-2011 period)
consider that NTB structure of bigger EEU NTB structure will become like of bigger
EU NTB one, and of smaller EEU members like of smaller EU. Similarly to Scenario
2a, in this scenario the changes in NTBs will be evenly over our benchmark NTBs related
to transport, policy and value added costs.
3.6.2 The results
The outcomes of the Scenario 1
Table 3.16 presents the simulation results for Scenario 1. The introduction of common
external tariffs will be beneficial for the union members in terms of revenues associated with
tariffs. Due to the larger increases in tariff rates for Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan,
we find that approximate respective increases in their tariff revenues by 41%, 56% and 43%
in respective order. Russia and Belarus are the winners in this case. Because, it is decided
to collect all the tariff revenues from all the members into one pool and redistribute them
among members based on their weights (% share of each members, not by what each
country collects) then it is clear that Russia (and at slightly lesser degree but still Belarus
also) is better off in this situation.
134
Table 3.15: Trade cost structure: Bigger vs Smaller states
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Table 3.16: The simulation results (scenario 1)
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In terms of the impacts on trade, there is trade creation for Russia (0.52%) and a
trade diversion effect for the other members. Overall exports of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Armenia, and overall imports of Belarus, Armenia and Russian will reduce by 2-
5% implying that net trade is now negative, and trade creation within the union didn't
compensated the losses from the loss of trade with the ROW for smaller members of the
union. The reductions are mainly due to increase of trade barriers in tariffs toward non-
member regions. Also to note that the changes in tariffs occur not only for the members
but in a multilateral manner in our scenario  the non-members regions tariffs will be
restructured which impacts of the results of trade also. Further, even if for some members
which experienced larger change in tariff levels, yet their decision to trade depends on
relative overall trade barriers (that include non-tariff costs) via the multilateral resistances.
The net change in trade (including trade with non-member regions) is positive only for
Russia is positive although imports have reduced.
Despite the losses in trade with non-member regions and gains in tariff revenues, the
results for consumer gains show that Belorussian and Kyrgyz consumers' welfare improves.
Due to the increases in consumer prices for Kazakhstan and Armenia, and aggregate re-
ductions of labour earnings in Russia reduces consumer utility by about 0.8% annually in
those countries.
Aggregate production will be positive for Kazakhstan, Russia and Armenia at the
rate of 0.43-0.78% annually. Growth in Kazakh production is mainly due to TW and
UC sector, for Russia in TW and EX sectors, and for Armenia in TW and LM sectors.
Belarussian production fell by 0.83% and this is mainly because of the reduction of its
exports of agricultural products to non-member regions. Kyrgyz production will suffer
with reductions of demand for goods of EX and OS sectors.
Regarding the net changes for non-member regions, the tariff revenues of Georgia en-
large by about 20 % while XCA revenues will drop by the similar rate. The ROW also
increases its tariffs to the ECU members and receives some revenue (6.13%). Except AZE
and XCA, the rest of the regions will reduce their trade with the EEU countries. The
welfare of the majority of the non-member CIS countries will be reduced.
The outcomes of the Scenario 2a even
Further EU like restructuring of the NTBs will bring (relative to Scenario 1 ) bigger changes
(see Table 3.17 ). Net import increase by 1-3 % for all the members, while net exports re-
duces for Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan significantly by 34%, 17% and 9% respectively
.
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Table 3.17: The simulation results (scenario 2a)
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With further reduction of NTBs, the revenues associated with rent-seeking NTBs also
reduce and relative reductions are larger for Russia (-10%), Belarus (-29%) and Armenia
(-21%).
Despite the losses in trade and the NTB revenues, the results for consumer gains are
positive for all the members. Larger utility gains are for Kyrgyz and Belorussian consumers
(by 6-7% in average), and at about 2% level for the other members. We record an increase
in labor earnings for Armenia but in Kazakhstan wages will drop by 2.8%.
Aggregate production will be positive only for Armenia at 0.45% rate annually. Rus-
sian production will drop by average of 2% for all the sectors except EX sector. Larger
production reductions in LM for Kazakhstan (-11%), in EX sector for Belarus and Arme-
nia (-12%). Although Armenia manages to improve its production in LM and HM sectors,
while Kyrgyzstan in UC (10.6%) sector.
Regarding the net changes for non-members, the tariff revenues will improve for Azer-
baijan by 10.6% and Ukraine by almost 3%. All non-member CIS regions experience trade
creation with the ROW.
The outcomes of the Scenario 2b uneven
In this scenario, asymmetry is assumed with a bias of net gains in favor of Russia. Thus,
Russia declines its NTBs slightly and receives the revenue from rent-seeking NTBs by
7% less; while for Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Armenia those barriers will be reduced
significantly and their revenues therefore increases by 42-61%. If the revenues from rent-
seeking NTBs will be distributed in the bases of the weights then Russia and, at lesser
degree, Belarus are the winners (see Table 3.18 ).
In terms of impact on trade, Russia gains as its export volume increases (by 8%) as in its
imports (by 5.5%). Except slight improvement in Kazakh export and Kyrgyz imports, the
net trade for smaller members is negative. Trade of Armenia reduces by 6-7 %, Belorussian
import by 5.9%, Kazakh import and Kyrgyz export by average of 2%.
Despite losses in trade , welfare of consumers of member regions will improve, however
mainly Russian. Utility for Russia increases by 4.4%, Armenian by 1.3% and at level of
0.1-0.3% for the rest of the members.
Negative aggregate changes in production side of the member regions in several sectors.
For Kazakhstan, reductions are in almost all sectors except UC and TW. Armenia will
experience output expansion in PF, TW, LM and HM, and Belarus in sector of ML (2%)
and TW (5%). 5-8% reductions for Russia industries excepts EX (+2.2%) and OS (3.6%)
sectors.
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Table 3.18: The simulation results (scenario 2b)
140
The net changes for non member regions, the tariff revenues changes are at similar level
as they were in Scenario 2a where now Georgia enlarge by about 22 % while XCA revenues
will drop by -18%, the ROW also increases its tariffs to the ECU members and receives
some revenue (4.2%). The regional non-member countries will experience reductions in
their trade but export and import of the ROW will improve by 1.3-1.6%.
3.7 Conclusion
From the study we draw two main conclusions that, firstly, the impact of deeper integration
(future coming policy changes) will be larger than the impact of shallow integration (policy
changes until the current period), and, secondly, the gains from the integration shrink for
smaller members if the bigger member(Russia) exercises its bargaining power.
The impact of deeper integration of the Eurasian Bloc of countries will have a larger
impact compared to shallow integration. The changes throughout major indicators are
much higher in Scenario 2a and 2b (i.e. deeper integration scenarios) compared to the
respective changes in indicators of Scenario 1 (i.e. shallow integration). Technically speak-
ing, this is due to (1) the larger share of non-tariff barriers in the trade costs, relative to
tariff ones; (2) the assumption that in scenario 1 only tariff changes occur, while in further
scenarios non-tariff barrier changes.
The gains from integration shrink for smaller members if bigger member(s) exercise
its(their) bargaining power. This can be observed from comparison of outcomes of Scenario
2a (equal treatment of members and no bias toward Russia) and Scenario 2b (unequal
treatment of members with bias toward Russia). The results of Scenario 2b show that
the indicators for Russia improve while the indicators for smaller members become worse,
comparing to the respective indicators for the members in Scenario 2a. This suggests
that if Russia will exercise its bargaining power and influence decisions of supranational
institutions/smaller members for its own use then this will cause an unequal distribution
of gains in favor of Russia. The EEU is a modern and far-reaching attempt at economic
integration, but one that is weakened by internal and conceptual contradictions. What
was designed as a geo-economic framework is increasingly becoming a geopolitical issue.
In attempting to counter the influence of the EU's alternative integration regime (the
Eastern Partnership), Russia has shifted its diplomacy from persuasion to coercion, and
Moscow is increasingly resorting to using the EEU as a foreign policy tool. The countries of
the entredeux  literally, something placed between two things  are being forced to face to
a geopolitical choice they had been trying to avoid, or at least to defuse. Divisive domestic
politics, separatism, structural dependencies and the economic and political calculations
of internal actors are key factors mediating and complicating their choice.
There are some limitations and caveats that this study considers as areas for future
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research. Firstly, this study doesn't take into account all the possible policy changes which
is partially explained by the fact that there is yet uncertainty about what specific policies
will be undertaken during deeper integration of EEU region. Moreover, this study doesn't
consider the impact of Russian WTO entry in 2012, or the impact of Western sanctions
toward Russia, which impact on the wellbeing of Russia and the existing EEU members
as at macro and at micro level negatively. Although our results capture the impact of
enlargement of the union with Kyrgyzstan and Armenia as the next joiners.
In this study, unlike previous studies we find, we introduce two assumptions related to
modelling non-tariff barriers and multilateral changes in trade costs. CGE studies we find
normally assume that non-tariff barriers are protective measures, and there is no revenue
received by official bodies of countries that impose the measures and thus, any revenue
from non-tariff measures will be dissipate. However, some non-tariff barriers are imposed
for rent seeking purposes too like licensing costs, for instance. Some studies (Racine [144],
Maliszewska et al. [116]) also argue that some part of NTBs is imposed for rent-seeking
purposes in the CIS region. Besides, tariffs and NTBs are seen as substitutes rather
than complements meaning that NTBs can be also viewed as tariffs, though perhaps not
all NTBs. Kee et al. [95] run regressions by controlling for country and product fixed
effects, and results shown that tariffs and NTBs are substitutes to each other. For this
reasons, unlike previous CGE studies, in our simulations we assumed that part of NTBs
are rent-seeking. However, our split of NTBs into rent-seeking and non-rent parts based on
proxies from Fugaza et al. [67]. We haven't exclusively dealing with introducing measuring
techniques of the parts of NTBs, and besides there is no clear data exist for appropriate
further decomposition into the rent and non-rent parts of the costs. It will be interesting
to see new studies that could offer new methods or databases with the measures.
Another distinguishing point of this study is that the assumption about policy change
considered in simulations not only of the EEU region or in all regions in the model. This
is possibly a new feature, too, of this study. Usually, the CGE studies which analyse
the impact of a certain policy change in a certain region make no assumptions about
policy changes in all other regions. However, any economic relations (export, import
etc.) in a CGE model are bilateral (if only two regions) or multilateral (if more than two
regions), therefore, policy changes also occur in bilateral/multilateral manner too. While,
for instance, region A changes its policy toward regions B and C, as a response, the B
and C regions also change their policies toward region A as each country consider optimal
position which can change due to the course of policy development in other regions too.
Of course, CGE is a forward looking method, it is usually difficult to make assumptions
about responses of other regions toward region which is undertaking a certain reform.
However, in all of our scenarios, we provide multilateral policy changes, not only in the
EEU region. This was possibly for us to do as we had actual data on changes in tariff
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structure not only of EEU members, but also of other regions in the model. Unlike the
studies that provided a pure impact of external tariff changes, by taking into account
tariff changes in non EEU regions, our scenario 1 provide with more realistic impact of
shallow integration. In scenarios of deeper integration, non-tariff trade cost structure
also change in multilateral manner based on results of current trade cost structure of the
EU. Possibly, there no guarantee that EEU integration would proceed in the same way
the EU developed, and changes in the course of deeper integration might go in some other
way.
Appendix 3: CGE model structure
The CGE model we use for this study has been developed by Dr Huw Edwards and pre-
viously employed in Edwards ([47, 49]). In this study we modify the CGE model by
aggregation and classification of regions, sectors and factors. This model based on an im-
perfectly competitive market structure of a Dixit-Stiglitz style. Based on Dixit and Stiglitz
[38], in this model, we assume that a sector, i, contains a large number of goods produced
by firms competing in the same market in the various regions. Each commodity, g, is
produced in one country, c, only. Section 3.3 outlines the theoretical framework of this
type of model. The assumption is that various types of commodities produced within each
region and sector, nc,i, is immobile. The advantage of the framework of the model is that it
allows us to model monopolistic markups which is impossible in Armington setup. There
are two types of factors of production in the model, namely, capital and labor. Capital
is mobile between regions but labor only within each region. The producer price of each
commodity contains production costs and a markup, but before each commodity will be
used for the final consumption, it will also contain constant some trade costs. Therefore,
we introduce trade costs (proxied with the method previously described in Section 3.4 )
in a price-wedge form, instead of traditional transport margins. There are three types
of trade costs, namely, transportation, policy and value added costs where part of policy
costs are distinguished as rent-seeking costs that generate revenue for official bodies of
each region in the model (i.e., import tariffs, licensing etc.) and the rest of the costs are
modelled as resource costs meaning that any revenue from such costs will dissipate. The
rest of this section provide with mathematical description of our model.
Notation used to denote dimension of each variable in the structure below: c(g) for
commodities (there is 10 aggregate type of commodities), s(i) sectors (same number as
commodities, i.e., 10 sectors), and r(c) stand for regions (there is 11 regions).
Commodity Production. The value added production function of each firm is formed
from labor and capital inputs and modelled in a standard Cobb-Douglas function:
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V Ac = θr,sL
(1−βr,s)
c K
βr,s
c , (3.12)
where V A is value added (quantity), L is labor and K is capital. θ is a scale parameter and
β is a share parameter. We do not provide further distinction between types of labor and
capital for simplification purposes of our analysis. The cost of all inputs is, as normally for
a benchmark, assumed to equal to 1 for any firm of any region. To obtain an equation for
the whole sector s in region r, we assume all firms commodity c within s in a given region,
r, are identical in terms of cost, inputs, output and market share. We also choose units so
that θr,s = 1. Differentiating (3.12) with respect to K and L and setting value of marginal
products equal to the wage rate and capital return rate gives
Lr,s = V Ar,cPVr,sβc,i(1− βc,i)/W r, (3.13)
Kr,s = V Ar,sPVr,sβr,s/Rr,s, (3.14)
where W denote the wage rates for labour, and R denotes return on capital. Labour is
assumed to be mobile between sectors, but not between regions, so that wage rates are
equal across sectors. Land is sectorally immobile, while capital is mobile between sectors
in each region (for benchmark case) and internationally between regions (in counterfactual
case). Hence, we fix R within each region:
Rr,s = RBr. (3.15)
The price of value added is given by
PVr,s = (W rLr,s +RrKr,s)/V Ar,s. (3.16)
At the top nest of production, the output of commodity of sector s is produced by a
combination of other sectors' commodities ss, and value added, V A. This is done again
using a Cobb-Douglas production function
Yr,s = Ωr,sV A
αvr,s
r,s
∏
ss
II
αIr,ss,s
r,ss,s , (3.17)
where Y is top level output, II is the input of commodity of other sectors ss into the
commodity of sector s and the α coefficients are input shares which sum to unity. Cost-
minimisation exercises gives inputs:
IIr,ss,s = αIr,sYr,sPYr,s/PUr,ss,s, (3.18)
where PY is the unit output price and PU is the unit input price, and
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V Ar,s = αvr,sYr,sPYr,s/PVr,s. (3.19)
The marginal cost, PPY , of producing output, Y , is derived from the input costs per
unit output:
PPYr,ss = (V Ar,ssPVr,ss +
∑
s
IIr,s,ssPUr,s)/Yr,ss. (3.20)
Trade and the commodity aggregation. We assume that in each region we have
one aggregate consumer,who obtains utility by aggregate consumption of commodities
using a two-level nested utility function: lower nest consumption, the different varieties of
commodities within sector s are aggregated using a Dixit-Stiglitz utility function. Then
at the top nest consumption, the aggregate commodities bundle for each sector, s, are
combined to provide aggregate utility using a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The total
demand in region r for produce of sector s is denoted as TUr,s. This is an aggregate
bundle of all the commodities, c, which belong to sector s, using a Dixit-Stiglitz demand
function:
TUr,s = (
∑
c
γc,rU
ρ
c,r)
1/ρ, (3.21)
where Uc,r is use of commodity c in region r and γ is a parameter reflecting qualitative
factors (e.g. compatibility of standards) and home bias in consumption. ρ is a substitu-
tion parameter, where ρ = (σ − 1)/σ, where σ is the elasticity of substitution between
commodities c in sector s (assumed to be the same in all regions and across sectors).
If we assume there are nrr,s firms in region rr making commodity in sector s, and
that the γ preference parameter depends only on region of origin, rr, region of use, r,
and sector, s, then we can rewrite (3.21) in order to sum, first, the different commodity
varieties of sector s, c ∈ (rr⋂ s), which are produced in region ss (which all carry the
same γ preference parameter), and then to sum across regions:
TUr,s = (
∑
rr
∑
c∈(rr⋂s)γcc,c,iUρg,c,i)1/ρ. (3.22)
The assumption that all firms within an industry/country are identical in size allows
us to rewrite (3.22) in terms of the total purchases of goods class i by country cc from
country c, QUi,c,cc and the total number of firms in that industry in producing country i:
TUcc,i = (
∑
c
nciγi,c,cc(QUi,c,cc/nc,i)
ρ)1/ρ, (3.23)
where c is a CES share parameter, and ρ is an elasticity-related parameter, related to the
elasticity of substitution σv by the formula:
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ρ = (σ − 1)/σ. (3.24)
Total expenditure in region rr on commodity in sector s (by final consumers and
intermediate users) is calculated by summing final user price multiplied by the volume for
all commodity c in sector s.
V Urr,s =
∑
r
QUs,r,rrPUUs,r,rr (3.25)
This is then used to compute the price of PU of the aggregate bundle TU :
PUrr,s = V Urr,s/TUrr,s. (3.26)
Top nest of Consumption. Consumers' earnings are divided between the different
sectors s in order to maximise their utility which represented with a Cobb-Douglas utility
function
UTr =
∏
s
CN
βcs,r
s,r , (3.27)
where UT is utility and CN is consumption of produce of sector s in region r by final
consumers (in other words, after deducting intermediates use). The βc coefficients are
expenditure shares, and sum to 1. Consumers' expenditure on each sector, s, CNs,r can
be computed relatively easily from the Cobb-Douglas property that βcs,r is the share of
expenditure on i in total consumers' expenditure in region r, CEr. Hence:
CNs,r = βcs,rCEr/PUr,s. (3.28)
The derivation of total consumers' expenditure is explained below.
Competition and pricing. In a Dixit-Stiglitz model, firms are monopolistic competi-
tors. We assume in this model that each firm produces one commodity, and the com-
modities are symmetrically competitive, with a constant elasticity of substitution between
all commodities in a sector consumed in one region. The own-price elasticity of demand
facing a firm is derived as follows: (1) If the own price elasticity for the aggregate produce
of a sector s is ηs, and if competitors do not change their prices in response to firm, c,
changing its price (Bertrand-Nash equilibrium), then the own-price elasticity facing com-
pany c would be σ+Sc(ηs−σ), where ηs is the top-level elasticity of substitution between
commodities c, and Sc is the value share of firm c in demand for sector s. If Sc is small
(i.e., n is large) the own price elasticity would be approximately equal to σ; (2) Within
export markets, it is assumed that a firm has a very small market share and so its own-price
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elasticity is σ; (3) By contrast, in the home market region r, the firm's market share Sc,r
is assumed to be significant. It is computed as Sc,r = (1/nr,s)(1− SMr,s), where SMr,s is
the share of imports in consumption of commodity of sector s in region r. Since the top
level of the consumption function (where different sectors' products are aggregated) is a
Cobb-Douglas function in our model, the own price elasticity for the aggregate product of
sector s, ηs = 1. Consequently, the firm's own price elasticity in the home market:
ηhr,s = σ + (1/nr,s)(1− SMr,s)(1− σ), (3.29)
where, if HU denotes consumption from domestic suppliers and PTs,r,rr is the price at
which it sells (including taxes), then
SMr,s = 1−HUr,sPTs,r,rr/V Ur,s. (3.30)
4) The overall own price elasticity for a firm's sales is taken as a weighted average (by
sales) of its own-price elasticity in the home and export markets.
ηor,s = ηhr,s(HUr,s/Yr,s) + σ(Yr,s −HUr,s/Yr,s) (3.31)
5) We assume that the number of firms is fixed, we fix the value of ηoci too. Monopolistic
competition markups: it is assumed that the firm marks up its production costs by a
proportion MMr,s, where
MMr,s = 1/(1− (1/ηor,s))− 1 (3.32)
The price of commodity c including monopoly markups is therefore:
PMr,s = PYr,s(1 +MMr,s) (3.33)
It is assumed that no monopoly margin is charged on import tariffs (the justification
being that importer-region can buy the commodity in another region if the manufacturer
starts price discrimination between markets).
Resource costs. There are three type of resource costs in the model, namely, transport,
policy and value added costs. By resource costs it meant the costs that are dissipate and
bring no revenue to official bodies of each region. The costs are measured using actual
bilateral trade flows with inverted gravity method, and introduced exogenously. Thus, the
output price in international trade enlarge by some value of resource costs that associate
with transportation, policy restrictions and value addings on commodity of sector s from
region r to sell in region rr is
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PTRs,r,rr = PMr,s(1 + Transs,r,rr + SNTBs,r,rr + V ACs,r,rr), (3.34)
where Transs,r,rr is the transport and other distance related cost, SNTBs,r,rr are non-
tariff policy barrier related resource costs, V ACs,r,rr is value added cost (that occur through
reselling, distribution, advertising and other work by other firms that provide additional
work and add extra value on top of the cost of traded commodities.
Rent-seeking costs. We have two types of rent-seeking costs: tariff and non-tariff policy
costs. By rent seeking costs we mean the costs associated with policies used by the official
bodies of each region to restrict or motivate trade but at the same time those costs are
paid costs by traders and bring some real revenue to the budget of each region that import
the policies. Tariffs on imports of sector s from region r into region rr are expressed as a
percentage rate. Consequently, the price including resource and rent-seeking costs is
PTs,r,rr = PTRs,r,rr((1 + trfs,r,rr +RNTBs,r,rr)/100). (3.35)
The price above is also the price of produce of sector s from region r consumed in region
rr, PUUs,r,rr, that include taxes on use of s in rr, which applies to both domestically-
produced and imported varieties. Hence, the price facing consumers is
PUUs,r,rr = PTs,r,rr. (3.36)
Exports. We define consumption (final and intermediate) in region rr of commodity of
sector s produced in region r as
QUs,r,rr = Xs,r,rr/(1 + Transs,r,rr +NTPBs,r,rr + V ACs,r,rr) if rr 6= r or HUs,r if rr = r,
(3.37)
where Xs,r,rr is the corresponding volume of exports, and (Transs,r,rr + NTPBs,r,rr +
V ACs,r,rr) is the proportion which `melts' (to use the iceberg analogy) en route between
the regions. The equation for aggregating QU within each sector, equation (3.23), has
already been explained.
Total Use and Sales shares. We then differentiate (3.23), setting price equal to
marginal utility, to calculate QUs,r,rr as a function of total use of products of sector s
in region rr, TUcc,i and the relative price of input of s from region rr, PUUs,r,rr compared
to that of aggregate use of s in region rr, PUrr,s. Hence, taking
TUrr,s = (
∑
r
nr,sγs,r,rr(QUs,r,rr/nc,i)
ρ)1/ρ, (3.38)
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we differentiate with respect to QU , and set the resulting marginal product equal to
PUU/PU , giving
dTUrr,s/dQUs,r,rr = n
1−ρ
r,s γs,r,rrQU
ρ−1
s,r,rr(
∑
r
nr,sγs,r,rr(QUs,r,rr/nr,s)
ρ)(1−ρ)/ρ, (3.39)
= n1−ρr,s γs,r,rr(TUrr,s/QUs,r,rr)
1−ρ = PUrr,s/PUUs,r,rr. (3.40)
.
This is easily rearranged:
QUs,r,rr = TUrr,snr,s(γs,r,rrPUrr,s/PUUs,r,rr)
1/(1−ρ). (3.41)
Aggregate consumer price. The total value of expenditure on commodity s in region
r is given by
V Urr,s =
∑
r
QUs,r,rrPUUs,r,rr. (3.42)
The aggregate consumer price ofr s in rr,
PUrr,s = V Urr,s/TUrr,s. (3.43)
Factor markets. Labor is immobile between regions, but mobile between sectors within
each region. The wage is assumed to clear each labor market, so that total labor use by
all sectors equals the labor endowment of region r
LUr =
∑
s
LU r,s. (3.44)
Capital is fully mobile between sectors. A further assumption is that capital is fixed
to each region for short run period (i.e., when shallow integration such as formation of
the customs union) and mobile internationally in the long run period (i.e., when deeper
integration occur with formation of the Eurasian Economic Union and harmonization of
non-tariff barriers occur). Hence
Kr =
∑
s
Kir,s. (3.45)
Where Kr is allowed to be zero in the short run and non-zero (so that there are
international transfers of capital) the global total of K is set to zero.
∑
r
Kr = 0. (3.46)
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The rate of return on capital in each sector is equated to the national rate of return,
RBr:
Rr,s = RBr. (3.47)
Variety of goods. The model assumes that all commodities within a sector are produced
by separate firms. Each firm within a region is of identical size, though the average company
size may vary between regions. For sensitivity analysis, the fixed firm numbers version of
the model assumes the total number of firms in each country is fixed,
nr,s = nr,s. (3.48)
National accounts. Home use of commodities from sector s in region r, HUr,s, is defined
as total production in region r less exports.
HUr,s = Yr,s −
∑
rr
Xs,r,rr. (3.49)
Imports of s from region rr to region r are equal to exports from rr to r deflated to
take account of resource costs. Where r = rr (i.e., the variable IDENr,rr equals 1), total
use of commodity s in region r produced in region rr equals home use. Otherwise (when
IDENr,rr equals 0), total use equals imports from rr to r. As mentioned earlier, there are
two sources of rent via policy: use tariffs and non-tariff measures used by exporter-region
and importer-region in international trade. Revenue from the sources is given by
TUYr = (
∑
s
HUr,sPTs,rr + (
∑
rr
PTs,rr,rEXs,rr,r/(1 + Transs,r,rr+ (3.50)
+SNTBs,r,rr + V ACs,r,rr)))(1 + trfs,r,rr +RNTBs,r,rr).
Total consumer expenditure in region r, CEr, is taken as equaling value added from
all sectors in C
+ monopoly profits from all sectors in region r
+ total revenue from imposement of rent-seeking measures in region r
- total subsidies
- the trade balance of region r (assumed to be constant and exogenous)
- interest on net capital imports paid at the world rate.
Hence,
CEr =
∑
s
V Ar,sPVr,s+
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+
∑
ss
∑
s
IIr,s,ssPIIr,s,ss
∑
s
∑
rr
EXs,rr,rPTs,rr,r (trfs,r,rr +RNTBs,r,rr)
−BOTr −
∑
s
∑
ss
IIr,s,ssPIIr,s,ss. (3.51)
The Balance of Trade, BOTr, (including long-term net capital payments) is represented
as
BOTr =
∑
s
∑
rr
EXs,r,rrPMr,s −
∑
rr
EXs,rr,rPMrr,s −KrRBr. (3.52)
We include long-term net capital payments because capital is internationally mobile in
the long run case: we would expect interest to be paid at rate RBr on net capital imported
from abroad, Kr, and one would expect this to involve region r either exporting more or
importing less.
Key assumed parameter values. Demand side: The top level utility function is Cobb-
Douglas in functional form (so the elasticity of substitution between consumption of the
produce of each industry, i, is unity). Share parameters for each product class are calibrated
from value shares in total expenditure. The lower level utility function has an elasticity of
substitution between commodity type of c in sector s of σ. This is assumed to equal 5 in
all sectors.
Supply side: production technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, so elasticities of
substitution between inputs are unity, and share parameters can be directly calibrated
from shares in total costs (once monopoly profit has been subtracted from costs). Using
WB BEEPS survey data, firm sizes have been proxied and differentiated across regions
but same within sectors in each region. Larger markets (like the ROW or RUS) have more
firms, and so are more competitive. The main reason for these assumptions is to simulate
the pro-competitive effects of trade liberalisation in reducing monopolistic mark-ups in
smaller, more sheltered economies.
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Discussion and scope for future work
In this thesis, three separate studies have been presented. In the first study (Chapter 1 ),
we have attempted to analyse trade between CA and Russia in 1995-2011 period. Russia
colonized CA over 150 years ago and CA become independent in 1991 only. Head, Mayer &
Ries' (HMR [78]) study finds that in post-colonial period, colony-colonizer trade typically
erode by 60% in 30 years. However, if we consider that Russia and CA relationship as a
colonizer-colony one, then we find that in post-Soviet period their trade is not complying
with HMR predictions. In second study (Chapter 2 ), we investigate the drivers of CACs
trade performance by measuring the contributions of country-specific properties and net-
working factors in 185 bilateral CACs trade flows over the period 1995-2011. In third study
(Chapter 3 ) we attempt to assess the impact of asymmetry and symmetry in bargaining of
members of the Eurasian regional integration using a CGE model along with a number of
inverted gravity trade costs measures. From the results of three separate studies we with-
draw several main implications related to CA-Russia colonial ties, CA policy-performance
linkages and the future EEU integration in the case of asymmetry.
Those main implications are:
 The presence of Soviet socio-economic ties is gradually reducing in post-
Soviet Russia-CA trade, but because of CA specific and Russia specific
factors their trade has been growing.
Under the gravity concept we have decomposed trade patterns into monadic and dyadic
components. Further we compared dynamics of each component with dynamics of variables
over time. As the HMR study predicts, CA-Russia economic ties were cooling down over
the last two decades and dropped by 40% (relative to its level in 1996), however the upward
trend in trade is not explained by dyads but with monads. This implies that based on the
fact that in the post-Soviet period, trade between the CA and Russia trade has diverged
from the expected post-colonial decline because of increasing GDPs and deeper integra-
tion with the world economy. Economic, political and social ties such as traditional trade
specialization (CAC supplies production inputs and Russia refine them), Soviet infrastruc-
tural linkages, commonly spoken Russian and labour migrations have become traditional
part of CA-Russia relationship that are inherited from Soviet era are still highly present
152
in CA- Russia trade as can be observed from intra-industrial trade and specialisations.
Integration to the World market, increase of demand for goods and investments for energy
sectors of CA, economic co-operations of Russia-CA industries, easing tariff and NTBs via
multilateral regional trade agreements are the main driving forces behind Russia CA trade.
 The socio-economic environment in CAC is heterogeneous, and this is
because of open or isolationist policies used by the CAC that effected their
economic performance.
First of all, while all CAC have experienced growing trade since the end of the 1998 Rus-
sian crisis, this does not mean that the countries are homogeneous. In fact, while they
share aspects of culture, history and landlockedness, CAC show considerable variety in
initial conditions (size, population, resource base, specialisation). Moreover, in terms of
transitional reform, there is a considerable divergence between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzs-
tan, in the reformist camp, and the other CAC. Reform in terms of trade tends to be
strongly correlated with other transitional reforms. Further, we note that trade has grown
considerably in all countries, reflecting the rise in Russian and regional incomes (following
stabilisation and oil/gas price recovery). Oil and gas exporters have particularly benefited.
However, the evidence is that the more isolationist states have simply relied on these, pos-
sibly fortuitous factors to boost their trade, whereas the more reform-minded states have
achieved considerable trade growth through reducing trade costs. Hence, the growth and
fluctuations in trade of the more isolationist economies Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan are driven by changes over time in monadic variables (primarily GDP) while
trade partnerships of the more open economies Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are driven
roughly equally by dyadic variables (changes in trade costs) as well as monadic variables.
 The more open CAC are more sensitive to the changes in the global
economy, unlike the more isolationist CAC.
With globalization and worldwide liberalisation, open CA countries build more trade
connections that raise income and welfare. However, there are also some negative implica-
tions: not just in terms of trade diversion where integration is regional, but also in terms
of vulnerability to shocks. For example, during the 1998 Russian crisis The Euromoney
Risk Ranking for Russia went up from 78 (in December 1997) to 129 (in September 1998).
Observing this situation, Fitch IBCA lowered Russia's International Credit Rating from
B+ to CCC-. As a result, Russian interest rates increased from 3% to 6%. This had
a strong impact upon the CAC, both through monadic effects (GDP in a major export
market reduced), and through trade costs (since access to finance is important for trade).
Kazakhstan, with a common border with Russia, was more exposed than Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan, and was hit by the crisis harder (Westin [182]), although even isolationist
CAC were dependent on Russia as the primary export market for their gas, as dictated
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by pipeline routes. Financial shortages reduced CAC-Russia trade in both directions by
40%. Furthermore, the debt-to-GDP ratio, in early 1999, rose more sharply for small open
CAC, Kyrgyzstan (54%) and Tajikistan (90%), and less for large and more diversified
Kazakhstan (17%) while for isolationist Turkmenistan (1.7%) and Uzbekistan (- 4.4%) the
effect was negligible (Pastor and Damjanovic [129]).
 Trading with all CAC is very costly and this is due to their geolocation,
specificity of transportation system, infrastructure and border barriers
which explains most of trade costs.
The CAC's location in the heart of Eurasia is strategically important but imposes a dis-
advantage in trade. Overland transport costs of goods average $1.380/1000km, almost 10
times higher than by sea ($190/1000km) raising trade costs by 60% as found by Limao
and Venables [108]. Since 90% of CAC trade is by rail, Leamer and Levinsohn [102] rightly
assert that distance matters and it matters a lot. Raballand [142] found that the trade
of landlocked Former Soviet Union countries fell by 80% compared to coastal ones during
1995-1999. Landlocked CAC had to negotiate with bordering coastal states, as well as
other landlocked states controlling routes (Grigoriou, [69]). For example, Uzbekistan is
virtually surrounded by other landlocked countries. Trade barriers imposed by (coastal)
Russia to landlocked CAC were very high (Djarkov and Freud [39]). Even though Uzbek-
istan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan share a border with coastal China, trade is impeded
by the Himalaya-Tibet massif, and the only convenient geographic corridor to China is
the Djunghar Gate of Kazakhstan. Note that the infrastructure and rail roads to China
were built during the Soviet era mostly with strategic considerations (Grigoriou, [69]), and
partly reflect poor Soviet-Chinese relations since the late 1950s. Furthermore, Pittman
[133] finds that reforms to the monopolistic freight railways in the Former Soviet Union
have slowed to a halt over time, and that even the more reform-minded countries (the
Baltics, Russia and Kazakhstan) have not followed the path of Western reforms. Other
factors of importance are the conditions of access and use of CAC's transport infrastruc-
ture (Grigoriou, [69]), CAC access to sea ports (Kulipanova [100]), transit systems in the
region (Raballand [142]).
 Trading with CAC is also difficult and costly due to non-geographic trade
barriers that are linked to trade policies, trade terms and agreements with
regional and non-regional partners.
While our study finds RTA membership to be statistically insignificant, it potentially al-
lows the CAC to lessen transport and transit costs as well as to improve regional transport
infrastructure and create transport corridors. However, the complexity of regional trade
partnerships often creates additional obstacles. Moreover, most of the regional RTAs have
had relatively little practical importance (Acharya et al. [1]). The major exception is the
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Eurasian Custom Union (EACU) which unifies the external tariffs of Kazakhstan, Russia
and Belarus. Mogilevskii [120] demonstrates the EACU effect by pointing out that the
trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Russia increased by 28% between 2010-11, while
for the same period growth rate of trade between the CU and OCAC is 19%. Kyrgyzstan is
likely to join the EACU next year and Tajikistan is currently negotiating its membership.
However, Kassenova [94] reports that despite the EACU formation, Kazakhstan still faces
high Russian NTBs. Furthermore, there are serious questions outstanding, especially for
those CACs reluctant to reform like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan who are not showing
any sign of interest in the EACU. Trade barriers, indeed, reach beyond the transport and
border costs, and as mentioned in AvW [7] also include policy costs (tariff and non-tariff
like quotas), cost of information and currency exchange, finance, distribution costs and
trade costs associated with unobservable barriers linked to cultural and historic ties. In-
deed, trade costs as estimated in our gravity formulation will include any costs of business
regulation and/or corruption. Evans et al. [53] suggest that political systems, differences
in education, production, market and industrial structure should be considered as primary
factors of trade. Dow and Karunaratna [40] examine 37 different studies to identify main
psychic distance factors. They find that culture, language, education level, religion, time
zone, industrial development, and political systems are most common factors used in trade
studies. Of these factors, the latter two are likely to be most relevant for the CAC. Inher-
ited from Soviet days, the main industries and infrastructure in CAC are quite outdated,
but the energy rich CAC (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) using oil and gas
revenues have been able to modernize their industries, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan de-
veloped their agrarian sectors. Regarding the political system, the IMF Survey [190] finds
a close correlation between relatively liberal (more accurately less authoritarian) political
systems like in Kyrgyzstan, which are linked to less restrictive trade regimes compared
to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. To conclude: we find a relationship between being an
open/isolationist country and having dyadic/monadic driven trade with other countries.
Open CAC's (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) trade performance is mostly explained by time
varying bilateral factors while the trade performance of isolationist CAC (Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan) is affected mostly by country-specific properties.
 The impact of further EU-like deeper integration (future coming policy
changes) will be larger for the EEU than the impact of the shallow inte-
gration (i.e. ECU and SES impact).
The results from CGE simulations show that impact of deeper  integration of the Eurasian
Bloc of countries will have larger impact comparing to shallow  integration. The changes
throughout major indicators are much higher in Scenario 2a and 2b (i.e. deeper integra-
tion scenarios) relative to the respective changes in indicators of Scenario 1 (i.e. shallow
integration). This is because the share of non-tariff barriers in trade costs are much higher
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than tariffs, and consequently reduction of NTB will cause larger changes than tariff policy.
WB [193] also find that the impact of further integration will be more impactful than the
ECU formation. In their current scenario WB [193] implements the ECU policy changes
(i.e., borders removed and external tariffs harmonized within the troika), and find that
welfare will reduce by 0.2% for Kazakhstan. In their optimistic scenario (they implement
NTB reduction by half within the union and border costs reduce by 25% within troika and
by 10% to ROW), utility improves by 1.5% which is almost 8 times larger, and similar
changes throughout other indicators (i.e., export and import, capital and labor earnings
and adjustments etc.).
 Deeper Eurasian integration will not be optimal for smaller members of
the union if the bigger member(Russia) exercises its bargaining power.
The gains from the integration shrink for smaller members if bigger member(s) exercise its
bargaining power. This can be observed from comparison of outcomes of Scenario 2a (equal
treatment of members and no bias toward Russia) and Scenario 2b (unequal treatment of
members with bias toward Russia). The results of Scenario 2b show that the indicators
of Russia improve while the indicators for smaller members become worse, comparing to
the respective indicators for the members in Scenario 2a. This suggest that if Russia will
exercise its bargaining power and influence decisions of supranational institutions/smaller
members for its own use then this will cause an unequal distribution of gains in favor
of Russia. The EEU is a modern and far-reaching attempt at economic integration, but
one that is weakened by internal and conceptual contradictions. What was designed as a
geo-economic framework is increasingly becoming a geopolitical issue. In attempting to
counter the influence of the EU's alternative integration regime (the Eastern Partnership),
Russia has shifted its diplomacy from persuasion to coercion, and Moscow is increasingly
resorting to using the EEU as a foreign policy tool. The countries of the entredeux 
literally, something placed between two things  are being forced to face to a geopolitical
choice they had been trying to avoid, or at least to defuse. Divisive domestic politics,
separatism, structural dependencies and the economic and political calculations of internal
actors are key factors mediating and complicating their choice.
Limitations in gravity based studies and prospects for further research
During the conduct of the research, we faced several limitations linked to data quality,
estimation and modelling issues, interpretation of results and time constraint. However,
the same limitations open the roads for future research and extension of the work included
to this thesis. We further provide with some limitations of our work and discuss possible
prospects for the future research.
One of such future research prospects are linked to the results of the second study
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where we seemingly found a linkage or correlation between economic performance and
open/protectionism policies. The results of tetrading show that the growth and fluctuations
in trade of the more isolationist economies Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are
driven by changes over time by monadic variables (primarily GDP) while trade partnerships
of more open economies Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are driven roughly equally by dyadic
variables (changes in trade costs) as well as monadic variables. This conclusion is also fits
well with the literature we find. However, can such a linkage be observed in the other
parts of the world? Nowadays the bilateral trade data for the most countries of the world
is available (from sources like WITS and DOTS) and by using the tetrad method with the
larger data, the phenomena we find can be tested in the future.
Another area for future research is testing of the modified GMTC method we offer
to derive new OTCIs and extend their use in empirical studies. Using the original and
modified versions of HMN method, we calculate bilateral overall trade cost measures for
troika. In Figure 4, we plotted the OTCI of the troika that shown that variation of their
bilateral trade costs over time. Now using a modified version of the OTCI, we can see that
trade costs between either pair of troika are not the same. Trade costs for imports from
Kazakhstan to Russia (0.6) were lower relative to imports from Russia to Kazakhstan (0.8)
in 1996, however over time the cost of Kazakh exports to Russia grew by 1.4/0.6% (1.4)
while exporting to Kazakhstan for Russia reduced by 0.7/0.8 (0.7). In Kazakh-Belarus
trade, exporting to Belarus become costly for Kazakhstan, while trade barriers for Belarus
to export to Kazakhstan reduced over time. With being able to obtain OTCIs for a few
years in Belarus-Russia trade, we still can observe that trade costs are much higher for
Belarus to export its commodities to Russia. OTCIs obtained using original HRN method
are the same for each presented pair (and for all the pairs we calculated) which are showing
general trend of trade costs between the pair countries, but not the difference between trade
costs. Besides, from the HRN-OCTIs in the plots, they represent the geometric mean of
trade costs obtained using modified method. However, when we look at the trade costs
by aggregating and average out for each separate country, we observe that the measures
obtained using two methods are not the same. Further differences between the methods and
obtained measuring trade costs could possibly reveal new findings which couldn't possibly
observed or analysed with original HRN method for its theoretically assumed restrictions
of equal trade costs. Using GMTC, Jacks, Meissner and Novy [86] measures long run
trade costs for 130 countries and find that in forty years before WWI trade costs reduced
by 60-70%, and by 16% since WWII. Could we re-measure the costs with modified HMTC
and come up with different results? or with results that provide with new insights for the
Jacks et al. findings?
We previously, in Chapter 3, compared our decomposed trade costs with the mea-
sures provided by Kee et al. [95], however we found that our measures don't fully comply
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with the compared measures. Their tariff and non-tariff measures are in average lower
then our respective estimates. Those policy cost measures are so-called the Overall Trade
Restrictiveness Index (OTRI representing policy trade costs on imports) and the Mar-
ket Access Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (MAOTRI represent policy trade costs
applied on exports) which are theoretically consistent measures with justifications from
Anderson & Neary ([3, 4, 5]). Unlike our method that could be viewed as a top-down
method of measuring trade costs implicitly from trade, the OTRI and MAOTRIs measures
based on directly observable data on different trade cost measures, thus can be viewed as
bottom-up measures. Although there is the possibility that measures of (MA)OTRIs
are undermined in Kee et al. [95] study due to using available data on trade restricting
measures. There are some shortcomings in the existing measures of trade restriction has
been signified in previous studies. Further, papers that review existing trade cost measures
like Anderson and van Wincoop [7] or Bagai et al. [13] find that available trade restriction
measures are limited in the number of countries, years or sectors they cover. Fugazza et al.
[67] also argue that OTRIs estimated by Kee et al. [95] are only capturing part of NTBs,
namely, prices, quantity measures, monopolistic measures and technical regulations. All
of these are reasonable arguments, however, it is yet uncertain and cannot be concluded
that one or the other method is inappropriate. Whether limitations in observable trade
cost data, or measurement errors cause the differences we encounter in the measures are
needs to be examined, tested and explained by further research in this area.
Limitations of CGE work and prospects for futher research
There are some caveats that the CGE study consider as areas for the future research.
Firstly, this study doesn't take into account all the possible policy changes, which is par-
tially explained by the fact that there is yet uncertainty about what specific policies will
be undertaken during deeper integration of EEU region. Moreover, this study doesn't con-
sider the impact of Russian WTO assessment in 2012, or the impact of Western sanction
toward Russia which is impacting on the wellbeing of Russia and the existing EEU mem-
bers as at macro and at micro level negatively. Although our results capture the impact of
enlargement of the union with Kyrgyzstan and Armenia as the next joiners. WB [193] find
that if Kazakhstan become a WTO member than the gains will be four or five times larger
of optimistic forecasts. For instance, if Kazakh welfare at the extreme optimistic case is
1.5% increase annually, in the WTO accession case, Kazakh utility will go up to 6.5%.
In this study, unlike previous studies we find, we introduce two assumption related to
modelling non-tariff barriers and multilateral changes in trade costs. The CGE studies
we find are normally assume that non-tariff barriers are protective measures and there is
no revenue is received by official bodies of countries that impose the measures and thus,
any revenue from non-tariff measures will be dissipate. However, some non-tariff barriers
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are imposed for rent seeking purposes too like licensing cost, for instance. Some studies
(Racine [144], Maliszewska et al. [116]) also argue that some part of NTBs is imposed for
rent-seeking purposes in the CIS region. Besides, tariffs and NTBs are seen as substitutes
rather than complements meaning that NTBs can be also viewed as tariffs, not all NTBs
possibly. Kee et al. [95] run regressions by controlling for country and product fixed effects,
and results shown that tariffs and NTBs are substitutes to each other. For this reasons,
unlike previous CGE studies, in our simulations we assumed that part of NTBs are rent-
seeking. However, our split of NTBs into rent-seeking and non-rent parts based on proxies
from Fugazza et al. [67]. We haven't exclusively dealing with introducing measuring
techniques of the parts of NTBs, and besides there is no clear data exist for appropriate
further decomposition into the rent and non-rent parts of the costs. This will be interesting
to see new studies that could offer new methods or databases with the measures.
Another distinguishing point of this study is that the assumption about policy change
considered in simulations not only of the EEU region or in all regions in the model. This is
possibly a new feature too, of this study. Usually, the CGE studies to analyse the impact
of a certain policy change in a certain region make no assumptions about policy changes in
all other regions. However, any economic relations (export, import etc.) in a CGE models
are bilateral (if only two regions) or multilateral (if more than two regions), therefore,
policy changes also occur in a bilateral/multilateral manner. While, for instance, if region
A changes its policy towards region B and C, as a response, B and C regions also change
their policies toward region A, as each country considers the optimal position which can
change due to the course of policy development in other regions too. Of course, CGE is
a forward looking method, it is usually difficult to make assumptions about responses
of other regions toward region which is undertaking a certain reform. However, in all of
our scenarios, we provide multilateral policy changes, not only in the EEU region. This
was possible for us to do as we had actual data on changes in tariff structure not only of
EEU members, but also of other regions in the model. Unlike the studies that provided
with pure impact of external tariff changes, by taking into count tariff changes in non
EEU regions, our scenario 1 provide with more realistic impact of shallow integration. In
scenarios of deeper integration, non-tariff trade cost structure also change in multilateral
manner based on results of current trade cost structure of the EU. Possibly, there is no
guarantee that EEU integration would proceed in the same way the EU developed, and
changes in the course of deeper integration might go in some other way.
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